scholarly journals The Efficiency of Optimal Taxes

2005 ◽  
pp. 3-12 ◽  
Author(s):  
George Karakostas ◽  
Stavros G. Kolliopoulos
Keyword(s):  
Optimal Taxes

Optimal tariffs, optimal taxes and public goods

1973 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 391-403 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. Boadway ◽  
S. Maital ◽  
M. Prachowny
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Optimal Taxes ◽  
Optimal Tariffs

scholarly journals The Welfare Impact of Second-Best Uniform-Pigouvian Taxation: Evidence from Transportation

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 211-242 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher R. Knittel ◽  
Ryan Sandler
Keyword(s):  
Market Failure ◽  
Social Cost ◽  
Deadweight Loss ◽  
Negative Externalities ◽  
Market Outcomes ◽  
Welfare Impact ◽  
Second Best ◽  
Pigouvian Taxes ◽  
Gasoline Taxes ◽  
Optimal Taxes

When consumers or firms don’t face the true social cost of their actions, market outcomes are inefficient. In the case of negative externalities, Pigouvian taxes are one way to correct this market failure, but it may be infeasible to tax the externality directly. The alternative, taxing a related product, will be second-best. In this paper, we show that in the presence of heterogeneous externalities and elasticities, this type of indirect tax performs poorly. In our empirical application, gasoline taxes to address pollution externalities, less than a third of the deadweight loss of the externality is addressed by second-best optimal taxes. (JEL D62, H21, H23, H71, H76, Q53, R48)

Optimal Mirrleesean Taxation in a Ben-Porath Economy

2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 219-248 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marek Kapička
Keyword(s):  
Human Capital ◽  
Life Cycle ◽  
Income Taxes ◽  
Optimal Tax ◽  
Cycle Economy ◽  
The Us ◽  
Optimal Taxes

I characterize optimal taxes in a life-cycle economy where ability and human capital are unobservable. I show that unobservable human capital effectively makes preferences over labor nonseparable across age. I generalize the static optimal tax formulas to account for such nonseparabilities and show how they depend both on own-Frisch labor elasticities and cross-Frisch labor elasticities. I calibrate the economy to US data. I find that the optimal marginal income taxes decrease with age, in contrast to both the US tax code and to a model with observable human capital. I demonstrate that the behavior of cross-Frisch elasticities is essential in explaining the decline. (JEL D91, H21, H24, J24)

Optimal taxes and pensions with myopic agents

2013 ◽  
Vol 42 (3) ◽  
pp. 597-618
Author(s):  
Kerstin Roeder
Keyword(s):  
Optimal Taxes

scholarly journals An Estimable Model of Income Redistribution in a Federation: Musgrave Meets Oates

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 406-434 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin Milligan ◽  
Michael Smart
Keyword(s):  
Tax Avoidance ◽  
Tax Base ◽  
Tax Rate ◽  
Personal Taxes ◽  
Cross Border ◽  
State Tax ◽  
Decentralization Reform ◽  
National Tax ◽  
Optimal Taxes ◽  
Personal Taxation

We develop a theory of cross-border income shifting in response to subnational personal taxation in a federation and examine its implications for the excess burden of personal taxes. We show how a properly chosen federal tax rate can offset the fiscal externality between states and facilitate decentralization, even in a heterogeneous federation where unitary taxation is suboptimal. Optimal taxes depend on the elasticities of national tax avoidance and of cross-state tax base shifting. We estimate these elasticities around a tax decentralization reform in Canada, finding both to be empirically relevant. We discuss the implications for optimal federalism. (JEL D31, H21, H23, H24, H26, H71, H77)

scholarly journals Optimal Taxes and the Structure of Preferences

Econometrica ◽  
1981 ◽  
Vol 49 (5) ◽  
pp. 1245 ◽  
Author(s):  
Angus Deaton
Keyword(s):  
Optimal Taxes

scholarly journals Optimal Taxes in Atomic Congestion Games

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-33
Author(s):  
Dario Paccagnan ◽  
Rahul Chandan ◽  
Bryce L. Ferguson ◽  
Jason R. Marden
Keyword(s):  
Marginal Cost ◽  
Price Of Anarchy ◽  
Local Information ◽  
Congestion Games ◽  
Shared Resources ◽  
Lower Efficiency ◽  
Traffic Routing ◽  
Linear Programming Formulation ◽  
Correlated Equilibria ◽  
Optimal Taxes

How can we design mechanisms to promote efficient use of shared resources? Here, we answer this question in relation to the well-studied class of atomic congestion games, used to model a variety of problems, including traffic routing. Within this context, a methodology for designing tolling mechanisms that minimize the system inefficiency (price of anarchy) exploiting solely local information is so far missing in spite of the scientific interest. In this article, we resolve this problem through a tractable linear programming formulation that applies to and beyond polynomial congestion games. When specializing our approach to the polynomial case, we obtain tight values for the optimal price of anarchy and corresponding tolls, uncovering an unexpected link with load balancing games. We also derive optimal tolling mechanisms that are constant with the congestion level, generalizing the results of Caragiannis et al. [8] to polynomial congestion games and beyond. Finally, we apply our techniques to compute the efficiency of the marginal cost mechanism. Surprisingly, optimal tolling mechanism using only local information perform closely to existing mechanism that utilize global information, e.g., Bilò and Vinci [6], while the marginal cost mechanism, known to be optimal in the continuous-flow model, has lower efficiency than that encountered levying no toll. All results are tight for pure Nash equilibria and extend to coarse correlated equilibria.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document