Intuitive Expertise in Moral Judgements

According to the ‘expertise defence’, experimental findings which suggest that intuitive judgements about hypothetical cases are influenced by philosophically irrelevant factors do not undermine their evidential use in (moral) philosophy. This defence assumes that philosophical experts are unlikely to be influenced by irrelevant factors. We discuss relevant findings from experimental metaphilosophy that largely tell against this assumption. To advance the debate, we present the most comprehensive experimental study of intuitive expertise in ethics to date, which tests five well-known biases of judgement and decision-making among expert ethicists and laypeople. We found that even expert ethicists are affected by some of these biases, but also that they enjoy a slight advantage over laypeople in some cases. We discuss the implications of these results for the expertise defence, and conclude that they still do not support the defence as it is typically presented in (moral) philosophy.

Improving decision-making effectiveness in crisis situations: developing intuitive expertise at the workplace

Design/Methodology/Approach This review examines the role of intuition as a cognitive tool to better manage complex crises. The paper draws on a case study in the aviation industry, the Hudson river incident, to advance the potency and value of intuitive expertise in crisis situations. Purpose Crisis managers operating in safety critical domains are often faced with difficult and exceptional conditions that may challenge their expertise and cause them to rely more heavily on their experiential knowledge. This review therefore provides insights into intuitive thinking and demonstrates its importance in crisis decision-making. Findings Evidence suggests that intuition arguably offers a better cognitive option to decision-makers in high staked and time-pressured crisis situations. The Hudson River case study further highlights why organizations should aim to train their personnel to become better intuitive thinkers. Originality/value This review challenges conventional classical decision theory, outlining its limitations in typical fast paced crises environments. The paper instead positions intuition as a scientific construct that holds important value for crisis managers in extreme conditions.

Intuitive Expertise and Irrelevant Options

In the ‘push-dilemma,’ a train is about to run over several people and can only be stopped by pushing a heavy person onto the tracks. Most lay people and moral philosophers consider the ‘push-option,’ i.e., pushing the heavy person, as morally wrong. Peter Unger (1992, 1996) suggested that adding irrelevant options to the push-dilemma would overturn this intuition. This chapter tests Unger’s claim in an experiment with both lay people and expert moral philosophers. This allowed an investigation of the ‘expertise defense,’ which various philosophers have suggested as an answer to ‘experimental restrictionists,’ who argue that experimental philosophy undermines the trustworthiness of intuitions about hypothetical cases. Overall, the chapter finds that adding irrelevant options increases the ratings for the push-option. Moreover, the intuitions of expert moral philosophers are no less susceptible to the presence of irrelevant options than lay people’s intuitions. The chapter discusses how these findings bear on the expertise defense.

Intuitive Expertise and Irrelevant Options

In the so-called push dilemma, an out-of-control speed-train is about to run over five people and can only be stopped by pushing a heavy person onto the tracks. Most lay people and moral philosophers consider it morally wrong to kill the heavy person. Unger (1992, 1996), however, argued that adding irrelevant options to the push dilemma would overturn this intuition. In this paper, we empirically test Unger’s claim with both lay people and expert moral philosophers. Including philosophical experts allowed us to investigate the so-called expertise defense, according to which the intuitions of philosophical experts are superior to the intuitions of lay people. Overall, we found that adding irrelevant options indeed increased the ratings for the “push option”. Moreover, we found that the intuitions of expert moral philosophers were no less susceptible to the presence of irrelevant options than lay people’s intuitions. We discuss how these findings bear on the expertise defense.

Intuitive Knowledge Generation in Post-Bureaucratic Organizations

To address the need for more suitable cognitive mechanisms in post-bureaucratic organizations, this chapter explores how the use of intuition can enhance organizational decision making and information sharing, and thus contribute to knowledge generation in fast-paced, high-pressured environments. In the context of film production teams, as an example of such environment, it identifies three distinct categories that are in frequent use: intuitive expertise, intuitive creation, and intuitive foresight. The findings suggest that the employment of intuition in dynamic settings is indeed common but, contrary to previous beliefs, it is much more nuanced. Not only do various professional groups utilize different kinds of intuition, they also adjust its use to the specific type of activity. A distinction has been detected in particular between approaches to task-related versus people-related activities. The understanding which organizational player and under which conditions relies on intuition, provides new insights into knowledge generation in modern organizations.