Hostile Takeovers

2018 ◽  
pp. 117-148
Keyword(s):  
2007 ◽  
pp. 70-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. Demidova

This article analyzes definitions and the role of hostile takeovers at the Russian and European markets for corporate control. It develops the methodology of assessing the efficiency of anti-takeover defenses adapted to the conditions of the Russian market. The paper uses the cost-benefit analysis, where the costs and benefits of the pre-bid and post-bid defenses are compared.


2006 ◽  
Vol 7 (6) ◽  
pp. 603-610 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefan Maier

In German post-war history, hardly any other trial concerning economic criminal cases attracted as much interest as the so-called Mannesmann trial. This is for two main reasons. First, the facts that form the basis of the decision, that is, the hostile takeover of the German Mannesmann AG by the British Vodafone, attracted much attention and sparked public discussion about eliminating the very possibility of hostile takeovers in general in Germany. Second, interest in the case was due to the magnitude of the bonuses granted and the significance this had for the public at large. As a consequence of this trial and the settled payments, the debate around the appropriateness of executive compensations, existing prior to the case, grew more acute. After all, the current draft law to disclose executive pay resulted from these debates about the size of the compensations.


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