Operationalizing Respect for Persons

1983 ◽  
pp. 161-182 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert L. Dickman
Keyword(s):  
Respect For Persons

Liberalism

Philosophy ◽  
1974 ◽  
Vol 49 (187) ◽  
pp. 13-32 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. J. McCloskey
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Major Elements ◽  
Respect For Persons ◽  
Ethical Theories ◽  
Value Judgments ◽  
Philosophical Basis ◽  
Reduction Of Pain ◽  
Historical Fact ◽  
Social Arrangements ◽  
Liberal Thought

Liberalism is commonly believed, especially by its exponents, to be opposed to interference by way of enforcing value judgments or concerning itself with the individual's morality. My concern is to show that this is not so and that liberalism is all the better for this. Many elements have contributed to liberal thought as we know it today, the major elements being the liberalism of which Locke is the most celebrated exponent, which is based upon a belief in natural, human rights; the liberalism of which Kant is the best known exponent, which is based on respect for persons as ends in themselves; and the liberalism of Bentham and the Mills, which is based upon utilitarian ethical theories and most especially with concern for pleasure and the reduction of pain. These different elements of liberalism have led to different emphases and different political and social arrangements, but all have involved a concern to safeguard values and to use force to that end. Today they constitute strands of thought which go to make up liberal thought as we now know it, hence it is not simply a historical fact about liberalism, but a fact about its philosophical basis, that liberalism is firmly involved in certain value and moral commitments. In the remainder of this paper I shall seek to bring this out.

A New Look at Kantian Respect for Persons

Kant Yearbook ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ernesto V. Garcia
Keyword(s):  
Respect For Persons ◽  
New Look

Open Science, Closed Doors? Countering Marginalization through an Agenda for Ethical, Inclusive Research in Communication

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jesse Fox ◽  
Katy E Pearce ◽  
Adrienne L Massanari ◽  
Julius Matthew Riles ◽  
Łukasz Szulc ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Open Science ◽  
Research Community ◽  
Ethical Principles ◽  
Respect For Persons ◽  
Communication Research ◽  
Research Practices ◽  
Science Practices ◽  
Research Communication ◽  
The Future

Abstract The open science (OS) movement has advocated for increased transparency in certain aspects of research. Communication is taking its first steps toward OS as some journals have adopted OS guidelines codified by another discipline. We find this pursuit troubling as OS prioritizes openness while insufficiently addressing essential ethical principles: respect for persons, beneficence, and justice. Some recommended open science practices increase the potential for harm for marginalized participants, communities, and researchers. We elaborate how OS can serve a marginalizing force within academia and the research community, as it overlooks the needs of marginalized scholars and excludes some forms of scholarship. We challenge the current instantiation of OS and propose a divergent agenda for the future of Communication research centered on ethical, inclusive research practices.

The reasons of the unreasonable: Is political liberalism still an option?

2021 ◽  
pp. 019145372110405
Author(s):  
Benedetta Giovanola ◽  
Roberta Sala
Keyword(s):  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Social Solidarity ◽  
Strict Sense ◽  
Public Justification ◽  
Respect For Persons ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Liberal Societies ◽  
Harsh Criticism ◽  
Sense Of Justice

In this study, we claim that political liberalism, despite harsh criticism, is still the best option available for providing a just and stable society. However, we maintain that political liberalism needs to be revised so as to be justifiable from the perspective of not only the “reasonable” in a Rawlsian sense (that we define as “fully” reasonable) but also the ones whom Rawls labels as “unreasonable.” To support our claim, going beyond Rawls’s original account, we unpack the concept of unreasonableness and identify three different subsets that we label as the “partially reasonable,” the “non-reasonable,” and the “unreasonable.” We argue that both the “fully” reasonable and the “partially reasonable” would be included into the constituency of public justification; more specifically, we claim that the latter would support liberal institutions out of their reasons: we define these reasons as mutually intelligible reasons and claim that they allow to acknowledge the importance of a convergence approach to public justification. As for the “non-reasonable” and “unreasonable,” we claim that they cannot be included in the constituency of public justification, but they nonetheless could be compliant with liberal institutions if political liberalism offers them some reasons to comply: here, we claim that political liberalism should include them through engagement and propose reasoning from conjecture as an effecting way of offering reasons for compliance. In particular, we claim that through reasoning from conjecture, the “non-reasonable” could find conciliatory reasons to comply with liberal institutions on a stable base. With regard to the “unreasonable” in the strict sense, we claim that through reasoning from conjecture, their unreasonableness could be contained and they could find reasons—even if just self-interested—for complying with liberal institutions rather than defying them. In our discussion, we consider the different subsets not as “frozen” but as dynamic and open to change, and we aim to propose a more complex and multilayered approach to inclusion that would be able to include a wider set of people. To strengthen our argument, we show that the need for a wider public justification and for broader inclusion in liberal societies is grounded in respect for persons both as equal persons and as particular individuals. In particular, we claim that individuals’ values, ends, commitments, and affiliations activate demands of respect and can strengthen the commitment to the liberal–democratic order. Through a reformulation of the role of respect in liberal societies, we also show a kind of social and communitarian dimension that, we claim, is fully compatible with political liberalism and opens it up to “civic friendship” and “social solidarity,” which are constitutive elements for the development of a sense of justice and for the realization of a just and stable society.

scholarly journals Respect for Persons: Beyond the Mortal World

2009 ◽  
Vol 24 (6) ◽  
pp. 393-394
Author(s):  
Gregory Bierer
Keyword(s):  
Respect For Persons

Can't We All Just Respect One Another a Little Less?

2004 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 463-484
Author(s):  
Michael Neumann
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Respect For Persons ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Thomas Nagel ◽  
Moral Claims

Contemporary moral philosophy and much contemporary moralizing almost radiate respect for persons. Thomas Nagel is one of many who take its primacy for granted. In a review of Scanion he says:Scanlon's theory addresses a number of its central questions: first, the question of the objectivity or truth of moral Claims, their relation to reason, and whether or not they should be regarded as in some sense relative or subjective; second, the question of the kind of concern or respect for persons that is at the foundation of morality…Many others take the centrality and foundational role of such respect as a given. This is a big change from the days when moralists held that all human beings deserved a certain basic and equal disrespect.

Human Rights and the Vulnerability of Rights-bearers

2021 ◽  
Vol 65 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-67
Author(s):  
Diana Tietjens Meyers ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Human Dignity ◽  
Respect For Persons ◽  
Human Vulnerability ◽  
Vulnerable Subjects ◽  
Autonomous Agency ◽  
The Relationship

I seek to understand the relationship between human vulnerability and human rights as something more than a problem that respect for human rights solves. After characterizing vulnerability and noting that human rights are generally regarded as entitlements that respect the dignity of persons by securing their autonomous agency, I draw out the implications of these premises. I argue that human vulnerabilities are constitutive of the capacity for autonomous agency and therefore that the circumstances of respect for persons must include persons’ vulnerability to many sorts of harms. Given that the opportunity to lead one’s life in one’s own way—that is, the opportunity to exercise autonomous agency—is indispensable to human dignity, respect for persons entails respect for the vulnerability that underwrites autonomous agency. If so, rights-bearers are necessarily vulnerable subjects. I further defend this conception of rights-bearers by arguing that it comports with three types of human rights theory: agency-centered, needs-centered, and practice-based accounts of human rights.

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