Epilogue

In the Epilogue, various possible implications of Survival Nihilism are considered. It is argued, first, that Rational Egoism must be rejected if Survival Nihilism is true. Second, the question of whether Survival Nihilism excludes both the possibilities of compensation and of moral responsibility is examined. The conclusion is that it does but only if compensation and moral responsible require that there some relation matters in survival, but it is uncertain one way or the other that this is a requirement of either compensation or moral responsibility. Finally, the possibility of a purely pragmatic justification for having a practice of prudential concern—organized around identity or some other relation—that cannot be defeated by metaphysical considerations is assessed. It is suggested that, in fact, given the metaphysical reflections of this work, a pragmatic justification for adopting a practice of prudential concern, so organized, would not mean that identity or an alternative non-identity relation would give you a non-derivative or derivative reason for prudential concern.

“Yes, but…” Yes, and…” - A Sympathetic Challenge (and Reframing) of Matusov’s “The Right for Freedom of Education.”

In this response to Matusov's "Right for Freedom in Education," I will offer two “yes, but…” concerns about crucial complexities of this freedom that I think Matusov leaves unaddressed, and a “yes, and…” alternative pragmatic justification of this freedom that differs from, but I think is more compelling than, Matusov’s.

The Proportionality Puzzle in Contract Law: A Challenge for Private Law Theory?

This article explores the emerging use of the proportionality concept in the contract law of the Anglo-common law world, first to understand its internal logic, and secondly, to situate its invocation within private law theory. What are judges doing when they appeal to “proportionality”?, and what does this say about the ideology of adjudication? I draw insights from the use of proportionality in other domains, in particular public law, to uncover its internal rationality as a means-ends rationality review coupled with a process of balancing competing considerations, which I illustrate with reference to the illegality, penalty, and cost of cure doctrines. I argue that proportionality reflects a method of pragmatic justification, expressing an aspiration towards a structured and transparent mode of argumentation that is anti-formal and anti-ideological, focusing from the bottom-up on contextual considerations, and occupying a distinct space against existing theories in private law driven, for instance, by “top-down”? rights-based ideologies or critical and communitarian perspectives.

The Green Open Access

This chapter considers green open access (e.g., OARs). OARs constitute a contemporary response regarding the dissemination of information. Thus, it is important to examine theoretical arguments about the desirability of OARs in the digital age. The chapter argues that OARs could be seen as a form of social justice towards strengthening social cohesion in modern societies. The argument relies on the concept of public policy as one means of achieving social justice. The discussion about OARs aligns with public policy, and social justice considerations should be examined. Additionally, the chapter demonstrates that public policy should concentrate on social cohesion, whereas open access could be considered as an instrument towards social cohesion. The chapter is divided into three broad topics. First, two main justifications for access to knowledge are addressed: (1) the philosophical justification, based on the concept that knowledge is power, and it is significant that everyone has access to knowledge; and (2) the pragmatic justification that it is impractical to enforce copyright in the traditional sense in this digital age. Second, the concept of social justice and relevant theories are considered. Third, theories concerning connections between public policy and social justice towards social cohesion are examined.

Contract Damages, Moral Agency, and Henry James’ The Ambassadors

This paper enters the dispute over the proper interpretation of the expectation measure of damages in contract law. Should damages be measured by the plaintiff’s financial loss or by the cost of acquiring a substitute performance (“cost of cure”)? I begin by presenting a moral (as opposed to an economic or a pragmatic) justification for the traditional contract principle that a plaintiff has a right to compensation for the financial loss flowing from breach but no right to performance. I do so by showing that implicit in the principle that the plaintiff has a right to compensation for financial loss alone is a conception of moral agency as a capacity for detachment from things. Through an exploration of Henry James’ novel The Ambassadors, I try to show what is valuable in that conception, although I argue that it is, in the end, incomplete. Then I consider the self-authorship conception of moral agency implicit in the moralist’s proposal to replace the financial loss remedy with a right to performance or to compensation for the cost of securing a substitute performance. Again, through a reading of James’ novel, I try to show what is valuable in this conception although I argue that it too is incomplete. I suggest that the conceptions of moral agency respectively implicit in the financial loss and cost of cure remedies are constituent parts of a complete conception. Once we see this, we arrive at a moral justification for a contract law which treats compensation for financial loss as the normal rule but exceptionally allows for a remedy that aims at securing performance.

THE META-INDUCTIVE JUSTIFICATION OF INDUCTION

ABSTRACTI evaluate Schurz's proposed meta-inductive justification of induction, a refinement of Reichenbach's pragmatic justification that rests on results from the machine learning branch of prediction with expert advice.My conclusion is that the argument, suitably explicated, comes remarkably close to its grand aim: an actual justification of induction. This finding, however, is subject to two main qualifications, and still disregards one important challenge.The first qualification concerns the empirical success of induction. Even though, I argue, Schurz's argument does not need to spell out what inductive method actually consists in, it does need to postulate that there is something like the inductive or scientific prediction strategy that has so far been significantly more successful than alternative approaches. The second qualification concerns the difference between having a justification for inductive method and for sticking with induction for now. Schurz's argument can only provide the latter. Finally, the remaining challenge concerns the pool of alternative strategies, and the relevant notion of a meta-inductivist's optimality that features in the analytic step of Schurz's argument. Building on the work done here, I will argue in a follow-up paper that the argument needs a stronger dynamic notion of a meta-inductivist's optimality.

Philosophical difficulties of stakeholder theory

Philosophical difficulties of stakeholder theory—which plays an important role in CSR and business ethics—are mainly connected to the questions of its status and justification. What sense does stakeholder theory have: descriptive, instrumental or normative? And if normative, why then should executives worry about multiple stakeholder demands? It is well known that Freeman, one of the most important authors of stakeholder theory, deliberately disregarded these problems. In philosophical questions, he invoked Rorty’s pragmatism that in his opinion effectively undermined the “positivistic” dichotomy between facts and values, science and ethics, and enabled stakeholder theory to be understood as both descriptive and normative. The article presents some difficulties connected with this view, focusing on its dubious assumptions and unfavourable consequences. These assumptions contain a false dilemma, taken from Rorty, which states that knowledge follows either a rule of representation or a rule of solidarity. One of the unfavourable consequences is the conclusion that stakeholder theory may be true only if its followers are able to force the stakeholders to accept its truthfulness. The main thesis of the article says that, because of pragmatic justification, stakeholder theory became a sort of arbitrary narration, which is unable to deal with its (empirical) misuses. However, a more traditional view on facts and values enables us to appreciate the descriptive advantages of the theory and to identify difficulties connected with its normative layer. From this point of view, the attempt at a pragmatic interpretation of stakeholder theory was a misunderstanding that should be withdrawn from circulation.