A multi-labelled sequent calculus for Topo-Logic

We present a labelled sequent calculus for a trimodal epistemic logic exhibitied in Baltag et al. (2017, Logic, Rationality, and Interaction, pp. 330–346), an extension of the so called ‘Topo-Logic’. To the best of our knowledge, our calculus is the first proof-calculus for this logic. This calculus is obtained via an adaptation of the label technique by internalizing a semantics over topological spaces. This internalization leads to the generation of two kinds of labels in our calculus and the labelling of formulae by pairs of labels. These novelties give tools to provide a simple calculus that is intuitively connected to the semantics. We prove that this calculus enjoys many structural properties such as admissibility of cut, admissibility of contraction and invertibility of its rules. Finally, we exhibit a proof search strategy for our calculus that allows us to prove completeness in a direct way by the extraction of a countermodel from a failure of proof. To define this strategy, we design a tool for controlling the generation of labels in the construction of a search tree, although the termination of this strategy is still open.

A cut-free labelled sequent calculus for dynamic epistemic logic

Dynamic epistemic logic is a logic that is aimed at formally expressing how a person’s knowledge changes. We provide a cut-free labelled sequent calculus ($\textbf{GDEL}$) on the background of existing studies of Hilbert-style axiomatization $\textbf{HDEL}$ of dynamic epistemic logic and labelled calculi for public announcement logic. We first show that the $cut$ rule is admissible in $\textbf{GDEL}$ and show that $\textbf{GDEL}$ is sound and complete for Kripke semantics. Moreover, we show that the basis of $\textbf{GDEL}$ is extended from modal logic K to other familiar modal logics including S5 with keeping the admissibility of cut, soundness and completeness.

CONDITIONAL BELIEFS: FROM NEIGHBOURHOOD SEMANTICS TO SEQUENT CALCULUS

The logic of Conditional Beliefs (CDL) has been introduced by Board, Baltag, and Smets to reason about knowledge and revisable beliefs in a multi-agent setting. In this article both the semantics and the proof theory for this logic are studied. First, a natural semantics forCDLis defined in terms of neighbourhood models, a multi-agent generalisation of Lewis’ spheres models, and it is shown that the axiomatization ofCDLis sound and complete with respect to this semantics. Second, it is shown that the neighbourhood semantics is equivalent to the original one defined in terms of plausibility models, by means of a direct correspondence between the two types of models. On the basis of neighbourhood semantics, a labelled sequent calculus forCDLis obtained. The calculus has strong proof-theoretic properties, in particular admissibility of contraction and cut, and it provides a decision procedure for the logic. Furthermore, its semantic completeness is used to obtain a constructive proof of the finite model property of the logic. Finally, it is shown that other doxastic operators can be easily captured within neighbourhood semantics. This fact provides further evidence of the naturalness of neighbourhood semantics for the analysis of epistemic/doxastic notions.

Omega-inconsistency without cuts and nonstandard models

This paper concerns the relationship between transitivity of entailment, omega-inconsistency and nonstandard models of arithmetic. First, it provides a cut-free sequent calculus for non-transitive logic of truth STT based on Robinson Arithmetic and shows that this logic is omega-inconsistent. It then identifies the conditions in McGee (1985) for an omega-inconsistent logic as quantified standard deontic logic, presents a cut-free labelled sequent calculus for quantified standard deontic logic based on Robinson Arithmetic where the deontic modality is treated as a predicate, proves omega-inconsistency and shows thus, pace Cobreros et al.(2013), that the result in McGee (1985) does not rely on transitivity. Finally, it also explains why the omega-inconsistent logics of truth in question do not require nonstandard models of arithmetic.

PROOF ANALYSIS FOR LEWIS COUNTERFACTUALS

A deductive system for Lewis counterfactuals is presented, based directly on the influential generalisation of relational semantics through ternary similarity relations introduced by Lewis. This deductive system builds on a method of enriching the syntax of sequent calculus by labels for possible worlds. The resulting labelled sequent calculus is shown to be equivalent to the axiomatic system VC of Lewis. It is further shown to have the structural properties that are needed for an analytic proof system that supports root-first proof search. Completeness of the calculus is proved in a direct way, such that for any given sequent either a formal derivation or a countermodel is provided; it is also shown how finite countermodels for unprovable sequents can be extracted from failed proof search, by which the completeness proof turns into a proof of decidability.