Virtually spatialized sounds enhance auditory processing in healthy participants and patients with a disorder of consciousness

Neuroscientific and clinical studies on auditory perception often use headphones to limit sound interference. In these conditions, sounds are perceived as internalized because they lack the sound-attributes that normally occur with a sound produced from a point in space around the listener. Without the spatial attention mechanisms that occur with localized sounds, auditory functional assessments could thus be underestimated. We hypothesize that adding virtually externalization and localization cues to sounds through headphones enhance sound discrimination in both healthy participants and patients with a disorder of consciousness (DOC). Hd-EEG was analyzed in 14 healthy participants and 18 patients while they listened to self-relevant and irrelevant stimuli in two forms: diotic (classic sound presentation with an “internalized” feeling) and convolved with a binaural room impulse response (to create an “externalized” feeling). Convolution enhanced the brains’ discriminative response as well as the processing of irrelevant sounds itself, in both healthy participants and DOC patients. For the healthy participants, these effects could be associated with enhanced activation of both the dorsal (where/how) and ventral (what) auditory streams, suggesting that spatial attributes support speech discrimination. Thus, virtually spatialized sounds might “call attention to the outside world” and improve the sensitivity of assessment of brain function in DOC patients.

Seeing, Knowing, and Doing

This book provides an overall theory of perception and an account of knowledge and justification concerning the physical, the abstract, and the normative. It has the rigor appropriate for professionals but explains its main points using concrete examples. It accounts for two important aspects of perception on which philosophers have said too little: its relevance to a priori knowledge—traditionally conceived as independent of perception—and its role in human action. Overall, the book provides a full-scale account of perception, presents a theory of the a priori, and explains how perception guides action. It also clarifies the relation between action and practical reasoning; the notion of rational action; and the relation between propositional and practical knowledge. Part One develops a theory of perception as experiential, representational, and causally connected with its objects: as a discriminative response to those objects, embodying phenomenally distinctive elements; and as yielding rich information that underlies human knowledge. Part Two presents a theory of self-evidence and the a priori. The theory is perceptualist in explicating the apprehension of a priori truths by articulating its parallels to perception. The theory unifies empirical and a priori knowledge by clarifying their reliable connections with their objects—connections many have thought impossible for a priori knowledge as about the abstract. Part Three explores how perception guides action; the relation between knowing how and knowing that; the nature of reasons for action; the role of inference in determining action; and the overall conditions for rational action.

The Place of Emotion and Moral Intuition in Normative Ethics

This chapter discusses emotion and intuition, and offers an illustration of how they arise in several moral domains as well as a sketch of the place of moral imagination in bringing both to bear on the formation of moral judgments. It should be no surprise that emotion can support intuition and its propositional content. Emotion is often a discriminative response to perceptible aspects of people or of things in the environment. In some cases it can magnify, unify, or extend the work of perception and thereby provide evidence concerning the person or situation perceived. The evidence may derive its force largely from the perceptible elements that underlie emotion, but emotion may also provide a kind of evidence of its own.