Knowability as De Re Modality: A Certain Solution to Fitch Paradox

Poznawalność jako modalność de re: pewne rozwiązanie paradoksu Fitcha W artykule staramy się znaleźć nowe, intuicyjne rozwiązanie paradoksu Fitcha. Twierdzimy, że tradycyjne wyrażenie zasady poznawalności (p → ◊Kp) opiera się na błędnym rozumieniu poznawalności jako modalności de dicto. Zamiast tego proponujemy rozumieć poznawalność jako modalność de re. W artykule przedstawiamy minimalną logikę poznawalności, w której zasada poznawalności jest ważna, ale paradoks Fitcha już nie obowiązuje. Logikę charakteryzujemy semantycznie, a także poprzez podejście aksjomatyczne i tabelaryczne.

The Problem of de re Modality

The problem of de re modality is how, if at all, one can make sense of it. Most who have discussed this problem have assumed that modality de dicto is relatively unproblematic. It is, rather, the interpretation of sentences involving, within the scope of modal operators, singular terms or free variables which is thought to give rise to grave—and in the view of some, insuperable—difficulties. Quine has two arguments against the intelligibility of de re modality: a “logical” and a “metaphysical” one. That the “logical” argument is central to Quine’s attack is surely indisputable. But my claim that it is his basic argument is, in effect, denied by Kit Fine. I can (and do) agree with Fine that there are some significant differences between the two arguments. The most important question, for my purposes, is whether he is right to claim that the two arguments have force independently of one another.

Comments on Bob Hale’s “The Problem of de re Modality”

There is a great deal in Hale’s chapter which I admire and with which I agree. In particular, I would go along with him in drawing a distinction between the syntactic and semantic de re, in finding no reasonable basis for modality de re within a linguistic conception of modality, and in diagnosing where Quines’s argument (or what I would call his “logical” argument) goes wrong. However, in typical philosophical fashion, I shall focus on two points of disagreement, one concerning the problem of accounting for the ...

The Problem of De Re Modality

Quine has two arguments against the intelligibility of de re modality: a ‘logical’ argument and a ‘metaphysical’ argument. That the ‘logical’ argument is central to Quine’s attack is surely indisputable. This chapter claims that this ‘logical argument’ is his basic argument. However, Kit Fine disagrees. It is conceded that Fine is correct that there are some significant differences between the two arguments. However, the most important question for the purposes of this chapter is whether Fine is right to claim that the two arguments have force independently of one another; that the metaphysical argument raises a separate and independent objection to the intelligibility of quantifying into modal contents. This chapter suggests not.

De Re Modality in the Late Twentieth Century

Quine’s (in)famous sceptical critique of de re modality is expounded in the pair of 1953 classic papers ‘Reference and Modality’ and ‘Three Grades of Modal Involvement’. Here, I position the salient, and non-sceptical, treatments of de re modality in the later part of the twentieth century—those due to Kripke, Lewis, and Fine—in relation to that prior sceptical critique. My theses are: (a) that that Kripke, Lewis, and Fine all undertake non-sceptical defences of de re modal predication that conform to the Smullyan language-independence strategy; and (b) none does so in a way that falsifies Quine’s prediction of the commitments involved. I emphasize the insights on which Quine’s scepticism was based and commend these as sound and enduring.