Game Model
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2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Yanfang Zha

The deployment of cache and computing resources in 5G mobile communication networks is considered as an important way to reduce network transmission delay and redundant content transmission and improve the efficiency of content distribution and network computing processing capacity, which has been widely concerned and recognized by academia and industry. Aiming at the development trend of cache and computing resource allocation in 5G mobile communication networks, in order to improve the efficiency of content cache and reduce network energy consumption, a 5G network cache optimization strategy based on Stackelberg game was proposed, which modeled network operators and content providers as multimaster and multislave Stackelberg game model. Providers buy base station storage space from network operators to cache popular content. In this paper, we construct the strategy space and profit function of the two sides of the game and prove the existence of Nash equilibrium solution among content providers given a set of base station rental prices of network operators. In this paper, distributed iterative algorithm is used to solve the game model, and the optimal base station pricing of network operators and the optimal base station occupancy rate of content providers are obtained.

2021 ◽  
Renbin Han ◽  
Mengke Yang

Abstract Joint distribution is an advanced logistics organization model for improving the quality and efficiency of express logistics industry and achieve high-quality development of logistics, but the distribution of common profit has always been a key obstacle to the effective development of joint distribution. Based on the background of green and low-carbon, this paper explores a fairer and more reasonable profit distribution scheme. The profit game between the government and the two types of member enterprises is analyzed. By focusing on how the government plays a role in inducing the joint distribution alliance to bring the green and low-carbon requirements into the profit distribution, the strategy evolution process of the three parties, the factors affecting the profit distribution and the stability of alliance are discussed through the establishment of "government-member enterprise A-member enterprise B" tripartite evolutionary game model. Finally, the evolutionary game model is numerically simulated based on system dynamics. It is found that: (1) It is necessary for the government to guide and motivate the alliance to create internal incentives and constraints. The effect of government subsidies and rewards to member enterprises is greater than the penalties for member enterprises. (2) The member enterprises are likely to conspire together to defraud government subsidies and rewards, carry out "free riding" and other speculative activities, which makes it necessary for the government and the alliance to establish supervision mechanism, information disclosure mechanism, and property rights protection system. (3) The willingness of member enterprise to positively cooperate will increase with the increase of the additional benefit coefficient, the proportion of profit distribution and the importance of environmental benefit factor; and will decrease with the increase of the cost of promoting green distribution operations.

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
Hui He ◽  
Siyi Zhang ◽  
Lilong Zhu

Green consumption is an important foundation for achieving stable and long-term economic development goals. With the rapid development of e-commerce and people’s widespread attention to sustainability, more and more consumers purchase green products online. Therefore, we consider consumer feedback mechanisms including evaluation and complaint and construct an evolutionary game model of green product quality supervision with the participation of governmental supervision department, third-party e-commerce platform, online seller and consumer, which analyzes the four parties’ evolutionary stable strategies. To verify the theoretical results, we conduct a numerical simulation by Matlab 2020b. Moreover, we study the conditions that make evolutionary stable strategy combination exist based on Lyapunov’s First Method. And we find that when consumer chooses complaint, (0, 0, 1) is likely to become an only evolutionary stable strategy combination. At this time, the online seller chooses to provide high-quality green product, third-party e-commerce platform chooses not to strengthen inspection, and governmental supervision department chooses to strictly supervise. Conversely, when the consumer chooses no complaint, (1, 0, 0) and (0, 0, 1) may become an evolutionary stable strategy combination. At this time, the online seller cannot be stable in providing high-quality green product. What’s more, governmental supervision department increases the penalty, which can incentivize a third-party e-commerce platform to strengthen inspection. Third-party e-commerce platform increases the reward and can promote online seller to provide high-quality green product. On the one hand, this paper enriches the theoretical basis of online shopping green product quality supervision. On the other hand, compared with existing literature, it extends the main body of the evolutionary game to four paries and broadens the application scope of the game model. In addition, it has put forward feasible suggestions for the government supervision department to strengthen the quality supervision, and provided decision-making support for the third-party e-commerce platform to assume the responsibility of quality inspection.

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Yongquan Guo ◽  
Hua Zou ◽  
Zhu Liu

The application of green technologies can reduce environmental hazards and promote sustainability. The connotation of green technology innovation has two main aspects: the first aspect is the generation of green technology from nothing to something, and the other aspect is the improvement and upgrading of existing green technology; these two aspects are related. However, from the existing research, there are relatively few studies on the process of green technology innovation from these two aspects at the same time. If green technology is not studied from this perspective, the evolutionary process and influencing factors of green technology from generation to development cannot be clarified, which is not conducive to the development of green technology and the realization of the goal of environmental friendliness. Research considers the green innovation process from R&D to upgrading linkages and analyses the roles of government departments, green technology R&D institutions, and green technology application enterprises in green technology innovation. In addition, the green technology application enterprises are considered to promote technology enhancement through technology application feedback with green technology R&D institutions. The evolutionary game model of three subjects was established, the strategic evolution process of different subjects was analyzed, the influence of each element on the strategic choice of different subjects was explored, and the stability analysis of strategic choice was conducted using simulation software. The study shows the following: (1) The greater the government’s punishment and support to green technology R&D institutions, the more favorable it is for green technology R&D institutions to carry out green technology R&D. (2) In green technology applications, if the government has no direct interest relationship with green technology application enterprises, the enterprises will choose negative response behavior. (3) The greater the technology enhancement gains of green technology R&D institutions and the greater the feedback gains of technology applications actively carried out by enterprises in response to the government’s call, the more the government departments tend to support green technology R&D.

2021 ◽  
pp. 2150021
Ajay Kumar Bhurjee ◽  
Vinay Yadav

Game theory-based models are widely used to solve multiple competitive problems such as oligopolistic competitions, marketing of new products, promotion of existing products competitions, and election presage. The payoffs of these competitive models have been conventionally considered as deterministic. However, these payoffs have ambiguity due to the uncertainty in the data sets. Interval analysis-based approaches are found to be efficient to tackle such uncertainty in data sets. In these approaches, the payoffs of the game model lie in some closed interval, which are estimated by previous information. The present paper considers a multiple player game model in which payoffs are uncertain and varies in a closed intervals. The necessary and sufficient conditions are explained to discuss the existence of Nash equilibrium point of such game models. Moreover, Nash equilibrium point of the model is obtained by solving a crisp bi-linear optimization problem. The developed methodology is further applied for obtaining the possible optimal strategy to win the parliament election presage problem.

2021 ◽  
Ming Liu ◽  
yemei li

Abstract We investigate a single-cycle product supply chain with one retailer and one supplier in a game model, where the supplier is the leader and the retailer is the follower. By innovatively introducing cleaner production fraudulent income perception factor into the game model, we studied the mechanism of the effect of enterprise social responsibility and environmental awareness on cleaner production fraud. The results showed that the value of cleaner production fraudulent income perception factor will affect the enterprise's choice of differentiation strategy. When the enterprise's sense of social responsibility is weak, i.e., the fraudulent income perception factor is correspondingly large, it more likely to choose cleaner production fraud. Conversely, under the constraints of high social responsibility, it more likely avoids production fraud. Regarding government supervision, a reasonable punishment for cleaner production fraud can reduce such violations to some extent. However, after the punishment reaches a level, the efficiency of supervision beginning to decline. In views of that, improving enterprise social responsibility through institutional reform is a more effective way to reduce cleaner production fraud. To contribute to a healthy competitive market environment, government supervision should establish a feedback mechanism, and make timely adjustments.

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (18) ◽  
pp. 10355
Haibo Chen ◽  
Zongjun Wang ◽  
Xuesong Yu

The sustainability of the mask emergency supply chain faces two problems during the current COVID-19 pandemic. First, mask manufacturers are mainly small and mid-size enterprises, resulting in a lack of funds and credit lines for the introduction of equipment. Second, the periodicity and uncertainty of pandemics create overcapacity risk for the mask emergency supply chain. To solve these problems, this study incorporates financial leasing institutions and the government into the mask emergency supply chain. Based on a questionnaire survey of practitioners of financial leasing institutions, the relationship between mask manufacturers, financial leasing institutions, and the government in the mask supply chain is analyzed through a game model, and the behavior of mask manufacturers to reduce the scale of mask production after the occurrence of overcapacity is investigated using the cusp catastrophe theory. We find that in the case of masks’ overcapacity, mask manufacturers tend to continue production. Finally, we propose that financial leasing institutions should lease mask production equipment to mask manufacturers under the guarantee of the government and develop a mechanism for the three parties to jointly share the risk of mask overcapacity, aiming at ensuring the sustainable manufacturing of masks during the pandemic.

Keke Sun ◽  
Zeyu Xing ◽  
Xia Cao ◽  
Weijia Li

The rural ecotourism system can be defined as a complex association of stakeholders. This system of rural ecotourism in relatively poor areas of China can influence rural revitalization strategies. The purpose of this study is to plan a rural ecotourism system among the tourism enterprises, local residents and government by using an evolutionary game theory. Based on the theoretical analysis, an evolution game model for the three stakeholders is developed and the evolution process of strategies is described by replicator dynamic equations. Then, a simulation method and case was used to analyze the stability of interactions among the stakeholders and determine an equilibrium solution in the finite rationality case. Finally, specific control strategies were proposed to suppress instability and an ideal evolutionarily stable strategy was obtained. This provides a theoretical basis for achieving a win-win situation among the three parties. The results of this study suggest appropriate roles for stakeholders in the rural ecotourism project that provide management implications for rural tourism activities, local economy and rural revitalization.

2021 ◽  
Wei Li ◽  
Fei Chen ◽  
Liurui Deng ◽  
Yiwen Zhao

Abstract In this paper, we assume that a closed-loop supply chain consists of an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) producing new products from raw materials, a remanufacturer producing re-manufactured products from used items directly collected from customers and a logistics provider which sells and distributes two products as a monopolist in the given market. By constructing game model in which logistics provider is a leader, OEM and remanufacturer are the equal status followers, we solve chain members’ optimal services decision-making. Finally, we analyze influence of service elasticities and intensities of service competition of two manufacturers on members’ equilibrium decision-making.

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