Artefacts in Analytic Metaphysics

2009 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 74-81 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wybo Houkes ◽  
Pieter E. Vermaas ◽  
Keyword(s):  

Disputatio ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (50) ◽  
pp. 201-216
Author(s):  
E. Díaz-León

Abstract The metaphysics of gender and race is a growing area of concern in contemporary analytic metaphysics, with many different views about the nature of gender and race being submitted and discussed. But what are these debates about? What questions are these accounts trying to answer? And is there real disagreement between advocates of differ- ent views about race or gender? If so, what are they really disagreeing about? In this paper I want to develop a view about what the debates in the metaphysics of gender and race are about, namely, a version of metaphysical deflationism, according to which these debates are about how we actually use or should use the terms ‘gender’ and ‘race’ (and other related terms), where moral and political considerations play a central role. I will also argue that my version of the view can overcome some recent and powerful objections to metaphysical deflationism of- fered by Elizabeth Barnes (2014, 2017).


Author(s):  
Craig Callender

How do the views developed in this book connect with traditional work in analytic metaphysics on time? After giving a potted history of the field, the chapter then displays many connections and modifications between that work and the present one. It highlights one major problem with traditional analytic philosophy of time, namely, its focus on bare existence, i.e., what events exist as of when. Almost by definition, existence will play no role in science, so philosophy of time will never be threatened by scientific results. The irony about this maneuver is that creating this safety zone around time leaves philosophers of time unable to do their original job, explaining the temporal phenomena.


2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew J Cull

Analytic metaphysics of gender has taken an ameliorative turn towards ethical and political questions regarding what our concept of gender ought to be, and how gendered society should be structured. Abolitionism about gender, which claims that we ought to mandate gender out of existence, has therefore seen renewed interest. I consider three arguments for abolitionism from radically different perspectives: Haslanger’s simple argument, Escalante’s Gender Nihilism, and Okin’s argument from ideal theory. I argue that none of the above manage to establish the desirability of abolitionism and that we should be wary of the abolitionist position, as it imperils trans lives.


2021 ◽  
pp. 146-157
Author(s):  
Mark Wilson

The grander metaphysical schemes popular in Hertz’s era often suppressed conceptual innovation in manifestly unhelpful ways. In counterreaction, Hertz and his colleagues stressed the raw pragmatic advantages of “good theory” considered as a functional whole and rejected the armchair meditations upon individual words characteristic of the metaphysical imperatives they spurned. Rudolf Carnap’s later rejection of all forms of “metaphysics” attempts to broaden these methodological tenets to a wider canvas. In doing so, the notion of an integrated, axiomatizable “theory” became the shaping tenet within our most conception of how the enterprise of “rigorous conceptual analysis” should be prosecuted. Although Carnap hoped to suppress all forms of metaphysics, large and small, through these means, in more recent times, closely allied veins of “theory T thinking” have instead encouraged a revival of grand metaphysical speculation that embodies many of the suppressive doctrines that Hertz’s generation rightly resisted (I have in mind the school of “analytic metaphysics” founded by David Lewis). The proper corrective to these inflated ambitions lies in directly examining the proper sources of descriptive effectiveness in the liberal manner of a multiscalar architecture.


Author(s):  
Otávio Bueno ◽  
Ruey-Lin Chen ◽  
Melinda B. Fagan

The questions “What is an individual?” and “What things count as individuals?” are classic philosophical inquiries, currently pursued mainly within analytic metaphysics. This volume takes a new approach, reformulating these questions and exploring them from the perspective of scientific practices. The guiding query then becomes: “How do scientists individuate the things they investigate and thus count them as individuals?” In this first chapter, the volume’s editors lay the groundwork for this new approach. The following sections define the problem of individuation, examine the close relation between individuality and individuation, and motivate the approach taken by this volume in the context of relevant literature. Key themes of the subsequent chapters—experimental practice, process, and pluralism—are discussed, as well as a brief introduction to each chapter.


1981 ◽  
Vol 7 ◽  
pp. 553-581
Author(s):  
Dennis E. Bradford ◽  
Keyword(s):  

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