Konsep Jalan Kehidupan dan Kematian Menurut Kitab Didakhe Pasal 1-6

The book of Didache is a non-canonical book in the Bible, therefore, the teachings of the book are not widely known, discussed, and taught. However, the book contains deep morality teachings. This article aimed to explore the teachings in the book so that we can explain the concept of the path of life and death as it was taught in the Bible. The study was conducted by using a descriptive-analytical approach based on Alistair Stewart’s view in his book “On the Way Life and Death, Light or Darkness: Foundation Texts in The Tradition.” From this study, that the teachings of the Book of Didache help believers to have spirituality discipline and lead to holiness of life so that believers no longer live in sins that will lead to death.Abstrak. Kitab Didakhe bukanlah Kitab kanonikal dalam Alkitab, oleh sebab itu ajaran dalam Kitab tersebut tidak banyak diketahui, dibahas, dan diajarkan. Namun demikian, Kitab tersebut mengandung ajaran moral yang dalam. Tujuan dari penulisan artikel ini adalah untuk menggali ajaran dalam kitab tersebut yang dapat menjelaskan konsep jalan kehidupan dan kematian sebagaimana yang diajarkan dalam Alkitab. Kajian dalam artikel ini menggunakan pendekatan deskriptif-analitis dengan mendasarkan pada pandangan Alistair Stewart dalam bukunya“On The Way Life and Death, Light or Darkness: Foundation Texts In The Tradition.” Dari kajian tersebut diperoleh hasil bahwa ajaran Kitab Didakhe menolong orang percaya untuk mendisplinkan diri dalam spiritualitas serta menuntun kepada kekudusan hidup sehingga orang percaya tidak lagi hidup di dalam dosa yang akan mendatangkan kematian.

Concluding Remarks

In this chapter we offer some concluding remarks. We point to the limitations of contractarianism, to its advantages over revisionism, and to its practicality. We show that for contractarianism wars are not necessarily ‘moral tragedies’, as they are for revisionists because wars do not necessarily involve unavoidable wrongdoing. According to contractarianism, combatants participating in war can do so without violating the rights of either combatants or civilians of the enemy side. The chapter also shows how even revisionists rely at times on contractualist premises to justify adherence to rules which they regard as unjustified in terms of ‘deep morality’. We also criticize the way this notion is utilized, especially the distinction between ‘deep morality’ and non-deep morality (associated with compliance with the laws of war). The distinction creates the impression that one should give priority to considerations stemming from deep morality over those stemming from shallow morality. But clearly, even revisionists do not assume such a priority—neither in general, nor in the field of war. Finally, the chapter highlights the ‘realist’ aspect of contractarianism, namely, its scepticism about the termination of wars and warfare. This scepticism has to do with the existence of evil individuals and of rogue states, but also with benign self-interest coupled with epistemic shortcomings and a constant suspicion of others. Given this realist assumption, states would be better off agreeing on rules to regulate war that would, on the one hand, facilitate effective self-defence, while on the other, reduce the killing and harm they cause.

Deep Morality and the Laws of War

It is important to reflect on the way we evaluate the laws and customs of armed conflict and the responsibilities we take on when we criticize and propose possible changes to them. These laws are not robust, and there is a danger that criticism may undermine their force while not providing effective alternatives. Moreover, in the area of armed conflict, it is easy to underestimate the pressures that a satisfactory set of norms has to respond to and easy to exaggerate the “merely” conventional character of such norms. Laws of war must be administrable in circumstances of fear, confusion, and violence and must include elements of technicality difficult to understand in philosophical terms. One of the most influential of recent laws of war revisionists, Jeff McMahan, acknowledges that his deep moral critique of existing norms of armed conflict does not necessarily yield a set of prescriptions for legal reform. This chapter extends McMahan’s and counsels the utmost caution in these critiques and re-examinations.