The Paradox of Stakeholder Power in Leveraged Buyout Financing: A Multiple-Agency Perspective

2015 ◽  
Vol 2015 (1) ◽  
pp. 13316
Author(s):  
Anantha Krishna Divakaruni ◽  
Miguel LCJ Meuleman
Author(s):  
Salim Chahine ◽  
Igor Filatotchev ◽  
Robert E. Hoskisson ◽  
Jonathan D. Arthurs

This chapter integrates agency research with an institutional perspective and investigates multiple agency conflicts in venture capital (VC) syndicates and their effect on stock-market performance of initial public offerings (IPOs) in the United States and the United Kingdom. Using a matched sample of 402 IPOs, the authors show that the size and diversity of a VC syndicate have a negative impact on performance, but this impact is higher in the United States. Ownership concentration within a syndicate improves performance, but this effect is stronger in the United Kingdom. Results indicate that the extent of multiple agency conflicts and their potential remedies are not universal and depend on formal and informal institutions.


2011 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 48
Author(s):  
William J. Bertin ◽  
Khalil M. Torabzadeh

This paper examines the possible excess returns to stockholders arising from leveraged buyout transactions in an effort to determine whether or not such transactions are consistent with shareholder wealth maximization. In addition, the excess returns generated through leveraged buyouts are compared to those associated with typical, non-leveraged acquisitions. The implications of these comparisons are discussed with a special emphasis on the impact of leveraged buyouts upon investors wealth. The major finding of this study is that shareholder wealth is increased, but not necessarily maximized, under leveraged buyouts.


2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 142-175 ◽  
Author(s):  
Trevor W. Chamberlain ◽  
◽  
Francois-Xavier Joncheray ◽  

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