Epilogue

In the Epilogue, various possible implications of Survival Nihilism are considered. It is argued, first, that Rational Egoism must be rejected if Survival Nihilism is true. Second, the question of whether Survival Nihilism excludes both the possibilities of compensation and of moral responsibility is examined. The conclusion is that it does but only if compensation and moral responsible require that there some relation matters in survival, but it is uncertain one way or the other that this is a requirement of either compensation or moral responsibility. Finally, the possibility of a purely pragmatic justification for having a practice of prudential concern—organized around identity or some other relation—that cannot be defeated by metaphysical considerations is assessed. It is suggested that, in fact, given the metaphysical reflections of this work, a pragmatic justification for adopting a practice of prudential concern, so organized, would not mean that identity or an alternative non-identity relation would give you a non-derivative or derivative reason for prudential concern.

Fission and Indeterminacy

In Chapter 3, the assumption that facts about personal identity are always fully determinate is put to one side so as to consider mappings of identity onto fission according to which it is indeterminate that the fissioner is identical to each fission product. In this chapter, the suggestion that what matters in survival is a relation that is “identity-based” but compatible with such indeterminacy is examined and rejected. In addition, an alternate claim is discussed according to which it is indeterminate, but nearly true that fissioner is identical to each fission product and it is that nearness to identity that really matters. This claim is rejected. It is concluded that identity and “identity-based” relations do not matter in fission.

Introduction

In the Introduction, the main questions and line of argument of this work are outlined. A summary of the critical part of this work is presented, the focus of which is on improving upon Parfit’s “Divergence Argument” for the thesis that identity is not what matters in survival, but showing that this argument still fails. Second, the positive argument of this work, the “triviality argument,” is outlined. This argument appeals to the idea that the important cannot depend on the trivial. According this argument, identity never matters in survival but neither does any other relation. The result is what I call “survival nihilism.”

The Divergence Argument

In Chapters 1 through 4, the Divergence Argument is refined and assessed. According to this two-step argument, it can be demonstrated that identity does not matter in fission and from fission cases, and, perhaps, other “divergent” cases, we can generalize to all cases of survival. In Chapters 1 through Chapter 3, it is argued that identity does not matter in fission since all mappings of identity onto fission seem clearly to lead to this result. In Chapter 1 itself, four such mappings are examined: (1) the fissioner is identical to both fission products; (2) the fissioner is identical to neither fission product; (3) the fissioner is identical to the fusion of the fission products; and (4) the fissioner is identical to one, but not the other of the fission products. Given each of these options, the result is the same—identity does not matter in fission.

Fission and Shared Stages

In Chapter 2, a fifth mapping of identity on to fission is considered, one that rejects the assumption that different people cannot shared stages. One variant of this “shared stage” approach is the idea that there are two people all along in fission and these two people wholly share a stage prior to fission. The claimed consequence is that the relation of different stages being stages of a common person and the relation that matters in survival do not diverge from each other in fission. It is pointed out that the relation of being stages of a common person is not the proper analogue—in the framework of temporal parts—of the “identity” of the commonsense proposition that “identity matters.” The proper analogue relation is outlined and the divergence in fission reemerges. An alternate version of the fifth mapping—there are two people all along in fission who only partially overlap prior to fission—does not eliminate this divergence.

The Non-Triviality Principle and Objections to Its Application

In Chapter 6, six objections to the application of the Non-Triviality Principle in the triviality argument are examined. According to the first objection, the Non-Triviality Principle does not apply to the kind of facts referenced in the triviality argument. According to the second and third objections, the triviality argument depends on what are claimed to be false assumptions about causation—respectively, that causation comes in degrees and that probabilistic causation implies that causation is scalar. The fourth objection is that the relation that matters varies in strength with the strength of the causal connection, but the triviality argument wrongly assumes otherwise. The fifth objection is that the triviality argument works only if reasons externalism is true, but reasons internalism is true. The sixth objection is that the triviality argument fails if particularism or brutalism applies to what matters in survival. None of these objections, it is argued, hit their targets.

Generalizing from Fission

In Chapter 4, the second step of the Divergence Argument is assessed. This second step consists in generalizing from fission, and, perhaps, other divergent cases, to the conclusion that identity never matters. Various positive rationales offered in support of this inference are examined. One such rationale involves positing cases of identity both without a certain relevant psychological/physical relation (Parfit’s M relation) and without what matters. But it is suggested that there no uncontroversial basis for positing the possibility of cases fitting this pattern. It is also argued that a rationale that appeals to simplicity does not take us to this general result. In addition, it is demonstrated that a further rationale that depends on the claim that the constitution relation between facts about identity and facts about psychological continuity is sufficient to ground this final inference is based on a principle that is subject to counterexamples. It is concluded that it is not plausible to think that the Divergence Argument for the claim that identity never matters is successful.

The Triviality Argument

In Chapter 5, a line of argument for the thesis that identity never matters in survival that does not require the generalizing step of the Divergence Argument is developed. This is the “triviality argument” and it depends on the Non-Triviality Principle that dictates that the important cannot depend on the trivial. This argument successfully leads to the result that identity does not matter, but only as a component of a more far-reaching result, Survival Nihilism. It is demonstrated that various candidates for the relation that matters in survival are either highly implausible or do not satisfy the Non-Triviality Principle whether or not one adopts a reductionist and a non-reductionist account of personal identity.