Uniqueness of Competitive Equilibria in the Arrow-Debreu Model

Author(s):  
Thorsten Hens ◽  
Beate Pilgrim
Author(s):  
Chiara Donnini ◽  
Marialaura Pesce

AbstractIn this paper, we study the problem of a fair redistribution of resources among agents in an exchange economy á la Shitovitz (Econometrica 41:467–501, 1973), with agents’ measure space having both atoms and an atomless sector. We proceed by following the idea of Aubin (Mathematical methods of game economic theory. North-Holland, Amsterdam, New York, Oxford, 1979) to allow for partial participation of individuals in coalitions, that induces an enlargement of the set of ordinary coalitions to the so-called fuzzy or generalized coalitions. We propose a notion of fairness which, besides efficiency, imposes absence of envy towards fuzzy coalitions, and which fully characterizes competitive equilibria and Aubin-core allocations.


1998 ◽  
Vol 78 (1) ◽  
pp. 187-194 ◽  
Author(s):  
Atsushi Kajii

Author(s):  
Gui Wang ◽  
Matias Negrete-Pincetic ◽  
Anupama Kowli ◽  
Ehsan Shafieepoorfard ◽  
Sean Meyn ◽  
...  

Author(s):  
Nicolay V. Tsarevsky ◽  
Wade A. Braunecker ◽  
Alberto Vacca ◽  
Peter Gans ◽  
Krzysztof Matyjaszewski

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