Introduction

Author(s):  
Paul A. Shackel

Toward the middle of 1897, the UMW (United Mine Workers), later known as the UMWA (United Mine Workers of America), began a strategic push to enroll members in the union in the anthracite region of northeastern Pennsylvania. During several weeks of protest and strikes in mid-August and early September 1897, union leaders began organizing many of the foreign-born, unnaturalized workers in and around Hazleton, Pennsylvania, one of the largest coal industry and commercial support centers in the region. Ironically, earlier that year the UMWA was instrumental in convincing state legislators to pass an anti-immigrant bill that would tax employers for each non-U.S. citizen worker on their payroll. In turn, the coal companies deducted this tax from the workers’ salaries....

2020 ◽  
pp. 67-92

Chapter 3 examines the reasons that caused workers to leave or reject unions. Scholars normally associate union decline with workers disillusion with unionism. This chapter, however, argues that workers’ faith in unionism did not waver as much as their faith in union leaders did. As Gilded Age unions like the United Mine Workers implemented a more centralized hierarchy, local union autonomy waned. As a result, workers doubted whether union leaders made decisions with the workers’ interests in mind, and they left the union when it seemed their leaders went astray. Rather than abandoning unionism altogether, however, many of these individuals formed local unions that rivaled the national unions, indicating that workers had more problems with union leadership than they did with unionism itself.


2020 ◽  
pp. 93-118

This chapter discusses the problems within unions that caused union leadership to treat members differently from one another. It argues that although union leaders often claimed the unions were open to all races and ethnicities, the efforts they pursued favored white laborers over people of color. Stereotypes that associated black miners with strikebreaking and construed non-English-speaking immigrant miners as unintelligent and unskilled cast a shadow over union procedures and the laws unions fought to secure. Even though farmers and white women had less experience in the mines, these individuals were welcomed far more readily than black and immigrant workers who were often highly skilled in the mining trades. In the end, the exclusivity practiced by organizations like the United Mine Workers alienated nonwhite and non-English-speaking workers, giving these groups little reason to join union ranks


2020 ◽  
pp. 119-138

This chapter examines the differences between union leaders and workers regarding union goals. As the 1893 depression set in, rural workers in multiple occupations mobilized to change the economic structures of Gilded Age society. The American Railway Union went on strike, and marchers across the country joined Jacob Coxey and other leaders in a populist push for social and economic change. Their efforts coincided with the centralization efforts of organizations like the United Mine Workers, which sought to capitalize on the grassroots activism by organizing nationwide strikes. Nonunion coal miners heartily joined strike efforts like the 1894 United Mine Workers coal strike, but they soon discovered that the union assumed more authority than the rank and file was willing to accept. As the officers reached a settlement and called off the strike without seeking approval from the rank and file, strikers refused to obey the order to return to work. Their refusal indicated that while workers were willing to use unions to achieve goals like earning higher pay, they rejected union leaders making decisions on their behalf.


ILR Review ◽  
1983 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-69 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeanne M. Brett ◽  
Stephen B. Goldberg

This article describes an experiment in the mediation of grievances that recently took place during two six-month periods in four districts of the United Mine Workers of America. Eighty-nine percent of the 153 grievances taken to mediation during the experiment were resolved before arbitration. This success rate did not appear to be influenced by whether one or both parties had to consent to take a grievance to mediation, or by the identity of the mediator or the nature of the issue, although no discharge grievances were mediated in the experiment. Instead, the key to settlement appeared to be the parties' willingness to negotiate. Cost savings attributable to mediating instead of arbitrating the 153 cases were nearly $100,000, and the average grievance was resolved three months sooner in mediation than it would have been had it gone to arbitration. Most of the participants in the experiment had favorable attitudes toward the process, regardless of the outcome of their particular case.


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