scholarly journals Semiperfect-Information Games

2005 ◽  
pp. 1-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Krishnendu Chatterjee ◽  
Thomas A. Henzinger
Keyword(s):  
Information Games

scholarly journals The simple geometry of perfect information games

2004 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 315-338 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefano Demichelis ◽  
Klaus Ritzberger ◽  
Jeroen M. Swinkels
Keyword(s):  
Perfect Information ◽  
Simple Geometry ◽  
Perfect Information Games ◽  
Information Games

scholarly journals Limited lookahead in imperfect-information games

2020 ◽  
Vol 283 ◽  
pp. 103218 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Kroer ◽  
Tuomas Sandholm
Keyword(s):  
Imperfect Information ◽  
Imperfect Information Games ◽  
Information Games

Strategic Interaction and Interstate Crises: A Bayesian Quantal Response Estimator for Incomplete Information Games

2008 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 250-273 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin Esarey ◽  
Bumba Mukherjee ◽  
Will H. Moore
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Learning Process ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Statistical Treatment ◽  
Quantal Response ◽  
Crisis Bargaining ◽  
Incomplete Information Games ◽  
Information Characteristics ◽  
Information Games

Private information characteristics like resolve and audience costs are powerful influences over strategic international behavior, especially crisis bargaining. As a consequence, states face asymmetric information when interacting with one another and will presumably try to learn about each others' private characteristics by observing each others' behavior. A satisfying statistical treatment would account for the existence of asymmetric information and model the learning process. This study develops a formal and statistical framework for incomplete information games that we term the Bayesian Quantal Response Equilibrium Model (BQRE model). Our BQRE model offers three advantages over existing work: it directly incorporates asymmetric information into the statistical model's structure, estimates the influence of private information characteristics on behavior, and mimics the temporal learning process that we believe takes place in international politics.

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