The Broad Structure of Buddhist Ethics

This chapter argues that Buddhist ethics does not fit into any of the standard Western metaethical theories. It is neither an instance of a virtue theory, nor of a deontological theory, nor of a consequentialist theory. It is closer to a sentimentalist theory, but different from those as well. Instead, it defends a reading of Buddhist ethics as a moral phenomenology and as particularist, utilizing casuistic reasoning. That is, Buddhist ethics is concerned primarily with the transformation of experience, of the way we perceive ourselves and other moral agents and patients. This chapter also argues that the metaphor of path structures Buddhist ethical thought.

REASONABLE DISPOSITIONS: A RESPONSE TO THE SITUATIONIST CRITIQUE OF VIRTUE ETHICS

<p>In The Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle presents a theory of ethics as the development of character, specifically the cultivation of particular character traits lying on the mean between two vices which he calls the virtues. Since the revival of virtue ethics in the mid-20th century, the virtues have often been interpreted as stable, broad-based dispositions to act in virtue appropriate fashion in response to eliciting conditions. In more recent years virtue ethics has come under a sustained attack known as the ‘situationist critique’, which argues that experiments in social psychology show no evidence of broad-based dispositions in the general population. If there are no broad-based dispositions, there are no virtues – virtue ethics is therefore empirically inadequate. My analysis of the evidence the situationists present in favour of their critique will show that it fails to unambiguously support the conclusion that virtue ethics is empirically inadequate. An investigation into the causes of the ethical failings identified in those experiments allowed me to propose remedies that are perfectly consonant with Aristotelian virtue ethics, requiring dedicated and disciplined reflection on past actions with an ongoing commitment to bringing our thoughts and emotions into harmony with our values. In the process I show that the situationists’ evidence supports the “cognitive-affective” theory of virtue over the broad-based dispositional theory, that this cognitive-affective theory is also supported by a careful reading of Aristotle, and therefore that the situationist critique simply helps to replace an inadequate virtue theory with a more robust one.</p>

REASONABLE DISPOSITIONS: A RESPONSE TO THE SITUATIONIST CRITIQUE OF VIRTUE ETHICS

<p>In The Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle presents a theory of ethics as the development of character, specifically the cultivation of particular character traits lying on the mean between two vices which he calls the virtues. Since the revival of virtue ethics in the mid-20th century, the virtues have often been interpreted as stable, broad-based dispositions to act in virtue appropriate fashion in response to eliciting conditions. In more recent years virtue ethics has come under a sustained attack known as the ‘situationist critique’, which argues that experiments in social psychology show no evidence of broad-based dispositions in the general population. If there are no broad-based dispositions, there are no virtues – virtue ethics is therefore empirically inadequate. My analysis of the evidence the situationists present in favour of their critique will show that it fails to unambiguously support the conclusion that virtue ethics is empirically inadequate. An investigation into the causes of the ethical failings identified in those experiments allowed me to propose remedies that are perfectly consonant with Aristotelian virtue ethics, requiring dedicated and disciplined reflection on past actions with an ongoing commitment to bringing our thoughts and emotions into harmony with our values. In the process I show that the situationists’ evidence supports the “cognitive-affective” theory of virtue over the broad-based dispositional theory, that this cognitive-affective theory is also supported by a careful reading of Aristotle, and therefore that the situationist critique simply helps to replace an inadequate virtue theory with a more robust one.</p>

Human governance a pathway to integrity in counteracting corruption

Purpose Corruption is a global phenomenon. The 2016 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Report and the 2019 Malaysia National Anti-Corruption Plan (NACP) Report stated that the government sector most prone to corruption is procurement. The purpose of this study is to explore what drives the government procurement practitioners to commit corruption or uphold integrity. The novelty of this research is it focusses on the human aspect based on a human model which comprises both the physical and non-physical dimensions. It incorporated four theories which are the virtue theory, transaction cost theory (TCT), human governance (HG) philosophy and Al-Ghazali theory of the soul to design the research framework. Design/methodology/approach This approach to counteract corruption is through the inner “Self” (spirituality) and is not limited or bound to processes, procedures, rules, regulations, systems and structures. Findings The findings obtained through the phenomenological method suggest that the Inciting Soul is the driver behind corruption. This happens when intellect (‘Aql) becomes submissive to appetition (Shahwa) and self-assertion (Ghadab) resulting in vice characters. In upholding integrity, Soul-at-Peace is the driver where intellect dominates appetition and self-assertion leading to virtue characters. The HG philosophy is what encapsulates the taxonomy of virtue character. Research limitations/implications This research concentrates only on understanding why corruption happens among those with authority. Nevertheless, this research did not delve into the inculcation of HG. Therefore, the authors would suggest for future research is to explore techniques to inculcate the ability of an individual to exercise all the necessary inner “Self” functions (to curb corruption) without having intervention from an external authority. Practical implications Corruption is a global phenomenon. The 2016 OECD Report and the 2019 Malaysia NACP Report found that procurement is the government sector most prone to corruption. Originality/value The novelty of this research is its focus on the human aspect based on the model of a human comprising both the physical and non-physical dimensions. The theoretical framework integrates the virtue theory, TCT, HG philosophy and Al-Ghazali theory of the Soul.

Science popularization and its ethical standpoint

Science popularization has both academic and policy implications. With the rapid development and large-scale application of science and technology, the demand for science popularization has generally increased, and its status in social development has been significantly improved. New features and challenges have emerged, such as changes in popularization content, the modernization of communication methods and the diversification of participants. In addition, science popularization is also faced with many new ethical issues. These new conditions require deeper consideration about which ethical standpoints should be established in science popularization. Beginning with an analysis of the academic and policy implications of science popularization, this study combines the new characteristics of contemporary science popularization to analyse the ethical issues it faces. Finally, it proposes an ethical standpoint that should be maintained in science popularization from the perspectives of utilitarianism, deontology, contract theory and virtue theory, and provides suggestions for converting responsible science popularization initiatives into concrete actions.

A virtue ethical approach to Public Policy: Promoting wellbeing through human capabilities.

<p><b>The best way to achieve wellbeing in a society is to tailor our policy settings to human capabilities. To do this, we need to adopt a form of virtue theory and apply a framework to policy problems which targets people’s capabilities, bringing them up to a minimum standard of wellbeing.</b></p> <p>Public policy should use distributive justice to deploy public goods to bring people up to a threshold of each capability. This is the bare minimum people need to live well. Justice should be balanced between what a government can realistically influence, with limitations to ensure that people’s freedoms are maintained without telling them how to live. </p> <p>The purpose of this is to reduce obstacles to wellbeing, particularly luck around wellbeing. This means that people can focus on their own functionings and moral actions without fear they will get so unlucky in life that they will never live well.</p>

A virtue ethical approach to Public Policy: Promoting wellbeing through human capabilities.

<p><b>The best way to achieve wellbeing in a society is to tailor our policy settings to human capabilities. To do this, we need to adopt a form of virtue theory and apply a framework to policy problems which targets people’s capabilities, bringing them up to a minimum standard of wellbeing.</b></p> <p>Public policy should use distributive justice to deploy public goods to bring people up to a threshold of each capability. This is the bare minimum people need to live well. Justice should be balanced between what a government can realistically influence, with limitations to ensure that people’s freedoms are maintained without telling them how to live. </p> <p>The purpose of this is to reduce obstacles to wellbeing, particularly luck around wellbeing. This means that people can focus on their own functionings and moral actions without fear they will get so unlucky in life that they will never live well.</p>

Epistemology, Philosophy of Science, and Virtue

This chapter offers an overview of how virtue-based concepts have been used by philosophers of science to shed light on epistemic aspects of science. In the epistemology of science, the word virtue has referred to two different concepts. First, virtue can be understood as excellence, where excellence is a quality of a model, a theory, or a hypothesis. Second, virtue can be understood more narrowly as a stable character trait and/or disposition of scientists themselves. The first meaning is connected to the long-standing debate on the qualities that make a scientific theory a good scientific theory. The second meaning is connected to a much more recent conversation exploring the connections between virtue epistemology and philosophy of science. I explore how these two meanings of virtue have been developed, and I highlight underexplored areas that can advance our understanding of the relation between virtue theory and philosophy of science.