A. C. Mukerji on the Problem of Skepticism and Its Resolution in Neo-Vedānta

This paper examines the work of the unsung modern Indian Philosopher A. C. Mukerji, in his major works Self, Thought and Reality (1933) and The Nature of Self (1938). Mukerji constructs a skeptical challenge that emerges from the union of ideas drawn from early modern Europe, neo-Hegelian philosophy, and classical Buddhism and Vedānta. Mukerji’s worries about skepticism are important in part because they illustrate many of the creative tensions within the modern, synthetic period of Indian philosophy, and in part because they are truly profound, anticipating in interesting ways the worries that Feyerabend was to raise a few decades later. Arguing that Humean, Kantian, neo-Hegelian, and Buddhist philosophy each fail to provide an adequate account of self-knowledge, Mukerji leverages this finding to further argue that these systems fail to offer a proper account of knowledge more generally. His solution to skepticism centers on a distinctively modern interpretation of Śaṅkara’s Vedānta.

Buddhist Ethics

This volume is one of a series of monographs on Buddhist philosophy for philosophers. It presents an outline of Buddhist ethical thought, presenting Buddhist ethical reflection as a distinct approach, or rather set of approaches, to moral philosophy. The book draws on a range of Buddhist philosophers to exhibit the internal diversity of the tradition as well as the lineaments that demonstrate its overarching integrity. This includes early Pāli texts, medieval Indian commentarial literature and philosophical treatises, Tibetan commentaries and treatises, and contemporary Buddhist literature. It argues that Buddhist ethics is best understood not as a species of any Western ethical tradition, but instead as a kind of moral phenomenology, and that it is particularist in its orientation. The book addresses both methodological and doctrinal issues and concludes with a study of the way that Buddhist ethical thought is relevant in the contemporary world.

The Madhyamaka Contribution to Skepticism

This paper examines the work of Nāgārjuna as interpreted by later Madhyamaka tradition, including the Tibetan Buddhist Tsongkhapa (1357–1419). It situates Madhyamaka skepticism in the context of Buddhist philosophy, Indian philosophy more generally, and Western equivalents. Find it broadly akin to Pyrrhonism, it argues that Madhyamaka skepticism still differs from its Greek equivalents in fundamental methodologies. Focusing on key hermeneutical principles like the two truths and those motivating the Svātantrika/Prāsaṅgika schism (i.e., whether followers of Nāgārjuna should offer positive arguments or should proceed on a purely “negative” basis), it argues that the Svātantrika commitment to mere conventional practice is robust and allows for a skepticism consistent with the scientific practices we must take seriously in the modern world. These findings are put forth as an illustration of what the Western tradition might gain by better understanding of non-Western philosophy.

The Truth about Śrīgupta’s Two Truths: Longchen Rabjampa’s “Lower Svātantrikas” and the Making of a New Philosophical School

Longchen Rabjampa (1308–64), scholar of the Tibetan Buddhist Nyingma tradition, presents a novel doxographical taxonomy of the so-called Svātantrika branch of Madhyamaka Buddhist philosophy, which designates the Indian Mādhyamika Śrīgupta (c. 7th/8th century) as the exemplar of a Svātantrika sub-school according to which appearance and emptiness are metaphysically distinct. This paper compares Longchenpa’s characterization of this “distinct-appearance-and-emptiness” view with Śrīgupta’s own account of the two truths. I expose a significant disconnect between Longchenpa’s Śrīgupta and Śrīgupta himself and argue that the impetus for Longchenpa’s doxographical innovation originates not in Buddhist India, but within his own Tibetan intellectual milieu, tracing back to his twelfth-century Sangpu Monastery predecessors, Gyamarwa and Chapa.

Cultivating Emotional Granularity

An emerging focus in affective science is the expertise that underlies healthy emotionality. A growing literature highlights emotional granularity – the ability to make fine-grained distinctions in one’s affective feelings – as an important skill. Cross-sectional evidence indicating the benefits of emotional granularity raises the question of how emotional granularity might be intentionally cultivated through training. To address this question, we present shared theoretical features of centuries-old Buddhist philosophy and modern constructionist theory that motivate the hypothesis that contemplative practices may improve granularity. We then examine the specific mindfulness-style practices originating in Buddhist traditions that are hypothesized to bolster granularity. We conclude with future directions to empirically test whether emotional granularity can be intentionally cultivated.

Buddhist Philosophy of Consciousness: Tradition and Dialogue, edited by Mark Siderits, Ching Keng and John Spackman.

Buddhist Philosophy of Consciousness: Tradition and Dialogue, edited by Mark Siderits, Ching Keng and John Spackman. Brill, 2021. 356pp., €135/$162. Hb ISBN-13: 9789004440890; e-PDF ISBN-13: 9789004440913.

Anti-Realisms Local and Global

The Madhyamaka school of Buddhist philosophy rejects the metaphysical realist thesis that there is such a thing as how things are anyway, independently of the concepts we happen to use. While other Buddhist schools claim that such things as persons, trees, and tables are mere useful fictions, they maintain that these fictions are usefully grounded in facts about the ultimate nature of reality. Not so Mādhyamikas, who are pan-fictionalists. They support this stance by seeking to demonstrate that various hypotheses concerning things with intrinsic nature (things that are thus purported to be ultimately real) lead to absurdities. The conclusion one is invited to draw is that all things are empty, that is, devoid of intrinsic nature. Some sample reductios are examined, and various realist objections are considered. Several different interpretations of Madhyamaka anti-realism are discussed, with a semantic non-dualist reading, to the effect that the very idea of ultimate truth is incoherent, being judged the most plausible.

Fundamental Ontology

This chapter discusses three crucial metaphysical theses endorsed and argued for by all schools of Indian Buddhist philosophy: mereological nihilism, anti-substantialism, and momentariness. The “neither identical nor distinct” argument for mereological nihilism is presented and evaluated, and its consequence for fundamental ontology—that only entities with intrinsic natures are strictly speaking real—is explored. One important result, that only tropes and not substances as property-possessors belong in our ultimate ontology, is discussed. Two arguments for momentariness are presented: the argument from cessation and an argument from the nature of existence. Out of this investigation there should emerge a clearer picture of the Buddhist conception of just what the ultimate nature of reality would have to be like.

Introduction

The Introduction outlines the book’s purposes and approach by explaining the title’s three components. It asks what it means to live skillfully and how the Vimalakīrti Sūtra focuses on the cultivation of life skills through the development of Buddhist practices. It then inquires into the meaning of a Buddhist philosophy of life and how it might play a crucial role in our efforts to diminish human suffering and to advance human awareness and awakening. Finally, it describes the unique character of the Vimalakīrti Sūtra and how this book will approach the sutra as a means to cultivate a contemporary philosophy of life along Buddhist lines that might accentuate the possibility of living skillfully.

Generative Meditations: Exploring Generative Art From the Perspective of Tibetan Buddhist Philosophy

<p>the purpose of this thesis is to document and explore the subjective struggles I have encountered in my own practise as a generative artist rather than to provide an objective overview of computational generative art. Hopefully this process will give some context from the ground up (from an artist’s perspective) to some of the larger questions that I and others in the field are asking about generative art. From the preliminary questions arising from these struggles I begin to explore and develop a generative art practise that primarily focuses on the topics of human experience and ideas directly related to human experience. This is opposed to using generative processes to explore ideas fundamentally based on computation (a-life, emergence, computational creativity, and data etc..). The foundation of, and reasons behind, such a focus are based on the non-realist and non-materialist philosophical tenets of Tibetan Buddhism, in particular the philosophy of the Madhyamika-Prasangika school of thought. The purpose of developing a generative practise based on the philosophy and symbolism of Tibetan Buddhism is to find a method to create personally relevant artwork with a firm foundation in a well established culture of art and philosophy. I might add however, that this isn’t merely a self-reflective exercise but rather it should be of interest to others in the field of (and study of) Generative art to see how this artistic method might be approached from a vastly different philosophical stance to the materialist view that receives the majority of attention in the field.</p>