Postępowanie przed Naczelnym Sądem Aptekarskim w sprawie naruszenia zasad etyki zawodowej farmaceuty

Members of the pharmacists’ self-government can be held liable before pharmaceutical courts for conduct breaching the rules of professional ethics and deontology, and infringing legal regulations concerning the practice of the pharmacist’s profession. Thus, the basis of professional responsibility of pharmacists is generally similar to the rules of professional liability of doctors, nurses, and midwives. Nevertheless, certain significant differences can be noticed in the course of the proceedings. Such a difference occurs in the proceedings before the Supreme Pharmaceutical Court. The professional group of pharmacists cannot be indifferent to punishable acts because this would imply tacit consent to breach of legal provisions regulating the professional practice and the rules of professional ethics and deontology set forth in the Code of Ethics of the Polish Pharmacist. Therefore, it is crucial that pharmacists, who practise a profession of public trust, should take care of the appropriate status of their occupation in order to conduct properly their mission of serving the society.

Silence and tacit consent in Armenian public law: Legal fiction, presumption or substitution?

In the article, the author researches the problematic aspects of silence in law, in particular, the definition of silence is provided, its meaning at various stages of historical development is outlined, the types of silence are described, the legal consequences of silence are discussed, and the place of silence in the sphere of legal conventions (legal presumptions, fictions, substitution). The author provides the following definition of silence: silence is a legitimate or unlawful inaction of the subject of legal relations, from which the conditional content of the subject’s will on a legal issue follows and (or) with which a positive law (transaction) directly connects the occurrence of legal consequences. Since silence can be interpreted as a sign of agreement or disagreement, it can be argued that it creates uncertainty. Given the fact that legal certainty in modern life is a constitutional value, positive law should exclude or mitigate this uncertainty, or the content of the will arising from silence should be predetermined by positive law or transaction. The result arising from the silence falls within the realm of legal conventions and in order to find out whether silence is a legal presumption, legal fiction or substitution, the article compares these categories. The author concludes that the legislator can formulate the same provision regarding silence both with the help of legal fiction (fictitious consent) and with the help of a legal presumption (presumed consent). At the same time, the article provides a justification for the impossibility of considering tacit consent as a legal substitution, in view of the fact that in objective reality there is no conditional silence, which is an essential reason for excluding the basis of legal substitution.

Lojalność społeczeństwa polskiego a konsolidacja władzy państwowej w latach 1956–1980

[The loyalty of Polish society and the consolidation of state power in 1956–1980] The article introduces several comments and reflections on the tensions between the state power and society in People’s Poland in 1956–1980, in the context of the consolidation of power and loyalty of society. During this period, the party and state authorities, wishing to maximally consolidate their power, did everything to achieve the ability and readiness to use all means necessary to control social behavior, to maintain the loyalty of society. It required total ideological unity of the party political elite and iron discipline in the functioning of its institutions. Such a strategy did not prevent social outbreaks. The emerging protests meant above all a real loss of control over society, social disorganization. Wishing to enjoy the loyalty of a society devoid of political alternatives, in other words its tacit consent, it would have to provide it with a certain level of living conditions. However, this task was very difficult, if at all possible, to be implemented in the realities of the centrally planned economy.

FICTITIOUS ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS: PROSPECTS OF REGULATION IN THE COUNTRIES OF CENTRAL ASIA

The Central Asian countries – Kazakhstan (twice: in 2000, 2015–2016), Kyrgyzstan (twice: in 2004, 2015), Tajikistan (in 2007), and Uzbekistan (twice: in 2007, 2015–2016) – are trying to implement laws on administrative procedure into their national legal systems. Laws on administrative procedure are а tool of western philosophy, an institute of European administrative law of the European understanding of open government and effective administrative regulation, approaches to which the countries of the region have begun to develop relatively recently. Instead of a formal pursuing the adoption of laws on administrative procedure, it is more important to find answers to the countries’ readiness to accept laws on administrative procedure into their existing social, political and economic realities, including the peculiarities of the legal systems. The research notes а lack of two key concepts of the laws on administrative procedure – the concept of administrative procedures as such and the concept of administrative acts. It is analyzed the possibility of implementation of one of the variants of the administrative decision adopted as the result of a fictitious approval (Genehmigungsfiktion). Today, in Central Asia а truncated model of fictitious approval is in operation – the principle “silence gives consent” – within the sphere of licensing procedures of entrepreneurship: “if the public authority does not submit within the established deadlines а motivated refusal or authorization document, such а document is considered to be issued (i. e. the procedure is deemed to be completed)”. The article provides its comparative legal analysis of the application of fictitious approval in the countries of Central Asia. The author arrives at а number of conclusions: − administrative “silence” can be used by the legislator as a fictitious administrative act (tacit consent); − administrative “silence” is а form of an administrative act, but only on the basis of legislative clauses; − objective limitations of the use of administrative “silence” are shown; − different types of inactivity are classified for its effective objection, the position of the term in the system of such definitions as “administrative silence”, “delay in the adoption of an administrative act”.

Tacit consent and costs of non-entry into the political community

This paper offers an analysis of an issue related to the social contract theory The issue concerned is disagreement in the form of tacit consent. Namely, if we accept the model of tacit consent, then an issue of costs of this disagreement is raised. These costs cannot be treated in the same way as in the case of express consent. The reason is that, in the case of tacit consent, a person does not have same chances and opportunities as others. This offers a possibility of claiming discrimination, especially if we accept the fact that these costs can be so high so that they deny the possibility of choice. At least in a practical sense and de facto. So, this topic must be understood properly if we want the social contract theory to function well. In this paper, we will try to do that through a logical and semantic analysis of basic terms: tacit consent, disagreement, and costs of contract.

Tacit consent in the doctrines of John Locke and John Rawls

Political theory often raises the question of how to establish an authority that is legitimate, the latter implying that the said authority does not threaten the autonomy of the will of an individual, which, according to modern political theory, is a condition allowing us speak about authority over citizens. Otherwise, we could talk about subjects of that authority, which is not relevant for this paper. In order to preserve the autonomy of the will of an individual, it is necessary that the decision-makers of the authorities voluntarily consent to them. There are different types of consent in political theory and practice, among which are explicit and tacit consent. This paper deals with the phenomenon of tacit consent, more precisely with an analysis of the concept of tacit consent in the doctrines of John Locke and John Rawls.

‘Targeted killing’ and the lack of acquiescence

Over the last decade, the concept targeted killing has received much attention in debates on the customary interpretation of the right to self-defence, particularly in the context of practices such as US armed drone attacks. In these debates, government silence has often been invoked as acquiescence to the jus ad bellum aspects of targeted killing. Focusing on the question of state silence on targeted killing practices by the Israeli and US governments in recent years, this article investigates over 900 UN Security Council and Human Rights Council debates and argues that there has been no tacit consent to targeted killing. The analysis firstly shows that the majority of states have condemned Israeli targeted killing practices and have raised concerns about armed drone attacks, while falling short of directly protesting against US practices. The article, secondly, applies the customary international law requirements for acquiescence and challenges the idea that silence on US armed drone attacks can be understood as a legal stance towards targeted killing. The article, finally, investigates the political context and engages with alternative interpretations of silence. Contextualizing acts of protest and lack of protest within an asymmetrical political context, the article posits that the invocation of silence as acquiescence in the case of targeted killing is problematic and risks complicity of legal knowledge production with the violence of hegemonic actors.

Consent and Obligation

In this short chapter, which mainly consist of board notes which accompanied her lectures, the reader is given a hint at what Shklar intended to argue: the complex relationship between democracy, tacit consent, law-bound rule, justice, and public conduct.