Leibniz on the Frege Point

In the debate on the Frege Point, the ‘Spinoza thesis’ is often mentioned. But Leibniz is kept out. Yet, on this topic, Spinoza and Leibniz shared a fairly similar goal. They sought to root the assertive force in the conceptual activity of the subject. But Leibniz, unlike Spinoza, wanted also to build a coherent theory of propositions. Propositions are for him always provided with assertive force. But what is affirmed by the propositions of logic is only a possibility – the possibility of the conceptual link they express. Stronger assertions require something more: a mark of actuality, a modal symbol in logic or the use of notae or particulae which belong to natural languages. Leibniz does not modify his conception of propositions in his “analysis particularum”. He tries to understand what we do when we use them in various contexts. The Leibnizian proposition is neutral, but it is not forceless. Since it is not forceless, there is no need to appeal to an external act or to a judgment. Leibniz thinks, like most of the authors of the Aristotelian tradition, that the proposition contains the act of judging. Since it is neutral, there is no need to venture into the many difficulties raised by cancellation to account for the force/content relation in the conditional, disjunctive or fictional contexts.

Motivation and Honesty

Up to this point, the book has said very little about motivation. But many philosophers, especially in the Aristotelian tradition of thinking about character, claim that a virtue must give rise to appropriate motivation as well as appropriate action. The first section of this chapter agrees with these philosophers, at least with respect to honesty. The second section briefly considers various implausible accounts of honest motivation, before turning to the pluralist account in the third section. The basic idea of this account is that many different kinds of motives can fit with the virtue of honesty, including dutiful, loving, and friendship motives. The main exception is self-interested motivation. The final section of the chapter considers some complications.

John Philoponus on Physical Place

This book examines the place of physical bodies, a major topic of natural philosophy that has occupied philosophers since antiquity. Aristotle’s conceptions of place (topos) and the void (kenon), as expounded in the Physics, were systematically repudiated by John Philoponus (ca. 485-570) in his philosophical commentary on that work. The primary philosophical concern of the present study is the in-depth investigation of the concept of place established by Philoponus, putting forward the claim that the latter offers satisfactory solutions to problems raised by Aristotle and the Aristotelian tradition regarding the nature of place. Philoponus’ account proposes a specific physical model of how physical bodies exist and move in place, and regards place as an intrinsic reality of the physical cosmos. Due to exactly this model, his account may be considered as strictly pertaining to the study of physics, thereby constituting a remarkable episode in the history of philosophy and science.

Spinoza's Account of Blessedness Explored through an Aristotelian Lens

ABSTRACT In this article, I examine whether Spinoza's account of blessedness can be identified with a contemplative ideal in the Aristotelian tradition. I first introduce the main features of the Aristotelian life of contemplation and its difference from the life of practically oriented virtues — a difference that is grounded in Aristotle's distinction between praxis and theoria. In highlighting the commonalities between Spinoza's two kinds of adequate cognition — that is, intuitive knowledge and reason — I show that there is no room for a similar distinction in Spinoza, which will enable us to identify intuitive knowledge and its attendant blessedness exclusively with the theoretical activity.

Visual Theory

This chapter provides an overview and assessment of Dante’s use of medieval visual theories in his writings. It first surveys his use of the medieval Aristotelian tradition of visual theory in the Convivio, and discusses his reliance on other models of vision in the Vita nova and Rime, including those found both in medical writings and in the works of other poets. The chapter then discusses how, in the Commedia, Dante incorporates a variety of other late medieval discourses about vision into his narrative. Dante does this—it is argued—in carefully structured and stratified ways that often reveal his characteristic syncretism. The poet continues to use neo-Aristotelian theory but also draws upon a rich body of material on seeing found in medieval theology, contemplation, and Biblical exegesis. Particular attention is paid to how these multiple traditions inform the presentation of Dante-character’s own visual experiences throughout the poem.

Replik

With these comments I try to explain why I am not quite convinced by the objections of four colleagues who touch on relevant issues of great weight. Axel Honneth claims that I failed to take into account the systematic weight of the Aristotelian tradition which I pursue only up until Thomas Aquinas (1). Peter Gordon points to an asymmetry in the presentation of the discourse between faith and knowledge that allegedly calls into question the independence of what philosophy developed, by its own standards, from an appropriation of semantic contents of religious traditions (2). Regina Kreide and Tilo Wesche explain the central intention that in fact guided me in this book, but criticise the one-sidedness of an undialectical account of learning processes, in whose shadow the victims tend to be neglected (3).

Sobre Emmanuele Vimercati e Valentina Zaffino (Eds.), Nicholas of Cusa and the Aristotelian Tradition. A Philosophical and Theological Survey (Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 2020)

Neste estudo procedemos a uma leitura detalhada da obra editada por Emmanuele Vimercati e Valentina Zaffino, Nicholas of Cusa and the Aristotelian Tradition. A Philosophical and Theological Survey, cuja oportunidade começamos por realçar. Os estudos que a constituem abordam a relação do pensamento cusano com Aristóteles e a tradição aristotélica e o modo como essa tradição chega a Nicolau de Cusa, mostrando ecos da sua presença na Lógica e na Epistemologia, na Física e na Psicologia, na Metafísica, na Ética e na Política, incluindo ainda um capítulo especial dedicado aos sermões do Cardeal alemão. A conclusão gral é a de que a inscrição do pensamento deste autor no neoplatonismo e na corrente mística, esquece habitualmente, de modo injusto, o papel que o diálogo com a tradição aristotélica desempenhou na sua constituição. Neste estudo crítico, a par do reconhecimento do elevado mérito dos contributos reunidos na obra, são também deixadas algumas notas críticas relativamente a alguns pormenores, o que não altera a perceção muito positiva que a leitura do livro nos deixou.