Northern philosophies and professional neocolonialism in occupational therapy: a historical review and critique

ABSTRACT In this article, the authors conduct a historical review of recent philosophies influencing the Occupational Therapy profession in the United States (analytic philosophy and Continental varieties such as neopragmatism). Four philosophical categories are explored: epistemology, axiology, ontology, and praxis. The dominant strand of analytic philosophy is characterized by reductionist views of knowledge and reality, with little sustained attention to ethics and practical action. Competing but lesser recognized Continentally-inspired philosophies offer a critical and more phenomenological approach which values human subjectivities, narratives, and social agency. The authors argue that the dominance of analytic philosophy has created the intellectual foundations for neoliberalism to thrive and permeate the profession of Occupational Therapy in its curricula, practice models, reimbursement systems, and research agenda. As this Northern (United States) version of Occupational Therapy expands globally, the danger exists for professional neocolonialism to occur which can negatively influence or contradict more local ways of knowing and doing. The article concludes by offering strategies to unmask, disentangle, and dismantle Occupational Therapy from its Northern roots towards wider acceptance of Southern epistemologies, ethics, and collective action.

Job's Final Insight, Narratives, and the Brain

In continental philosophy of religion, the hermeneutics of narratives takes a central role. Analytic philosophy of religion, on the other hand, considers religious statements mostly as assertions of fact. It examines the logical form and semantics of religious statements, addresses their logical commitments, and examines their epistemological status. Using the example of a passage in the Book of Job, it is investigated whether the methods of analytic philosophy are also suitable for analyzing religious narratives. The question is explored whether there is a genuine form of knowledge, besides propositional factual knowledge, which is bound to the form of narration. Particular attention will be paid to the inter-personal pragmatic embeddedness of narratives. The connection between second-personal knowledge and narratives is examined. Using the historical example of Ignatius of Loyola's theory of religious knowledge, it is argued that propositional argumentative knowledge is only one form of religious knowledge among others. The others are second-personal and narrative in character. Having thus established this distinct form of knowledge, it is asked whether our best empirical knowledge of the neurophysiological basis of intuitive and non-argumentative cognition provides a foundation for better understanding inter-personal religious cognition within narratives.

Editorial: E. J. Lowe’s Metaphysics and Philosophical Theology

Edward Jonathan Lowe was one of the most distinguished metaphysicians of the last 50 plus years. He made immense contributions to analytic philosophy in as diverse areas as metaphysics, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, philosophical logic, history of Modern philosophy (especially on John Locke), and philosophy of religion

"(In)distinct Languages": Revisiting the Dualism of Literal and Literary Meaning in Roman Jakobson and Donald Davidson

(In)distinct Languages: Revisiting the Dualism of Literal and Literary Meaning in Roman Jakobson and Donald Davidson The paper traces the relationship between the literal and literary language that is found in structuralism and analytic philosophy. The paper’s gist provides a comparative account of Roman Jakobson’s and Donald Davidson’s notions of poetic language and their relation to the general idea of language as it is given in their work. In reconsidering Jakobson’s and Davidson’s arguments, I propose abandoning the dualistic hypotheses of the oppositions between literal and non-literal language, and between literal and literary language. I contend that the notions of first and literal meanings are necessary for other types of interpretation. The dualistic hypothesis requires the cascade model, which displays a bottom-top transition across hierarchically arranged levels of meanings. Instead, I outline the multilayered structure of language with two thresholds: mimetic and semiotic. Therefore, the cascade model should be replaced with the palimpsest model of concurring, merging, and blending layers of meanings. Języki (nie)odrębne. Jeszcze raz o dualizmie znaczeń, dosłownego i literackiego, u Romana Jakobsona i Donalda DavidsonaW artykule poddano analizie relacje między językiem dosłownym a językiem literackim, występujące w strukturalizmie i filozofii analitycznej. W rozważaniach istotna była konfrontacja koncepcji języka poetyckiego Romana Jakobsona i Donalda Davidsona oraz ich związku z ogólną ideą języka, jaką można znaleźć w ich pracach. Rozważając ponownie argumenty Jakobsona i Davidsona, autor proponuje porzucić dualistyczne hipotezy, zasadzające się na opozycji między językiem dosłownym a językiem niedosłownym oraz między językiem dosłownym a językiem literackim. Twierdzi, że pojęcia znaczenia pierwszego i dosłownego są niezbędne w innych typach interpretacji. Hipoteza dualistyczna wymaga modelu kaskadowego, który ukazuje przejście od dołu do góry przez hierarchicznie ułożone poziomy znaczeń. Zamiast tego autor zarysowuje wielowarstwową strukturę języka z dwoma poziomami: mimetycznym i semiotycznym i wskazuje na konieczność zastąpienia modelu kaskadowego palimpsestowym modelem współbieżności, łączenia i mieszania warstw znaczeniowych.

Imitation of Rigor

J. L. Austin has written of “the blinding veil of ease and obviousness that hides the mechanisms of the natural successful act.” By revisiting a classic “small metaphysics” puzzle drawn from physics that launched a thousand ships of grander philosophizing, Imitation of Rigor employs recent insights into the architectures of effective reasoning as a means of explicating how Austin’s covert “mechanisms” operate in concrete terms. By these means, the book attempts to reconnect analytic philosophy with the evolving practicalities within science from which many of its grander concerns originally sprang. In doing so, it provides an “alternative history” of how the subject might have developed had the diagnostic insights of its philosopher/scientist forebears (e.g. Heinrich Hertz and Ernst Mach) not been cast aside in the vain pursuit of inappropriate standards of “ersatz rigor.”