Tacit consent and costs of non-entry into the political community

This paper offers an analysis of an issue related to the social contract theory The issue concerned is disagreement in the form of tacit consent. Namely, if we accept the model of tacit consent, then an issue of costs of this disagreement is raised. These costs cannot be treated in the same way as in the case of express consent. The reason is that, in the case of tacit consent, a person does not have same chances and opportunities as others. This offers a possibility of claiming discrimination, especially if we accept the fact that these costs can be so high so that they deny the possibility of choice. At least in a practical sense and de facto. So, this topic must be understood properly if we want the social contract theory to function well. In this paper, we will try to do that through a logical and semantic analysis of basic terms: tacit consent, disagreement, and costs of contract.

The Ways Judges Dismiss Cases

This chapter explains the ways that judges dismiss cases before trial, at trial, after trial, and even on appeal. It describes how cases proceed through litigation, discussing procedural junctures in a lawsuit that are likely to lead to a negative result for a worker claiming discrimination. It describes discrimination cases in which workers offered evidence suggesting that discrimination occurred and shows how judges dismissed those cases despite the workers’ evidence. Judges even dismissed cases after juries determined that the worker suffered discrimination in the workplace.

It’s not your fault: The social costs of claiming discrimination on behalf of someone else

Two experiments examined responses to bystanders who claimed that another person experienced discrimination. Participants read about a woman or man who experienced sexism and whose co-worker (male or female) either expressed sympathy or claimed that the target experienced sexism. Participants then evaluated the co-worker (bystander). Overall, participants evaluated bystanders who claimed that someone else experienced discrimination more negatively than they evaluated bystanders who did not claim discrimination. Furthermore, female bystanders who claimed discrimination on behalf of someone else were derogated more than male bystanders who did the same. Additional analyses indicated that female bystanders who claimed that another person experienced discrimination were derogated more than male bystanders who did so because the former threatened participants’ beliefs about the fairness of status differences to a greater extent than the later.