Do Judicial Instructions Aid in Distinguishing Between Reliable and Unreliable Jailhouse Informants?

Jailhouse informants are a leading cause of wrongful convictions. In an attempt to preempt such miscarriages of justice, several states (e.g., Connecticut and California) have mandated that judicial instructions be provided to act as a safeguard against false testimony. This study evaluated the effectiveness of these instructions in helping jurors distinguish between reliable and unreliable jailhouse informants. Participants read a trial transcript that varied instructions (Standard, Connecticut, Enhanced) and informant reliability (reliable, unreliable). The results indicated that the instructions had no effect on verdict decisions. Even though verdicts did not vary, participants rated the unreliable informant as less trustworthy, honest, and interested in justice than the reliable informant. This is consistent with previous findings that indicate that participants are aware of the legal prescriptions given in the instructions, but they do not implement them in making decisions. Therefore, instructions may be an insufficient safeguard.

The Effectiveness of Judicial Instructions on Eyewitness Evidence in Sensitizing Jurors to Suggestive Identification Procedures Captured on Video

Objectives. One of the legal safeguards designed to educate jurors about eyewitness evidence is judicial instructions. However, their effectiveness in sensitizing jurors to eyewitness accuracy and suggestive identification procedures captured on video is unknown. Methods. Participants (N = 232) watched the video-recorded identification and testimony of one of 16 genuine eyewitnesses. We varied the suggestiveness of the identification procedure, whether they saw an accurate or inaccurate identification, and whether or not they received Victorian judicial instructions about eyewitness evidence.Results. Participants were sensitive to eyewitness accuracy when identification procedures were non-suggestive, with participants more likely to believe accurate eyewitnesses than inaccurate eyewitnesses. This sensitivity to identification accuracy was impaired when participants saw an identification made under suggestive circumstances. Judicial instructions did not significantly affect participants’ judgments with one exception: when they led to confusion. Participants who saw an identification obtained under suggestive circumstances were more willing to believe the eyewitness when they read the judicial instructions compared to those in the control condition. Conclusions. Suggestive identification procedures impaired participants’ sensitivity to eyewitness accuracy. The Victorian judicial instructions did not improve participants’ sensitivity. This is the first test of judicial instructions that used Bayesian analyses to establish the absence of an effect. Thus, judicial instructions might not improve sensitivity to eyewitness accuracy or be an effective remedy for the damaging effects of suggestive identification procedures.

Character Evidence

The basic rule limiting character evidence is quite sensible. Personality traits predict less than most people (including jurors) realize; situations, and person-by-situation interactions, are more potent forces. As the law suspects, people tend to perceive the behavior of others through lenses of propensity; consequently, they over-attribute and over-predict consistency between character and conduct. In fashioning the character evidence rules, common law judges correctly diagnosed a problem and took steps to temper those attributional tendencies to avoid inaccurate and unfair verdicts. The rules allow numerous exceptions, admitting some character evidence out of fairness or to permit helpful evidence while barring its most misleading variants. For example, defendants in criminal cases are permitted to offer evidence of their own character or the character of a victim. Other exceptions are made to assist factfinders to evaluate witness credibility. A special class of that rule deals with witnesses’ criminal records: a maze of sub-rules governs admissibility of prior crimes. Research finds that people tend to rely on prior crime evidence for its improper propensity purpose, contrary to judicial instructions about the limited use to which it may be put. A relatively new set of rules permits prior criminal sexual conduct to be admitted, allowing factfinders to draw inferences about “any matter to which it is relevant.” These rules are controversial because they invite jurors to engage in the very propensity thinking that centuries of evidence doctrine prohibited. Moreover, behavioral data do not support the theory behind a special rule for prior criminal sexual conduct.