A Lie Is a Lie: The Ethics of Lying in Business Negotiations

I argue that lying in business negotiations is pro tanto wrong and no less wrong than lying in other contexts. First, I assert that lying in general is pro tanto wrong. Then, I examine and refute five arguments to the effect that lying in a business context is less wrong than lying in other contexts. The common thought behind these arguments—based on consent, self-defence, the “greater good,” fiduciary duty, and practicality—is that the particular circumstances which are characteristic of business negotiations are such that the wrongness of lying is either mitigated or eliminated completely. I argue that all these “special exemption” arguments fail. I conclude that, in the absence of a credible argument to the contrary, the same moral constraints must apply to lying in business negotiations as apply to lying in other contexts. Furthermore, I show that for the negotiator, there are real practical benefits from not lying.

Popular Legitimacy

The American and French Revolutions derived from—and promoted—a concept of legitimacy based on popular consent and the public will. This concept displaced the practice of relying on dynasticism, the prescriptive rights of hereditary monarchs. As a result, plebiscites have taken the place of dynastic marriages as mechanisms for the legitimization of transfers of sovereignty. Noteworthy examples include decisions in the unification of Italy and in the European settlement of 1919–1920. Plebiscites have not, however, been conducted when Great Powers have ruled them out—for instance, France’s rejection of a plebiscite concerning Alsace-Lorraine after the First World War. Popular legitimacy raises questions about the defining characteristics of a self-governing nation—its size and capacity for self-defence, its language and history, and the allegiance choices of its citizens. Disputes over minority rights may raise questions about national identity and cohesion, including the possible founding of new states seceding from established countries. In some cases, such as Israel, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, religion is a fundamental source of identity and state legitimacy.

Extraterritorial Use of Force against Non-State Actors: PS to Hague Academy Lectures

In July 2021, the author presented a Special Course for the Hague Academy of International Law Summer Courses on the Extraterritorial Use of Force against Non-State Actors. The course focused on two bases for the extraterritorial use of force against non-state actors, namely self-defence and intervention by invitation. The lectures came to a conclusion that may, at first glance, appear contradictory. With respect to the use of force in self-defence, the lectures adopted a restrictive (non-permissive) approach in which the use of force is not permitted save in narrowly construed exceptions. With respect to intervention by invitation, the lectures adopted a more permissive approach in which the use of force is generally permitted and prohibited only in narrowly construed exceptions. This article serves as post-script (PS), to explain the apparent contradiction. It concludes that the main reason for this apparent contradiction is the application of the fundamental principles of international law—sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence—which are consistent with intervention by invitation but are undermined by self-defence against non-state actors.

Transgressing to teach: Theorising race and security through struggle

Recent interventions in critical security studies have argued that the field has struggled to account for the racialised/racist foundations of security politics. This article engages with the US Black Panther Party (BPP), arguing that the Party did important work to show how security politics is dependent on racial violence. The idea that we can theorise global politics through struggle (`struggle as method’) is becoming popular within disciplinary International Relations (IR), but has longer lineages in Black radical thought. The BPP were important advocates of struggle as method, with tactics and strategies intentionally designed with a pedagogical purpose; through Panther actions (including community self-defence and survival programmes), and the state’s response to these, the mechanisms of capitalist white supremacy were laid bare. The article therefore acknowledges BPP action as a series of theoretical interventions, which demonstrated how the terms of US/white security are rooted in and dependent on anti-Blackness. It also shows how Panther tactics prefigured alternative, radical, anti-statist approaches to security, these conceptualised as `survival pending revolution’. The article closes by arguing that scholarship on critical security studies - especially as related to the racialised politics of security - should do more to work with and acknowledge its indebtedness to struggle as method.

Essays in the Regulation of Drones and Counter-Drone Systems

<p>Rapid growth in the use of drones potentially delivers significant economic benefits, but it has also given rise to considerable public concern about safety risks, infringement of privacy, and other unwelcome surveillance and observation. Drones are able to be operated remotely from the pilot, making it difficult to identify the operator and attribute liability for harm caused. This in turn means that existing regulatory frameworks might not induce an efficient level of drone-related harm. The first substantive chapter of this thesis considers measures to address concerns about privacy and surveillance. I propose the adoption of a package of measures including: tort law reform, the promulgation of a "Code of Practice for Drone Operations" under New Zealand's Privacy Act 1993, a remotely-readable identifier to identify approved operators, provision for aerial trespass by unmanned aircraft, provision for the destruction of unmanned aircraft committing trespass, and the clarification of what constitutes a privacy violation by broadcast or closed-circuit television and video systems. Fundamental to those proposals are the concepts of drone registration and the legalisation of the right to self-defence against drones. Registration requires that a drone is registered with the regulatory authorities, with a registered drone being traceable back to the owner of the drone. Registered drones may also be required to carry a remotely-readable identifier. Legalisation of self-defence allows bystanders to take defensive actions against drones, with the potential for a drone to be destroyed. Both of these mechanisms provide a means by which the operator of a drone faces some cost if they are causing harm, and thus may induce more efficient actions by the drone operator. This thesis establishes a theoretical framework for self-defence, registration, and registration in conjunction with self-defence. Conditions are established under which each will be the preferred form of regulation. It is also established that the status quo, with neither registration nor self-defence, is likely to be optimal when harm from drone activity is relatively low. The conditions established around when self-defence is efficient also provide the conditions for the regulation of counter-drone systems. I identify the legal impediments to the implementation of drone-detection systems and counter-drone systems in New Zealand, and propose a regulatory framework to allow the adoption of those systems.</p>

Essays in the Regulation of Drones and Counter-Drone Systems

<p>Rapid growth in the use of drones potentially delivers significant economic benefits, but it has also given rise to considerable public concern about safety risks, infringement of privacy, and other unwelcome surveillance and observation. Drones are able to be operated remotely from the pilot, making it difficult to identify the operator and attribute liability for harm caused. This in turn means that existing regulatory frameworks might not induce an efficient level of drone-related harm. The first substantive chapter of this thesis considers measures to address concerns about privacy and surveillance. I propose the adoption of a package of measures including: tort law reform, the promulgation of a "Code of Practice for Drone Operations" under New Zealand's Privacy Act 1993, a remotely-readable identifier to identify approved operators, provision for aerial trespass by unmanned aircraft, provision for the destruction of unmanned aircraft committing trespass, and the clarification of what constitutes a privacy violation by broadcast or closed-circuit television and video systems. Fundamental to those proposals are the concepts of drone registration and the legalisation of the right to self-defence against drones. Registration requires that a drone is registered with the regulatory authorities, with a registered drone being traceable back to the owner of the drone. Registered drones may also be required to carry a remotely-readable identifier. Legalisation of self-defence allows bystanders to take defensive actions against drones, with the potential for a drone to be destroyed. Both of these mechanisms provide a means by which the operator of a drone faces some cost if they are causing harm, and thus may induce more efficient actions by the drone operator. This thesis establishes a theoretical framework for self-defence, registration, and registration in conjunction with self-defence. Conditions are established under which each will be the preferred form of regulation. It is also established that the status quo, with neither registration nor self-defence, is likely to be optimal when harm from drone activity is relatively low. The conditions established around when self-defence is efficient also provide the conditions for the regulation of counter-drone systems. I identify the legal impediments to the implementation of drone-detection systems and counter-drone systems in New Zealand, and propose a regulatory framework to allow the adoption of those systems.</p>

Niger self-defence groups will hasten violence spiral

Significance Such attacks reinforce the sense of vulnerability and desire revenge that give rise to such self-defence groups in the first place, and contribute to a downward spiral in security in the Tillaberi and Tahoua regions. Impacts Governor and prefect reshuffles will not be enough to arrest the rising tide of violence. Western Niger will remain at crisis levels of food insecurity through mid-2022, due to the violence and other long-term vulnerabilities. Mali’s own spreading violence will hinder Niger from containing its own.

Self-Defence and a Phronetic Use of Violence: A Christian Response to Muslim-mob Attacks in Northern Nigeria

The sermon on the mount has often been used to support a nonviolent response to any form of injustice and violent attacks against Christians. This article argues that the sermon, understood in its original Old and New Testament contexts, does not necessarily support a wholesale prohibition of the use of violence. It also argues that the implicit ethical theory of the sermon – and the New Testament in general – is a combination of a virtue ethics and a divine command theory. On this premise, one is able to show that a measured use of violence for self-defence is a theologically tenable Christian response to unauthorized attacks. This measured use of violence for self-defence is qualified by a Christian phronesis or practical wisdom, which takes into full account both the teaching of Jesus on love of the enemy and the contextual or existential realities of Christians facing violent attacks in northern Nigeria.