Mind-dependence and objectivity

Constructivism takes practical reasons to be mind-dependent: facts about our mental states and activities figure ineliminably in its account of why some consideration is a reason for an agent to do something. This chapter defends constructivism against the objection that its commitment to mind-dependence renders it unable to accommodate the objectivity of practical reasons and our judgements about them. It distinguishes various versions of mind-dependence and argues that the constructivist’s alethic version is compatible with the three features that those who raise the objectivity objection are most often concerned about: the fallibility of our reason judgements, the universality of some reasons, and the modal robustness of some of those reasons.

Correct reasoning

According to the account of practical reasons presented in Chapter 4, those reasons are ultimately grounded in the soundness of certain episodes of practical reasoning. This chapter addresses what it is for an episode of practical reasoning to be correct, which is a necessary condition for their soundness. It first shows that, at least when it is applied to reasoning, the notion of correctness need not itself be understood in terms of reasons, which would render the constructivist’s overall view circular. Then, it presents an account that characterizes correct reasoning as reasoning in compliance with the constitutive rules of that activity. It also discusses how those rules can be determined, and what the constructivist should say about their ontological status.

Concluding remarks

The aim of this book was to explore the prospects of a constructivist account of practical reasons by elaborating the basic idea of constructivism into a fully fledged account of practical reasons and making its theoretical commitments explicit, thereby paving the way for a better-founded assessment of the merits of such an account. The view that has emerged from this can be summarized as follows....

Reasoning and reason judgements

This chapter takes the first step in developing a constructivist theory of practical reasons. It does so by giving an account of the cognitive role that judgements about those reasons play in an agent’s psychology. In particular, it presents the Normative Guidance Account of practical reasoning, according to which such reasoning always involves a reason judgement that guides it. This account is shown to be preferable to competing accounts in the literature and defended against two influential objections: the objection that it requires too much conceptual sophistication and thus excludes certain reasoners, and the objection that it leads into an infinite regress.

The nature of reason judgements

This chapter argues that the Normative Guidance Account of practical reasoning defended in Chapter 2 provides constructivists with the resources to formulate an anti-representationalist account of reason judgements. According to this account, these judgements are mental states whose characteristic cognitive function is to guide our reasoning, rather than to represent certain facts. The chapter also introduces a distinction between this rationalist version of anti-representationalism, which characterizes reason judgements in terms of their role in reasoning, and conativist versions of anti-representationalism, which characterize these judgements as motivational states. This is where the constructivist’s account of reason judgements differs from the one endorsed by most expressivists.

The truth about reasons

This chapter explores constructivism’s commitments in the theory of truth. It starts by considering in more detail what an account of the truth of reason judgements that is compatible with constructivism would have to look like. It then introduces a neo-pragmatist conception of truth that builds on the work of Crispin Wright and others, which meets those requirements and fits well with the constructivist’s overall approach because it connects the truth of a reason judgement to the soundness of the corresponding episode of reasoning. This conception of truth is embedded in a pluralist account, according to which there are different ways of being true in different domains of judgement. Finally, the chapter discusses the account of practical reasons that combining this conception of truth with the constructivist’s overall approach yields.

What is constructivism?

This chapter outlines the main theses of the constructivist position to be developed in this book: facts about what is a reason for doing what obtain because the corresponding reason judgements are true. Those reason judgements are not representational states; their nature is best understood in terms of their role in guiding the reasoning process. Thus, for such a judgment to be true is not for it to be representationally accurate. Instead, its truth—and hence the reason fact that corresponds to the true judgement—is grounded in the soundness of the episode of reasoning that the judgement is apt to guide. Therefore, practical reasons are mind-dependent, because facts about our mental activities figure ineliminably in the explanation of why some considerations are reasons for certain actions. The chapter also addresses how this position relates to the views of John Rawls and Christine Korsgaard, and shows how it fits onto the meta-ethical map.

Introduction

The introduction sets the stage for what follows. Constructivism is presented as a position that seeks to explain why some considerations are reasons for or against certain actions. It thus disagrees with fundamentalist views which deny that a general, yet informative explanation of this kind is available. Constructivism also differs from Humean views that offer such an explanation in terms of the agent’s actual or hypothetical desires. By contrast, constructivism suggests that reasons can be explained as an upshot of our capacity to reason. The introduction also highlights that the constructivist view to be developed in the book is a meta-ethical, rather than a first-order normative position, and that it offers an account only of practical reasons, leaving, e.g., epistemic reasons aside.