Lockean Beliefs, Dutch Books, and Scoring Systems

On the Lockean thesis one ought to believe a proposition if and only if one assigns it a credence at or above a threshold (Foley in Am Philos Q 29(2):111–124, 1992). The Lockean thesis, thus, provides a way of characterizing sets of all-or-nothing beliefs. Here we give two independent characterizations of the sets of beliefs satisfying the Lockean thesis. One is in terms of betting dispositions associated with full beliefs and one is in terms of an accuracy scoring system for full beliefs. These characterizations are parallel to, but not merely derivative from, the more familiar Dutch Book (de Finetti in Theory of probability, vol 1, Wiley, London, 1974) and accuracy (Joyce in Philos Sci 65(4):575–603, 1998) arguments for probabilism.

How to Believe Long Conjunctions of Beliefs: Probability, Quasi-Dogmatism and Contextualism

According to the so-called Lockean thesis, a rational agent believes a proposition just in case its probability is sufficiently high, i.e., greater than some suitably fixed threshold. The Preface paradox is usually taken to show that the Lockean thesis is untenable, if one also assumes that rational agents should believe the conjunction of their own beliefs: high probability and rational belief are in a sense incompatible. In this paper, we show that this is not the case in general. More precisely, we consider two methods of computing how probable must each of a series of propositions be in order to rationally believe their conjunction under the Lockean thesis. The price one has to pay for the proposed solutions to the paradox is what we call “quasi-dogmatism”: the view that a rational agent should believe only those propositions which are “nearly certain” in a suitably defined sense.

The Lockean Law of Restitution

This article argues—in contrast to the claims of right-libertarians—that the Lockean thesis of justice in property seems to entail much egalitarian property redistribution. It starts by outlining what the Lockean thesis of justice in property is. It then argues that a Lockean version of the law of restitution is a reasonable way to approach the problem of holdings which were not gained in line with Lockean justice. Furthermore, according to this law, property which has unknown rightful owners should ideally be redistributed in an egalitarian manner among everybody in the world. In addition, due to the history of Lockean injustice throughout the world (e.g., feudalism and colonialism), it appears that much property in the world should be redistributed in an egalitarian manner.