Zero rating and end-users’ freedom of choice: an economic analysis

Purpose According to European Union Open Internet Regulation, commercial practices of internet access service providers (IASP) should not restrict end-users’ choice regarding services, applications or contents. This paper aims to analyze the effects of Zero Rating (ZR) on freedom of choice translating this regulatory criterion into a formal expression: providing a ZR offer on a content or application provider (CAP) restricts end-users’ choice if it reduces the volume or provision of others usages. Design/methodology/approach The analysis is made in two steps. First, the authors assess the direct effect of introducing zero rating on non-ZR usages, all other things equal. Second, the paper studies the knock-on effect of ZR on IASP offers and the supply of CAP. Findings In the short term, zero rating does not restrict end-users’ choice increasing both ZR and non-ZR usages. In the long term, in the case of pure ZR, IASPs may adapt their offer to support ZR costs impacting negatively other usages. However, in practice, these effects are compensated or diluted by competitive forces or if the ZR traffic is small relatively to the data allowance. In the case of SD, the CAP covers the cost which prevents cross-subsidies and protects freedom of choice if SD is open to all CAPs. Originality/value The economic literature on zero rating is scarce and assesses this practice from the general economic criterion of social or consumer welfare. This paper is the first one to use economic analysis to analyze whether Zero Rating is compatible with the EU regulatory criterion of freedom of choice.

Optimization of Price, Default Ratio and Capital under Regulatory Criterion of Maximizing Social Benefit

In this paper, we explore the optimal price, default ratio, and capital for insurance companies under social welfare maximization from regulators' perspective. From comparisons of cases under symmetric and asymmetric information in the insurance market, we find that an optimal regulatory objective should be set to maximize social benefit and induce fair benefit distribution in a transparent insurance market, and direct regulation on capital constraint can increase insurance demand and shareholders' benefits in a non-transparent market.

Wave Wake: Focus on Vessel Operations within Sheltered Waterways

This article describes the development of an empirical tool that can rapidly and accurately predict the characteristics of the wave wake generated by vessels that typically operate within sheltered waterways, including small commercial craft and recreational vessels. A wave wake regulatory criterion is also proposed and incorporated within the prediction tool.

Wave Wake: Focus on Vessel Operations within Sheltered Waterways

This paper describes the development of an empirical tool that can rapidly and accurately predict the characteristics of the wave wake generated by vessels that typically operate within sheltered waterways, including small commercial craft and recreational vessels. A wave wake regulatory criterion is also proposed and incorporated within the prediction tool.

Regulatory and Study Conditions for the Determination of Bioequivalence of Highly Variable Drugs

Purpose. The FDA Working Group on Highly Variable (HV) Drugs recently presented interim procedures and conditions for determining the bioequivalence (BE) of HV drug products. They included analysis by the method of scaled average BE (SABE), a switching coefficient of variation of CVS = 30% and a regulatory standardized variation of CV0 = 25% for applying SABE, and the use of a secondary regulatory criterion restricting to 0.80-1.25 the point estimate for the ratio of estimated geometric means (GMR) of the two formulations. These conditions are scrutinized in the present communication. Methods. 3-period BE studies were simulated with various statistical and regulatory assumptions. Power curves, obtained by gradually increasing the true GMR, compared performances of the methods of SABE, a constrained point estimate of GMR (PE/GMR), and the composite of these two approaches. The consumer risk of each procedure was evaluated. Results. With CV0 = 30% and PE/GMR = 0.80-1.25, the composite criterion of BE relied on the confidence limits of SABE. In contrast, with CV0 = 25% and/or PE/GMR = 0.87-1.15, the composite criterion approached almost completely the features of the GMR point estimate, especially at high within-subject variation. The consumer risk was near 5% with CV0 = 30% but much higher when CV0 = 25%. Conclusions. The condition of CVS = CV0 = 30% and PE/GMR = 0.80-1.25 is recommended as a composite regulatory criterion. With alternative settings of the conditions, such as the recommended CV0 = 25% and/or PE/GMR = 0.87-1.15, the composite criterion would reflect almost entirely the GMR point estimate. This would be an undesirable outcome.