scholarly journals The simple geometry of perfect information games

2004 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 315-338 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefano Demichelis ◽  
Klaus Ritzberger ◽  
Jeroen M. Swinkels
Keyword(s):  
Perfect Information ◽  
Simple Geometry ◽  
Perfect Information Games ◽  
Information Games

scholarly journals BELIEF REVISION IN GAMES OF PERFECT INFORMATION

2004 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-115 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thorsten Clausing
Keyword(s):  
Belief Revision ◽  
Perfect Information ◽  
Backward Induction ◽  
Common Belief ◽  
Belief Condition ◽  
Perfect Information Games ◽  
Use Of Knowledge ◽  
Information Games

A syntactic formalism for the modeling of belief revision in perfect information games is presented that allows to define the rationality of a player's choice of moves relative to the beliefs he holds as his respective decision nodes have been reached. In this setting, true common belief in the structure of the game and rationality held before the start of the game does not imply that backward induction will be played. To derive backward induction, a “forward belief” condition is formulated in terms of revised rather than initial beliefs. Alternative notions of rationality as well as the use of knowledge instead of belief are also studied within this framework.

scholarly journals Best-Response Cycles in Perfect Information Games

2017 ◽  
Vol 42 (2) ◽  
pp. 427-433
Author(s):  
P. Jean-Jacques Herings ◽  
Arkadi Predtetchinski
Keyword(s):  
Perfect Information ◽  
Best Response ◽  
Perfect Information Games ◽  
Information Games

scholarly journals Best Response Cycles in Perfect Information Games

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
P. Jean-Jacques Herings ◽  
Arkadi Predtetchinski
Keyword(s):  
Perfect Information ◽  
Best Response ◽  
Perfect Information Games ◽  
Information Games

scholarly journals Several Remarks on Banach–Mazur Games and its Applications Ewa Drabik

2013 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-25
Author(s):  
Ewa Drabik
Keyword(s):  
Perfect Information ◽  
Perfect Information Games ◽  
Information Games

Abstract Certain type of perfect information games (PI-games), the so-called Banach-Mazur games, so far have not been applied in economy. The perfect information positional game is defined as the game during which at any time the choice is made by one of the players who is acquainted with the previous decision of his opponent. The game is run on the sequential basis. The aim of this paper is to discuss selected Banach-Mazur games and to present some applications of positional game

scholarly journals Non-existence of subgame-perfect $$\varepsilon $$ ε -equilibrium in perfect information games with infinite horizon

2014 ◽  
Vol 43 (4) ◽  
pp. 945-951 ◽  
Author(s):  
János Flesch ◽  
Jeroen Kuipers ◽  
Ayala Mashiah-Yaakovi ◽  
Gijs Schoenmakers ◽  
Eran Shmaya ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Infinite Horizon ◽  
Perfect Information ◽  
Perfect Information Games ◽  
Information Games
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