Religious Practices and Democratic Virtues

Some claim that religion in general—or certain religions—are disciplines that shape their adherents in ways that make them less fit for democratic politics. Religion in general (or some religion) makes people subservient or authoritarian. This chapter argues that democratic virtue theory can provide an approach to these types of concerns. Because democracy protects citizens’ associational freedoms, it should not interrogate all religious practices or all the virtues that religions value. However, it must evaluate those religious practices that citizens use in political activism. This chapter considers Gandhi’s practice of satyagraha—nonviolent direction action—as an example of this kind of assessment. The chapter asks whether satyagraha develops in its practitioners the virtues necessary for reciprocal accountability, a crucial democratic practice. This assessment acts as a model that can be extended to other politicized religious practices: prayer vigils, funerals, and the like.

Is Pacifism a Democratic Virtue? Pragmatist Reflections on an Often Neglected Dimension of Contemporary Peace Ethics

The article questions concepts of ‘democratic peace’ that presuppose an intrinsic relation between pacifism and democracy. This view lacks from both, empirical evidence and historical insight. Instead, pacifism as political and personal virtue can be better linked to the Deweyan idea of democracy as the basic way of life, that is, mutual cooperation and self-realisation. But not only pacifism but also warfare and aggressive conduct often are rooted and result in an ethos of solidarity and cooperation. Therefore, the task for any realistic concept of democratic pacifism is at least two-fold: finding ‘moral equivalents’ (W. James) to war and cultivating an ethos of self-criticism and self-restraint as already the Old Testament’s prophets have proclaimed.

Underminerer naturaliseringsprogrammet demokratiet? De danske naturaliseringskrav i lyset af Habermas’ demokratiteori

The group of Danish non-citizens is large due to strict naturalization demands. Are these demands reason- able? Speci cally, do they undermine their own ends if we evaluate the demands in light of the fact that successful applicants gain full democratic rights? In light of Habermas’ description of autonomy as the central democratic virtue, the paper discusses whether the demands stimulate the central citizenship virtue here de ned as ‘democratic autonomy’; a theoretical ideal which ts in the Danish case. Based on a sceptical evaluation of the naturalization demands in general and of the Danish language test in speci c, the paper discusses the merits of a possible alternative naturalization program. is program is also sketched on the basis of Habermasian ideas.