Conditions on Knowledge

Chapter 3 focuses on conditions of knowledge. It argues that, for activities with constitutive aims featuring normative properties, it is not uncommon to find substantive conditions on both the means of attaining the aim and the environment. Moreover, it shows that inquiry is a case in point. Since knowledge is the constitutive aim of inquiry, it follows that there are substantive constraints on the means for attaining knowledge and on the environment in which knowledge can be had. Chapter 3 goes on to develops a more detailed account of these constraints in terms of abilities to know and shows how these conditions can be used to solve the Gettier problem. It discusses a number of key objections and offers responses.

The Aim of Inquiry

Chapter 1 focuses on epistemologically substantive accounts of the aims of inquiry into specific questions. It mounts a detailed case that knowing that p/not-p is the aim of inquiry into whether p. To this end, Chapter 1 first develops two arguments that the knowledge aim of inquiry compares favourably with the main rivals in the literature, according to which the aim of inquiry is true belief or justified belief. Next, it shows how these arguments can be generalized to other views about the aim of inquiry that might be conceived. Finally, Chapter 1 responds to a number of objections to the idea that knowledge is the aim of inquiry and the argument developed in support of it.

Knowledge

Chapter 2 uses the idea that inquiry into specific questions is an activity with a constitutive aim and that knowledge is this constitutive aim to develop a non-reductive account of knowledge. The key idea is that certain activities with constitutive aims do not lend themselves to reductive analysis and instead afford a so-called network analysis in which each element cannot be properly understood without grasping the connections with other elements in the network. After addressing objections, Chapter 2 compares the account developed here with Williamson’s non-reductive account of knowledge as a sui generis mental state and argues that the former is preferable to the latter.

Introduction

Let’s start with the central methodological idea of this book, which is to take inquiry (or finding out about things) as the starting point for epistemological theorizing. What this means in practice is that, in this book, I will be thinking a good deal about inquiry, and I will argue that thinking about inquiry allows us to develop an attractive way of doing epistemology. In a nutshell, the reason for this is that thinking about inquiry gives us a systematic way of developing answers to a range of central epistemological questions that are not only novel but also promising....

Epistemic Value

Chapter 5 turns to issues relating to epistemic value. It argues that activities with constitutive aims constitute value domains in which the constitutive aims are domain-relative for-their-own-sake values. Applying this to the case of the two forms of inquiry, we get the results that knowledge and understanding are valuable for their own sake in the domains constituted by these activities. Chapter 5 argues that the two forms of inquiry constitute the epistemic domain, thus shedding light on the boundaries and the structure of the epistemic domain. Finally, it is shown that the resulting view can solve a number of so-called value problems in epistemology, including the difficult tertiary value problem according to which knowledge must come out more valuable than mere true belief as a matter of kind.

Understanding

Chapter 4 moves on to inquiry into general phenomena and develops a non-reductive systematic knowledge account of understanding. According to this view, roughly, maximal understanding of a phenomenon is maximally comprehensive and well-connected knowledge of it, degrees of understanding are a function of distance from maximal understanding, and understanding a phenomenon can be truly attributed when one surpasses a contextually determined threshold on degrees of understanding. Chapter 4 discusses a number of objections to the account and compares it with the most prominent rival views in the literature, according to which understanding is, in essence, knowledge of explanations. Again, it is argued that the systematic knowledge account comes out on top.

Scepticism

Chapter 6 addresses the problem of scepticism. More specifically, it focuses on a particularly difficult sceptical argument which proceeds from the plausible claims (i) that we don’t know that we are not radically deceived and (ii) that, if so, we don’t know much at all to the problematic sceptical conclusion that we don’t know much at all. It is argued that there is reason to take issue with both premises of this argument. More specifically, Chapter 6 presents a novel theoretical argument against the principle the knowledge transmits across competent deduction, which motivates the second premise. And it develops a new way of resisting the first premise. The key idea here is that we can have basic knowledge of the denials of sceptical hypotheses thanks to an ability to know that certain possibilities could not easily obtain. Having dealt with some objections, Chapter 6 compares the approach to scepticism developed here with its closest competitor, the sensitivity-based approach, and argues that there is reason to favour the former.