The Problem of De Re Modality

2020 ◽  
pp. 46-58
Author(s):  
Bob Hale
Keyword(s):  
Kit Fine ◽  
De Re ◽  
De Re Modality ◽  
Basic Argument

Quine has two arguments against the intelligibility of de re modality: a ‘logical’ argument and a ‘metaphysical’ argument. That the ‘logical’ argument is central to Quine’s attack is surely indisputable. This chapter claims that this ‘logical argument’ is his basic argument. However, Kit Fine disagrees. It is conceded that Fine is correct that there are some significant differences between the two arguments. However, the most important question for the purposes of this chapter is whether Fine is right to claim that the two arguments have force independently of one another; that the metaphysical argument raises a separate and independent objection to the intelligibility of quantifying into modal contents. This chapter suggests not.

The Problem of de re Modality

2020 ◽  
pp. 234-246
Author(s):  
Bob Hale
Keyword(s):  
Kit Fine ◽  
Singular Terms ◽  
De Re ◽  
Modal Operators ◽  
Free Variables ◽  
De Re Modality ◽  
Basic Argument ◽  
De Dicto

The problem of de re modality is how, if at all, one can make sense of it. Most who have discussed this problem have assumed that modality de dicto is relatively unproblematic. It is, rather, the interpretation of sentences involving, within the scope of modal operators, singular terms or free variables which is thought to give rise to grave—and in the view of some, insuperable—difficulties. Quine has two arguments against the intelligibility of de re modality: a “logical” and a “metaphysical” one. That the “logical” argument is central to Quine’s attack is surely indisputable. But my claim that it is his basic argument is, in effect, denied by Kit Fine. I can (and do) agree with Fine that there are some significant differences between the two arguments. The most important question, for my purposes, is whether he is right to claim that the two arguments have force independently of one another.

De re modality, generic essences, and science

Philosophia ◽  
1980 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 167-186
Author(s):  
Bryan G. Norton
Keyword(s):  
De Re ◽  
De Re Modality

De What Re is de Re Modality?

1974 ◽  
Vol 71 (16) ◽  
pp. 551 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. L. Mackie
Keyword(s):  
De Re ◽  
De Re Modality

De Re Modality in the Late Twentieth Century

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Divers
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
De Re ◽  
De Re Modality ◽  
Late Twentieth ◽  
Late Twentieth Century ◽  
Classic Papers

Quine’s (in)famous sceptical critique of de re modality is expounded in the pair of 1953 classic papers ‘Reference and Modality’ and ‘Three Grades of Modal Involvement’. Here, I position the salient, and non-sceptical, treatments of de re modality in the later part of the twentieth century—those due to Kripke, Lewis, and Fine—in relation to that prior sceptical critique. My theses are: (a) that that Kripke, Lewis, and Fine all undertake non-sceptical defences of de re modal predication that conform to the Smullyan language-independence strategy; and (b) none does so in a way that falsifies Quine’s prediction of the commitments involved. I emphasize the insights on which Quine’s scepticism was based and commend these as sound and enduring.

De re modality

2020 ◽  
pp. 70-81
Author(s):  
Boris Kment
Keyword(s):  
De Re ◽  
De Re Modality
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