Realism and Knowledge First. Interview with Timothy Williamson

The renowned British philosopher Timothy Williamson talks about his philosophical views and main lines of research. Williamson is a metaphysical realist in a broad sense. Fir him there are true or false answers to questions about all aspects of reality. Classical logic is a universal true theory. Knowledge-first epistemology is an alternative to the traditional belief-first epistemology. The former takes the concept of knowledge as a basic concept, explaining other epistemic concepts, including belief, in its terms, whereas the latter does the opposite. Knowledge, not truth, is the fundamental epistemic good. The Gettier problem and the skeptical problem that arise within traditional epistemology are ill posed and therefore cannot be solved. Hybrid epistemological theories do not satisfy the principles of simplicity and beauty and are refuted by counter-examples. Epistemic contextualism is problematic, and relativism violates the semantics of the phenomena being explained. Knowledge does not entail knowledge about knowledge. Knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that. The distinction between a priori and a posteriori is superficial, and there are no analytical truths. The concept of qualia is unhelpful for solving the problems related to consciousness. The so-called “hard problem” of consciousness points to an area of conceptual confusions in which we do not know how to reason properly. Speculative metaphysics is quite a respectable enterprise. But progress in metaphysics is not automatic; it requires the right methodology.

Cognitive Development by Zone of Proximal Development (ZPD)

Aim/Thesis: The aim of this research is to promote the use of the three concepts-- the Zone of Proximal Development (ZPD), the Gettier Problem, and Corpus Linguistics (Contextual Learning)--to increase the academic performance of early undergraduate engineering students. Concept/Methods: 30 Engineering students completed one untimed Mensa IQ Test of 10 questions and one Simon-Binet IQ Test of 50 random IQ questions with a 12 minute time limit. These 30 students were chosen from two different college sections: 15 students from each section. Before the second Simon-Binet Test, one group, G(a), was given ZPD scaffolding in three major topics — Working Memory, Fluid Reasoning and Spatial Reasoning —as they had answered questions based on these concepts incorrectly in their first Mensa IQ test. The second group, G(b), was not given the ZPD scaffolding. A statistical t-test that was later performed indicated that G(a), with scaffolding, outperformed G(b), without the scaffolding, in the second IQ test. Results and conclusion: Using the t-test, it is seen that the hypothesis of this research that ZPD, Gettier Problem and Corpus Linguistics can enhance the performance of the students in a short time period is correct. After the first Mensa IQ test, the level of both the groups G(a) and G(b) of engineering students was almost the same, indicated by a very similar mean results. However, after supporting G(a) utilizing ZPD, Gettier Problem and Corpus Linguistics for their three problem areas - Working Memory, Fluid Reasoning and Spatial Reasoning - identified after their first IQ test where the students needed scaffolding, the performance of this group improved more in comparison to G(b), as indicated by the results of the second online Simon-Binet Test. Research restrictions: It was not possible to provide all the random questions of the online Simon-Binet test given to all 30 students because the total number of questions would be 30*50=1500. Only the first ten questions of the Mensa IQ test are included in this research paper. Further, the third and fourth year engineering students are not included in this research as it is assumed that they have had already developed expertise and the effect of the investigated tools would not be clearly visible. Practical application: ZPD scaffolding was applied to the students when the students’ major problem areas were identified as requiring contextual learning and support. The Gettier Problem-- an epistemological concept-- was also used to keep their mind open at all the times during the learning process and Linguistics Corpus gave the contextual support as ZPD proposes the social-contextual mode of learning. Originality/Cognitive value: The paper presents empirical research on engineering students demonstrating the practical utility of ZPD, Gettier Problem and Corpus Linguistics in the process of learning, potentially irrespective of any discipline.

Explicationist Epistemology and the Explanatory Role of Knowledge

It has been argued that much of contemporary epistemology can be unified under Carnap’s methodology of explication, which originated in the neighboring field of philosophy of science. However, it is unclear to what extent epistemological theories that emphasize the explanatory role of knowledge fit into this picture, Kornblith’s natural kind epistemology and Williamson’s knowledge first approach being cases in point. In this connection, I raise three questions. Can we harvest the insights of these approaches without loss in the more standard and less idiosyncratic explicationist framework? Can we do so without falling prey to prominent criticism raised against those approaches? Finally, do the approaches come out as coherent under an explicationist rendering? I argue that in Kornblith’s case the answer to all three questions is essentially in the affirmative. Much of the knowledge first approach is also translatable into explicationism. However, from that perspective, Williamson’s central argument for treating knowledge as undefinable, referring to persistent yet unsuccessful attempts to solve the Gettier problem, amounts to an overreaction to that problem. Leaving explicationism aside, I ask, in the penultimate section, what Williamson’s own philosophical method really amounts to.

Conditions on Knowledge

Chapter 3 focuses on conditions of knowledge. It argues that, for activities with constitutive aims featuring normative properties, it is not uncommon to find substantive conditions on both the means of attaining the aim and the environment. Moreover, it shows that inquiry is a case in point. Since knowledge is the constitutive aim of inquiry, it follows that there are substantive constraints on the means for attaining knowledge and on the environment in which knowledge can be had. Chapter 3 goes on to develops a more detailed account of these constraints in terms of abilities to know and shows how these conditions can be used to solve the Gettier problem. It discusses a number of key objections and offers responses.

Consistency and Shifts in Gettier Cases

Two Gettier cases are described in detail and it is shown how they unfold in terms of reflective and reflexive desiderata. It is argued that the Gettier problem does not pose a problem for conceptions of knowledge as long as we are consistent in how we understand justification and knowledge. It is only by reading the cases with a reflective understanding of justification but a reflexive understanding of knowledge, without acknowledging that this takes place, that the cases become ‘problems.’

Elusive luck: Contextualist approach to the Gettier problem

Lewis' philosophical ambition to eradicate the skeptical threat towards infallibilism was the driving force behind his contextualist approach to knowledge. One of the discerning characteristics of his conversational contextualism is the claim that it can solve the Gettier problem. The first part of this paper will be directed towards explicating the arguments Lewis employed in reaching said solution. The second part will be concerned with Cohen?s critique of the proposed explanation. Cohen?s considerations result in an insight that contextualism does not have the adequate means to answer the Gettier challenge. Finally, I shall make an attempt at further motivating Cohen?s claim by investigating the essential component of Gettier cases - epistemic luck. This will be done by appealing to Pritchard?s concept of veritic epistemic luck. The author?s goal is to suggest that contextualist resources are neither suitable to solve nor exhaustively articulate the Gettier problem.

Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology

The internalism/externalism distinction in epistemology applies to both theories of justification and theories of knowledge. The distinction is most clearly defined for theories of justification. An internalist theory of epistemic justification is any theory that maintains that epistemic justifiedness is exclusively a function of states internal to the cognizer. Externalism is the denial of internalism. Thus, an externalist theory is any theory that maintains that epistemic justifiedness is at least partly a function of states or factors external to the cognizer, i.e., states or factors outside the cognizer’s ken. There is no unified agreement among internalists as to which internal states are epistemically relevant, and different internalisms emerge based on the subset of internal states deemed relevant. (See Internalism and Justification for details.) Internalists typically maintain that justification is a normative notion in the belief-guiding/regulative sense. Internalists also typically maintain that one can tell whether one is justified in believing p simply by reflecting on one’s internal evidence for p. The central internalist intuition, as highlighted by the New Evil Demon Problem is this: There can be no difference in justification without a difference in epistemically relevant internal states. Externalism is motivated by the intuition that epistemic justification must be conceptually connected to truth such that the conditions that make a belief justified also make it objectively probable. Externalists are also typically motivated by the view that children and animals can form justified beliefs, while failing to satisfy the internalist’s intellectualist requirements for justification. The dominant externalist theory of justification is process reliabilism, a simplified version of which holds that a belief is justified iff it’s produced by a reliable process. There is less canonical agreement when it comes to applying the internalist/externalist distinction to theories of knowledge. In one sense, every plausible epistemology is an externalist theory because every plausible epistemology requires an externalist truth condition and an externalist Gettier-blocking fillip. However, in another widely used sense, “externalist” theories of knowledge are theories that replace the internalist justification condition with either an externalist justification condition or some other externalist constraint (such as a causal or modal constraint); while “internalist” theories of knowledge hold that internalist justification is necessary for knowledge and also typically hold that no other kind of justification is needed for knowledge, though they do incorporate some sort of externalist constraint to handle the Gettier problem.