Special, radical, failure of reduction in psychiatry

Use of network models to identify causal structure typically blocks reduction across the sciences. Entanglement of mental processes with environmental and intentional relationships, as Borsboom et al. argue, makes reduction of psychology to neuroscience particularly implausible. However, in psychiatry, a mental disorder can involve no brain disorder at all, even when the former crucially depends on aspects of brain structure. Gambling addiction constitutes an example.

When narrative takes over: The representation of embedded mindstates in Shakespeare’s Othello

In recent times, researchers across a variety of disciplines in the humanities and social sciences have been interested in the human ability to process embedded mindstates, also known as ‘multiple-order intentionality’ (MOI): A believes that B thinks that C intends (etc.). This task is considered increasingly cognitively demanding with every order of embedding added. However, we argue that the way in which the information relevant to the task is represented in language (in particular, using a narrative) greatly influences how well people are able to deal with MOI cognitively. This effect can be illustrated by paraphrasing situations presented by a play such as Shakespeare’s Othello: by the end of Act II the audience has to understand that Iago intends that Cassio believes that Desdemona intends that Othello believes that Cassio did not intend to disturb the peace. Formulated this way, using sentence embedding to express the intentional relationships, this is highly opaque. At the same time, we know that Othello has been understood and appreciated by innumerable different audiences for ages. What is it that the play’s text does to make the audience understand all these embedded mindstates without undue cognitive strain? In this article we discuss six ‘expository strategies’ relevant to the representation of MOI and illustrate their working with examples from Shakespeare’s Othello.

La memoria como "autoconocimiento" y "amor de sí"

This work proposes a synthesis of the Augustinian Trinitarian conception of Mens with the dual theory of intentional relationships and the genres of the power of the sole that are true to the Aristotelian tradition. To this end, we will analyse the theory of the existential and essential sole of Saint Augustine, the duplex cognitio of Saint Thomas Aquinas, as well as other important aspects of the Jaime Bofill's Thomistic Augustinism which are relative to his theory of «memoria de sí» (self memory) or «Sentimiento fundamental» (essential feeling).