Epilogue

2021 ◽  
pp. 201-218
Author(s):  
Douglas Ehring
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Identity Relation ◽  
The Other ◽  
Pragmatic Justification ◽  
Rational Egoism

In the Epilogue, various possible implications of Survival Nihilism are considered. It is argued, first, that Rational Egoism must be rejected if Survival Nihilism is true. Second, the question of whether Survival Nihilism excludes both the possibilities of compensation and of moral responsibility is examined. The conclusion is that it does but only if compensation and moral responsible require that there some relation matters in survival, but it is uncertain one way or the other that this is a requirement of either compensation or moral responsibility. Finally, the possibility of a purely pragmatic justification for having a practice of prudential concern—organized around identity or some other relation—that cannot be defeated by metaphysical considerations is assessed. It is suggested that, in fact, given the metaphysical reflections of this work, a pragmatic justification for adopting a practice of prudential concern, so organized, would not mean that identity or an alternative non-identity relation would give you a non-derivative or derivative reason for prudential concern.

On the Relation Between Collective Responsibility and Collective Duties

Philosophy ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 96 (1) ◽  
pp. 99-131
Author(s):  
Niels de Haan
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Good Reason ◽  
Collective Responsibility ◽  
The Other ◽  
Individual Responsibility ◽  
Type Symmetry ◽  
Moral Demands

AbstractThere is good reason to think that moral responsibility as accountability is tied to the violation of moral demands. This lends intuitive support to Type-Symmetry in the collective realm: A type of responsibility entails the violation or unfulfillment of the same type of all-things-considered duty. For example, collective responsibility necessarily entails the violation of a collective duty. But Type-Symmetry is false. In this paper I argue that a non-agential group can be collectively responsible without thereby violating a collective duty. To show this I distinguish between four types of responsibility and duty in collective contexts: corporate, distributed, collective, shared. I set out two cases: one involves a non-reductive collective action that constitutes irreducible wrongdoing, the other involves a non-divisible consequence. I show that the violation of individual or shared duties both can lead to irreducible wrongdoing for which only the group is responsible. Finally, I explain why this conclusion does not upset any work on individual responsibility.

Autonomy and Addiction

2006 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 427-447 ◽  
Author(s):  
Neil Levy
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Human Agency ◽  
The Other ◽  
Reasons Responsiveness ◽  
Extended Agency ◽  
Conception Of The Good ◽  
Autonomous Agency ◽  
The Way

Whatever its implications for the other features of human agency at its best — for moral responsibility, reasons-responsiveness, self-realization, flourishing, and so on—addiction is universally recognized as impairing autonomy. But philosophers have frequently misunderstood the nature of addiction, and therefore have not adequately explained the manner in which it impairs autonomy. Once we recognize that addiction is not incompatible with choice or volition, it becomes clear that none of the Standard accounts of autonomy can satisfactorily explain the way in which it undermines fully autonomous agency. In order to understand to what extent and in what ways the addicted are autonomy-impaired, we need to understand autonomy as consisting, essentially, in the exercise of the capacity for extended agency. It is because addiction undermines extended agency, so that addicts are not able to integrate their lives and pursue a Single conception of the good, that it impairs autonomy.

Animal rights – Jewish perspectives

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronen Pinkas
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Animal Rights ◽  
Golden Rule ◽  
The Other ◽  
Jewish Tradition ◽  
Strict Adherence ◽  
The Status ◽  
The Face ◽  
Pain And Suffering ◽  
Paradigmatic Change

This article raises the question why is it that, despite Jewish tradition devoting much thought to the status and treatment of animals and showing strict adherence to the notion of preventing their pain and suffering, ethical attitudes to animals are not dealt with systematically in the writings of Jewish philosophers and have not received sufficient attention in the context of moral monotheism. What has prevented the expansion of the golden rule: »Love your fellow as yourself: I am the LORD« (Lev 19,18) and »That which is hateful to you do not do to another« (BT Shabbat 31a:6; JT Nedarim 30b:1) to animals? Why is it that the moral responsibility for the fellow-man, the neighbor, or the other, has been understood as referring only to a human companion? Does the demand for absolute moral responsibility spoken from the face of the other, which Emmanuel Levinas emphasized in his ethics, not radiate from the face of the non-human other as well? Levinas’s ethics explicitly negates the principle of reciprocity and moral symmetry: The ›I‹ is committed to the other, regardless of the other’s attitude towards him. Does the affinity to the eternal Thou which Martin Buber also discovers in plants and animals not require a paradigmatic change in the attitude towards animals?

The Third Antinomy Resolved

2021 ◽  
pp. 299-324
Author(s):  
Ian Proops
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
Human Freedom ◽  
The Other ◽  
Moral Argument ◽  
The Third ◽  
Moral Growth ◽  
Indirect Argument

This chapter examines the resolution of the third antinomy. Kant argues that the thesis and antithesis are (roughly speaking) sub-contraries rather than contradictories. However, the sense in which he maintains that the thesis and antithesis ‘can both be true’ is delicate. He holds that the truth of neither claim excludes the truth of the other; but this is compatible with necessary falsehood of the thesis, which affirms the existence of human freedom. Importantly, Kant does not take himself to show on theoretical grounds that freedom is even logically possible. The chapter also discusses: Kant’s conceptions of intelligible causality and of empirical and intelligible character; moral responsibility; moral growth; the rationality of blame; Kant’s criticisms of Leibniz’s compatibilism; the third antinomy as an indirect argument for Transcendental Idealism; and the first-Critique’s version of a moral argument for freedom. Kant emerges as a ‘soft determinist’ of a highly unusual stripe.

Educating for well-being and autonomy

2008 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-93 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefaan E. Cuypers ◽  
Ishtiyaque Haji
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Philosophy Of Education ◽  
Well Being ◽  
The Other ◽  
Free Agency ◽  
Liberal Ideal ◽  
The One

Liberals champion the view that promoting autonomy — seeing to it that our children develop into individuals who are self-governing in the conduct of their lives — is a vital aim of education, though one generally accredited as being subsidiary to well-being. Our prime goal in this article is to provide a partial validation of this liberal ideal against the backdrop of a freedom-sensitive attitudinal hedonism — our favored life-ranking axiology.We propose that there is a pivotal connection between the concept of maximizing well-being and another concept central in the philosophy of education and in the literature on free agency: the concept of our springs of action, such as our desires or beliefs, being `truly our own' or, alternatively, autonomous. We suggest that it is the freedom that moral responsibility requires that bridges the overarching aim of securing well-being, on the one hand, and the subsidiary aim of promoting autonomy, on the other.

FC31-05 - Mental disorder and moral responsibility

2011 ◽  
Vol 26 (S2) ◽  
pp. 1993-1993
Author(s):  
G. Meynen
Keyword(s):  
Mental Disorders ◽  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Mental Disorder ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Conceptual Analysis ◽  
Detrimental Effect ◽  
The Other ◽  
Related Factors ◽  
The One

IntroductionMental disorders are often considered to be able to undermine a person's moral responsibility, at least in some respect. Yet, it is unclear exactly how mental disorders would be capable of compromising a person's responsibility. Sometimes, it is suggested that mental disorders undermine responsibility via some detrimental effect on free will.ObjectivesEstablishing to what extent the effect of mental disorder on moral responsibility might be due to an effect on free will, and to what extent other factors might play a role.AimsProviding an analysis of the concept of free will and assessing the relevance of the elements of this concept with respect to mental disorders. Second, establishing what other - not free will related - factors might be relevant to the intuition that mental disorders can undermine responsibility.MethodsConceptual analysis with respect to free will and moral responsibility on the one hand and specific features of mental disorders on the other.ResultsSome of the responsibility-undermining features of mental disorders could have to do primarily with free will related issues. However, for some other aspects it is less clear. In fact, they might be more epistemic in nature instead of having to do with free will.ConclusionsThe possible effects of mental disorders on moral responsibility are likely to involve also other than free will related factors.

scholarly journals „Quo Vadis, Aida?“ in the Context of Prosthetic Memory

2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (4(17)) ◽  
pp. 207-224
Author(s):  
Lamija Milišić
Keyword(s):  
Critical Thinking ◽  
Mass Media ◽  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Modern Society ◽  
The Other ◽  
Historical Knowledge ◽  
Current Perspective ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Quo Vadis ◽  
Epistemological Uncertainty

The research for this paper was initially prompted by the insights of Alison Landsberg (Prosthetic Memory, 2004) on the development of prosthetic memory, namely the phenomenon of personally experienced content through the mass media – and the idea to apply the same insights to the film "Quo Vadis, Aida" (2020) directed by Jasmila Žbanić, because of the relevance of its topic on the Srebrenica genocide in 1995 for modern society. This paper analyzes the difference between collective and prosthetic memory, affective engagement concerning the process of identification in acquiring historical knowledge and prosthetic memory, and the elements of the film that encourage epistemological uncertainty and therefore potentially develop historical awareness and responsibility. Given the example of the film "Quo Vadis, Aida?", this paper aims to show the potential of mass media in developing prosthetic memory, which consequently brings to thinking about the other from the current perspective, thus encouraging moral responsibility and critical thinking.

Metaphysics of Group Moral Responsibility

2020 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 238-247
Author(s):  
Bhaskarjit Neog
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Moral Agency ◽  
Methodological Individualism ◽  
The Other ◽  
Individual Person ◽  
Intentional Actions ◽  
Individualism And Collectivism ◽  
Alternative Position ◽  
Moral Assessment ◽  
Similar Assessment

The concept of group moral responsibility is apparently problematic, in that it is unobvious in what sense a group, which is evidently not a conscious rational subject like an individual person, can be held morally accountable. It is unclear how a group can be said to have the ability to form beliefs and intentions needed for genuine group actions of moral assessment. Broadly speaking, there are two separate platforms from which one can investigate this problem: individualism and collectivism. Subscribing to the doctrinal position of methodological individualism, individualists suggest that individual members are the only capable entities, who can meaningfully bear the burden of moral responsibility, either individually or in a shared way. Collectivists, on the other hand look for an alternative position wherein they advocate the genuine possibility of attributing moral responsibility to groups qua groups. The collectivist approach has received substantial philosophical attention in recent years. However, most supporters of collectivism search for such possibility without strongly invoking the idea of group moral agency. In this article, I argue for an irreducible moral agential status of groups in terms of the intentional actions of their constituent individual members and their special conglomeration. I suggest that certain collective or group entities are capable of being identified as proper agents of moral assessment analogous to that of individual agents of similar assessment.

‘Irresistible Impulse’ and Moral Responsibility

1977 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 99-134
Author(s):  
Susan Khin Zaw
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Mentally Ill ◽  
Human Action ◽  
The Other ◽  
Legal Tradition ◽  
Human Actions ◽  
Moral Appraisal ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The Difference

Should the insane and the mentally ill be held morally responsible for their actions? To answer ‘No’ to this question is to classify the mentally abnormal as not fully human: and indeed legal tradition has generally oscillated between assimilating the insane to brutes and assimilating them to children below the age of discretion, neither of these two categories being accountable in law for what they do. In what respect relevant to moral responsibility were the insane held to resemble brutes and children? In the case of brutes, the answer seems to have been that the doings of the insane appeared to lack whatever it is that marks out human actions as distinctively human. What the insane did could not be thought of as issuing from deliberation, or as capable of having issued from deliberation, but seemed rather to be the result of the unbridled operation of nature — if a diseased nature. The natural comparison with insane killings seemed to be, for example, the killing of birds by cats. This distinction between animal doings and human actions does not depend on Cartesian views about the workings of animals; the operation of nature need not be thought of as mechanical. The thought is simply that where there is no room for deliberation there is no room for moral appraisal. Children, on the other hand, though capable of distinctively human action — i.e. of deliberating about what they do — were held not to be capable of the relevant kind of deliberation: for they were held ‘not to know the difference between right and wrong’.

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