Risk Transfer and Pricing of Illiquid Assets with Loan CDS

Author(s):  
Michael Schwalba ◽  
Matthias Korn ◽  
Konstantin Müller
2016 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 30
Author(s):  
Nooriha Abdullah ◽  
Darinka Asenova ◽  
Stephen J. Bailey

The aim of this paper is to analyse the risk transfer issue in Public Private Partnership/Private Finance Initiative (PPP/PFI) procurement documents in the United Kingdom (UK) and Malaysia. It utilises qualitative research methods using documentation and interviews for data collection. The UK documents (guidelines and contracts) identify the risks related to this form of public procurement of services and makeexplicittheappropriateallocation of those risks between the public and the private sector PPP/PFI partners and so the types of risks each party should bear. However, in Malaysia, such allocation of risks was not mentioned in PPP/PFI guidelines. Hence, a question arises regarding whether risk transfer exists in Malaysian PPP/PFI projects, whether in contracts or by other means. This research question is the rationale for the comparative analysis ofdocumentsand practicesrelatingtorisk transfer in the PPP/PFI procurements in both countries. The results clarify risk-related issues that arise in implementing PPP/PFI procurement in Malaysia, in particular how risk is conceptualised, recognised and allocated (whether explicitly or implicitly), whether or not that allocation is intended to achieve optimum risk transfer, and so the implications forachievement ofvalue for moneyor other such objectivesinPPP/PFI.


2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giovanni Calice ◽  
Christos Ioannidis ◽  
Julian M. Williams

Author(s):  
Jan Pieter Krahnen ◽  
Christian Wilde
Keyword(s):  

2017 ◽  
Vol 92 (6) ◽  
pp. 1-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tim Baldenius ◽  
Beatrice Michaeli

ABSTRACT We demonstrate a novel link between relationship-specific investments and risk in a setting where division managers operate under moral hazard and collaborate on joint projects. Specific investments increase efficiency at the margin. This expands the scale of operations and thereby adds to the compensation risk borne by the managers. Accounting for this investment/risk link overturns key findings from prior incomplete contracting studies. We find that if the investing manager has full bargaining power vis-à-vis the other manager, he will underinvest relative to the benchmark of contractible investments; with equal bargaining power, however, he may overinvest. The reason is that the investing manager internalizes only his own share of the investment-induced risk premium (we label this a “risk transfer”), whereas the principal internalizes both managers' incremental risk premia. We show that high pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) reduces the managers' incentives to invest in relationship-specific assets. The optimal PPS, thus, trades off investment and effort incentives.


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