Which Corporate Governance Model will Reign Becomes a Matter of Public Debate

2017 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 158-175
Author(s):  
Abiodun Jacob Osuntogun

This article examines the existing statutory and institutional framework for corporate human rights accountability in South Africa. It considers the questions whether corporations are duty bearers and whether they have responsibilities or obligations to respect human rights and the mode of corporate governance model adopted to regulate them. It argues that although the Bill of Rights adequately provides for the culture and entrenchment of corporate accountability for human rights, the possibility of achieving its objective is not certain because there is a wide gap between the fulfilment of the vision of the Constitution and the mechanism adopted for its realisation.


2018 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 107-120 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacob Errichetti ◽  
Saeed J. Roohani

ABSTRACT This paper utilizes corporate governance concepts to assess the merit of the Digital Accountability and Transparency Act of 2014 (DATA Act). The paper first compares the information flows seen in a corporate context to those seen in a governmental reporting context. The paper then utilizes agency theory to establish a conceptual link between the two reporting processes. This conceptual link is used to identify common goals between the participants in the information flows. Following this, a corporate governance model is used to outline factors that contribute to effective corporate governance. This governance model is then used as a basis for assessing the merit of the DATA Act. After this, differences between the participants in the information flows are discussed and limitations of the paper are acknowledged. The paper suggests that the DATA Act has merit due to its potential to improve transparency and monitoring in the governmental reporting process. Increased data timeliness and usability will enhance transparency, while improvements in automation, data transfer, and data analytics will improve monitoring. The conclusions of this paper have implications for the participants in the governmental reporting process including government agencies, legislators, regulatory bodies, contractors, non-voting taxpayers, and members of the voting public.


2014 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 18-36 ◽  
Author(s):  
Habib Jouber ◽  
Hamadi Fakhfakh

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether or not there is a link between CEO incentive-based compensation and earnings management and to examine how institutional environment's features influence such link. Design/methodology/approach – To test the predictions, the authors use a panel of 1,500 American, Canadian, British, and French firm-year observation over the period 2004-2008. Findings – The authors find a significant association between earnings management and CEO incentive-based compensation. Moreover, the analysis provides evidence that institutional factors are strong determinants of this association. Specifically, the results show that firms from countries within the Anglo-American corporate governance model, which provides greater protection of shareholder rights, ensures strict enforcement of law, and scores high on board oversight, tend to have lower level of earnings management. The analysis shows however, that beside the formal corporate governance quality, it is relevant to consider weaker shareholder protection and lower law enforcement indexes to explain earnings management in firms from countries within the Euro-Continental corporate governance model. Originality/value – This paper is the first to provide insights regarding the extent to which CEO incentive rewards imply management discretion and to indicate how much institutional features matter. The analysis contributes to two distinct strands of research. It extends prior research on the association between executive compensation and earnings management and adds to the literature demonstrating a relationship between institutional factors and financial decisions.


2016 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 70-111
Author(s):  
Wenjia Yan

As a global popular corporate governance system developed in the us, independent directors were officially adopted by China through ‘Guiding Opinions on the Establishment of Systems of Independent Directors by Listed Companies’ (hereinafter Independent Directors Opinion) in 2001 and through Article 123 of Company Law when it was amended in 2005. The emphasis on minority shareholders’ protection by adopting independent directors in China can be attributed to the global influence of the American corporate governance model, which depends on disinterested directors as independent decision-makers. However, with more than 10 years having passed, independent directors serve as powerless advisers rather than decision-makers in China. Accordingly, this paper aims to ascertain some profound reasons for powerless advisers in China and provide recommendations to address this problem by comparing the role of independent directors in China and the us.


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