Christ and the Principle of Alternative Possibilities

Classical Christology provides reason to reject the principle of alternative possibilities [PAP]. The Gethsemane prayer highlights an instance in which Jesus Christ performs a voluntary and morally significant action which he could not have done otherwise, namely, Christ’s submission to God’s will. Two classical Christological doctrines undermine PAP: (1) impeccability, and (2) volitional non-contrariety. Classical Christology teaches that Christ could not sin, and that Christ’s human will could not be contrary to his divine will. Yet, classical Christology also teaches that Christ’s death is voluntary and morally praiseworthy. First, I present the relevant elements of classical Christology: dyothelitism, impeccability, and volitional non-contrariety. Second, I define and disambiguate varieties of PAP. Third, I show that Christ’s prayer in Gethsemane disproves PAP. I respond to several objections along the way. Finally, I reflect on the implications of denying PAP.

Blameworthiness in Security Games

Security games are an example of a successful real-world application of game theory. The paper defines blameworthiness of the defender and the attacker in security games using the principle of alternative possibilities and provides a sound and complete logical system for reasoning about blameworthiness in such games. Two of the axioms of this system capture the asymmetry of information in security games.

Causation and Free Will in Early Buddhist Philosophy

Free will and determinism have recently attracted the attention of Buddhist scholars who have defended conflicting views on this issue. I argue that there is no reason to think that this problem cannot arise in Buddhist philosophy, since there are two senses of ‘free will’ that are compatible with the doctrine of non-self. I propose a reconstruction of a problem of free will and determinism in Early Buddhism, given a) the assumption that Buddhist causation entails universal causal determinism, and b) a crucial passage (A I 173–175) suggesting that Early Buddhism is committed to the principle of alternative possibilities which is arguably incompatible with a determinist interpretation of causation. This passage suggests that Early Buddhism must leave room for a robust, incompatibilist form of free will, and that a conception of indeterminist free will in the spirit of Robert Kane’s theory allows us to make sense of that notion.

Causation and Free Will in Early Buddhist Philosophy

Free will and determinism have recently attracted the attention of Buddhist scholars who have defended conflicting views on this issue. I argue that there is no reason to think that this problem cannot arise in Buddhist philosophy, since there are two senses of ‘free will’ that are compatible with the doctrine of non-self. I propose a reconstruction of a problem of free will and determinism in Early Buddhism, given a) the assumption that Buddhist causation entails universal causal determinism, and b) a crucial passage (A I 173–175) suggesting that Early Buddhism is committed to the principle of alternative possibilities which is arguably incompatible with a determinist interpretation of causation. This passage suggests that Early Buddhism must leave room for a robust, incompatibilist form of free will, and that a conception of indeterminist free will in the spirit of Robert Kane’s theory allows us to make sense of that notion.

Blameworthiness in Strategic Games

There are multiple notions of coalitional responsibility. The focus of this paper is on the blameworthiness defined through the principle of alternative possibilities: a coalition is blamable for a statement if the statement is true, but the coalition had a strategy to prevent it. The main technical result is a sound and complete bimodal logical system that describes properties of blameworthiness in one-shot games.

ROBUST FLICKERS OF FREEDOM

This essay advances a version of the flicker of freedom defense of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) and shows that it is invulnerable to the major objections facing other versions of this defense. Proponents of the flicker defense argue that Frankfurt-style cases fail to undermine PAP because agents in these cases continue to possess alternative possibilities. Critics of the flicker strategy contend that the alternatives that remain open to agents in these cases are unable to rebuff Frankfurt-style attack on the grounds that they are insufficiently robust (that is, morally significant in a way that could ground ascriptions of moral responsibility). Once we see that omissions are capable of constituting robust alternatives, even when they are not intentional, it becomes clear that agents in these cases do indeed possess robust alternative possibilities—alternatives that are ineliminable from cases of this sort. The upshot is that Frankfurt-style cases are theoretically incapable of providing us with good grounds for rejecting PAP.

Sobre las alternativas robustas contextuales

On Contextual Robust Alternatives Resumen: En su libro El libre albedrío: un estudio filosófico Carlos Moya presenta una objeción a los contraejemplos tipo-Frankfurt según la cual lo que hace que una alternativa sea robusta o no es el contexto en el que se encuentra el agente; así, alternativas que, en principio, no se verían como robustas y eximentes, pueden llegar a serlo en circunstancias especiales y los contraejemplos tipo-Frankfurt presentan, justamente, este tipo de circunstancias. En este escrito presento tres objeciones al brillante argumento de Moya. En primer lugar, defiendo que no es claro que la alternativa que él considera robusta esté cumpliendo el papel de soportar, al menos en parte, la atribución de culpa del agente. En segundo lugar, retomo la respuesta que Moya ha dado a una crítica de Pereboom quien lo acusa de presuponer en el seno de su argumento al principio de posibilidades alternativas y, por ende, de caer en una petición de principio. Defiendo que la respuesta que ha dado Moya no le permite eludir la crítica de Pereboom. Finalmente, ofrezco una consideración acerca de cómo podría desarticularse la propuesta de Moya si se logra presentar un contraejemplo tipo-Frankfurt de corte determinista. Palabras clave: Alternativas robustas, contexto, contraejemplos tipo-Frankfurt, Principio de posibilidades alternativas, determinismo. Abstract: In his book El libre albedrío: un estudio filosófico Carlos Moya presents an argument against Frankfurt-Style cases according to which what makes an alternative robust and exempting is a matter of the context in which the agent finds himself; thus, alternatives that don’t seem to be robust can become robust and exempting in certain special circumstances, and Frankfurt scenarios present just such circumstances. In this paper I offer three objections to Moya’s brilliant argument. First, I defend that it is not clear that the alternative Moya finds in such cases is doing the work of grounding, at least partially, the attribution of blame to the agent. Secondly, I examine a reply Moya gives to a critique made by Pereboom according to which Moya’s argument presupposes the principle of alternative possibilities and thus begs the question against the compatibilist. I defend that Moya’s response is insufficient to elude Pereboom critique. Finally, I defend that Moya’s strategy can be disarticulated if a deterministic Frankfurt-case can be presented. Keywords: Robust alternatives, context, Frankfurt-style cases, Principle of alternative possibilities, determinism.

Coercion and Volition in Law and Philosophy

This paper discusses cases in which defendants were coerced to do something they wanted to do anyway. Through these cases a stark divergence between the legal and philosophical discussion of alternative possibilities is highlighted. The paper seeks to vindicate the legal approach to coercion and volition by showing that the legal approach could be accounted for with an epistemic version of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities, a version which is also immune to Frankfurt-type examples.