The Distinction Between False Dilemma and False Disjunctive Syllogism

Since a clear account of the fallacy of false disjunctive syllogism is missing in the literature, the fallacy is defined and its three types are differentiated after some preliminaries. Section 4 further elaborates the differentia specifica for each of the three types by analyzing relevant argument criticism of each, as well as the related profiles of dialogue. After defining false disjunctive syllogisms, it becomes possible to distinguish between a false dilemma and a false disjunctive syllogism: section 5 analyzes their similarities (which explains why the fallacies are often confused with one another) and section 6 explains their differences.

Against the Shiftiness Dilemma

This chapter argues that the Shiftiness Dilemma is a false dilemma: KNA is perfectly compatible with Classical Invariantism. Furthermore, it offers independent reason to believe that if KNA and Classical Invariantism are true, variation in proper assertability is exactly what we may expect. More precisely, the chapter advances the debate in two important ways: (1) it identifies a widely held assumption concerning epistemic norm individuation (Content Individuation), which gets the Shiftiness Dilemma off the ground; (2) it argues that Content Individuation is false, and that therefore the norm at stake in the debate need not be epistemic.

Introduction

Borders today evoke exclusion, and they pose a dilemma for inclusive democrats: if borders define the people by exclusion, and democratic politics requires the people, then democracy requires exclusive borders. So, on one horn, there is democratic politics, but exclusion; on the other, inclusion, but no democracy. This chapter argues that this is a false dilemma, because it only arises if there is a tight connection between people and territory. Such a connection occurs in the mainstream model of territorial politics, which envisions countries as desert islands belonging to a people—but there are alternatives. This introductory chapter shows how turning to a neglected tradition of territorial politics that focuses on place and geography and takes the environment seriously can show a way out of the dilemma. It proposes a watershed model of territorial politics grounded on place, rather than identity. The rest of the book will use this model to tell us where should borders go, and how should they be governed.

NATURALISM VERSUS THEISM IS A FALSE DILEMMA

This article argues that it is a mistake to assume that atheism entails naturalism, that naturalism is what leads someone to embrace atheism, and that atheists must sign up to a ‘naturalistic world-view’.

HUME, KANT, AND FEUERBACH: WHY THE ANTHROPOMORPHIC CRITIQUE REVEALS A FALSE DILEMMA BETWEEN NATURALISTIC ATHEISM AND ANTI-NATURALISTIC THEISM

In current debates concerning atheism, two positions are considered possible: naturalistic atheism or anti-naturalistic theism. Anti-naturalistic theism is motivated by the failure of naturalism to explain the fundamental nature of reality. We, however, endorse anti-naturalistic atheism by reviving the ‘anthropomorphic critique’, arguing that theism misattributes human traits to the deity. Anti-naturalistic atheism is better suited to refute theists, since it undercuts their appeal to science's inadequacies. We trace the anthropomorphic critique from Hume's Dialogues, through Kant's epistemology, and conclude with its reception in Feuerbach. The anthropomorphic critique is an epistemological – not metaphysical – thesis, hence, it is agnostic about the fundamental nature of reality. Yet it convincingly shows that theism is not a tenable position. In essence, we aim to decouple atheism from naturalism, on the basis of a salient critique in the history of modern philosophy, in order to ameliorate current debates between atheists and theists.