Demosthenes onPhilanthrōpiaas a Democratic Virtue

2013 ◽  
Vol 108 (3) ◽  
pp. 202-222 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew R. Christ
Keyword(s):  

2018 ◽  
pp. 136-167
Author(s):  
Benjamin R. Hertzberg

Some claim that religion in general—or certain religions—are disciplines that shape their adherents in ways that make them less fit for democratic politics. Religion in general (or some religion) makes people subservient or authoritarian. This chapter argues that democratic virtue theory can provide an approach to these types of concerns. Because democracy protects citizens’ associational freedoms, it should not interrogate all religious practices or all the virtues that religions value. However, it must evaluate those religious practices that citizens use in political activism. This chapter considers Gandhi’s practice of satyagraha—nonviolent direction action—as an example of this kind of assessment. The chapter asks whether satyagraha develops in its practitioners the virtues necessary for reciprocal accountability, a crucial democratic practice. This assessment acts as a model that can be extended to other politicized religious practices: prayer vigils, funerals, and the like.



2005 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 207-235 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Sabl

AbstractLiberal or democratic virtue theories have successfully spread the idea that liberal democracies cannot flourish unless their citizens have certain qualities of mind and character. Such theories cannot agree, however, on what those qualities are. This article attempts to explain and solve this problem. It proposes distinguishing between core virtues, necessary for the actual survival of liberal democracies, and ideal virtues, which promote “progress” according to a given conception of what liberal democracies ought to be about and which values they should most embody. Beyond this, it portrays the relevant virtues as pluralistic (not everyone need have the same ones) and episodic (different virtues are relevant at different times and under different circumstances). It then applies this framework to some key issues of political action and motivation: acts of loyalty and dissent express different aspects of a common response to moral pluralism, and the virtues of citizens differ fundamentally in origin and nature from those of professional politicians. Finally, it suggests more briefly that questions of civil religion, patriotic mobilization in times of war, civic courage, and selfish versus altruistic motives for public action can profit from being seen in this new way.







Politik ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Laumann Jørgensen

The group of Danish non-citizens is large due to strict naturalization demands. Are these demands reason- able? Speci cally, do they undermine their own ends if we evaluate the demands in light of the fact that successful applicants gain full democratic rights? In light of Habermas’ description of autonomy as the central democratic virtue, the paper discusses whether the demands stimulate the central citizenship virtue here de ned as ‘democratic autonomy’; a theoretical ideal which ts in the Danish case. Based on a sceptical evaluation of the naturalization demands in general and of the Danish language test in speci c, the paper discusses the merits of a possible alternative naturalization program. is program is also sketched on the basis of Habermasian ideas. 





2013 ◽  
Vol 96 (4) ◽  
pp. 355
Author(s):  
Daniel A. Morris
Keyword(s):  


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