Institutional Analysis within Political Economy: The Work of Thorstein Veblen

Author(s):  
Matthew Watson
1995 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 117-147 ◽  
Author(s):  
JONAS PONTUSSON

The historical institutionalist tradition in comparative politics commonly assigns analytical primacy to political institutions. Whereas this polity-centeredness may be quite justifiable for purposes of comparative public policy, students of comparative political economy should pay systematic attention not only to economic institutions but also to a range of economic-structural variables that lie beyond the conventional confines of institutional analysis. Providing the basis for an analysis of collective actors and their interests, such an approach is needed to account for institutional change and policy realignments within stable institutions.


Author(s):  
Keith Krehbiel

This article discusses pivots and provides an overview of pivot theories. It also develops and illustrates a new form of comparative institutional analysis, which would serve as a means for discriminating between such theories. This article shows that pivot theories are rather flexible, and can be powerful tools of contemporary political economy.


2016 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Joshua I. Newman ◽  
Kyle S. Bunds

In its most artless definition, political economy refers to the study of inter- and intrastate transaction—concerned in large part with the dialectics of state governance and the production/consumption functions therein. Many of us, with varying degrees of deliberation, have read the works of forerunning political economists such as Adam Smith (c. 1723-1790), David Ricardo (c. 1772-1823), Thomas Malthus (c. 1766-1834), John Stuart Mill (c. 1806-1873), Karl Marx (c. 1818-1883), and Thorstein Veblen (c. 1857-1929). These classic political economists and their contemporaries shared a concern for the extent to which land, labor, income, capital, and the population derived value from, and maintained contingency with, state polity. While each diverged from the others in how to best organize the State in relation to markets and exchange activities (and vice versa) so as to optimize the citizenry’s well-being, these scholars and their contemporaries laid the foundations for the long-standing field of inquiry fixed on exploring how various national political systems (democracy, monarchy, aristocracy, oligarchy, etc.), markets, and political and economic behavior could bring about national prosperity, maximize individual freedom, or raise collective utility.


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