Cooperative differential game model with continuous updating

The paper considers and describes the class of cooperative differential games with continuous updating. Such a class of differential games is new, at the moment only the classnoncooperative game models with continuous updating have been studied. This paper describes the process of constructing cooperative strategies, cooperative trajectory, characteristicfunction and cooperative solution with continuous updating. Cooperative case of limited resource extraction game model with continuous updating is considered. Optimal strategies,characteristic function and cooperative solution are constructed. The Shapley vector is used as a cooperative solution. The numerical simulation results are demonstrated in the Matlabenvironment.

Looking forward approach with random horizon in cooperative differential games

In the paper authors present a new approach to determination and computation of a solution for differential games with prescribed duration in the case when players lack certain information about the dynamical system and payoff function on the whole time interval on which the game is played. At each time instant players receive information about dynamical system and payoff functions, however the duration of the period of this information is unknown and can be represented as a random variable with known parameters. At certain periods of time the information is updated. A novel solution is described as a combination of imputation sets in the truncated subgames that are analyzed using Looking Forward Approach with random horizon. A resource extraction game serves as an illustration in order to compare a cooperative trajectory, imputations, and imputation distribution procedure in the game with Looking Forward Approach and in the original game with prescribed duration. Looking Forward Approach is used for constructing game theoretical models and defining solutions for conflict-controlled processes where information about the process updates dynamically.

Payoff Distribution in a Multi-Company Extraction Game with Uncertain Duration

A nonrenewable resource extraction game model is analyzed in a differential game theory framework with random duration. If the cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) of the final time is discontinuous, the related subgames are differentiated based on the position of the initial instant with respect to the jump. We investigate properties of optimal trajectories and of imputation distribution procedures if the game is played cooperatively.

Payoff Distribution in a Multi-Company Extraction Game with Uncertain Duration

A nonrenewable resource extraction game model is analyzed in a differential game theory framework with random duration. If the c.d.f. of the final time is discontinuous, the related subgames are differentiated based on the position of the initial instant with respect to the jump. We investigate properties of optimal trajectories and of imputation distribution procedures if the game is played cooperatively.