Do Country-level Creditor Protections Affect Firm-level Debt Structure Concentration?

We study the effects of country-level creditor protections on the firm-level choice of debt structure concentration. Using data from 46 countries, we show that firms form more concentrated debt structures in countries with stronger creditor protection. We propose a trade-off framework of optimal debt structure and show that in strong creditor rights regimes, the benefit of forming concentrated structures outweighs its cost. Because strong creditor protections increase liquidation bias, firms choose concentrated debt structures to improve the probability of successful distressed debt renegotiations. Firms with ex-ante higher bankruptcy costs, including those with higher intangibility, cash flow volatility, R&D expenses, and leverage exhibit stronger effects. Firms with restricted access to capital are also affected more. A difference-in-differences analysis of firms’ debt structure responses to creditor rights reforms confirms the cross-country results. Our findings are robust to alternative settings and a battery of robustness checks.

Analysis of Foreign Bank Operation- Comparison of Creditor Rights and Information Sharing

The continued operation of foreign banks is of great concern. This article compares and analyzes the two major influencing factors of foreign bank operations- creditor rights and credit information sharing. In addition, this article also discusses whether we should pay more attention to creditor rights or credit information sharing, taking consideration of the advantageous lending technology (SME credit scoring model) of foreign banks.

Creditor rights, monetary policy, financial crisis, and trade credit

This article analyses how creditor rights affect the trade credit channel of monetary policy. We also aim to test whether these effects were conditioned by the global financial crisis of 2008. Using a sample of 15,356 firms from 29 countries (2001–2017), we found that in normal times or in countries not very severely affected by the financial crisis, trade credit receivables increase during monetary restrictions. Moreover, this increase is less pronounced as creditor protection strengthens. In countries strongly affected by the financial crisis, however, trade credit receivables do not react or even decrease after monetary expansions, regardless of the degree of creditor protection. Furthermore, the results of trade credit payables and net trade credit are not conclusive. JEL CLASSIFICATION: E52; K22; G32