Affirmative Consent

Author(s):  
Kevin Cole
Keyword(s):  
Screen Bodies ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 87-91
Author(s):  
Karen Fiss

In California, where I live, an affirmative consent law was recently passed: often referred to as the “yes means yes” standard for sexual assault, it is now required of all colleges receiving state funds. Supporters of the law argue that campus rapists can no longer be exonerated because their victims did not resist or were incapacitated by fear, shame, or intoxication. On the other side of the country, a student at Columbia University became an icon in this ongoing legal struggle by carrying her mattress around with her everywhere, including to her graduation, as a sign of protest against the university’s refusal to expel the male student who raped her.


2021 ◽  
pp. 162-173
Author(s):  
Eithne Dowds
Keyword(s):  

2021 ◽  
pp. 348-386
Author(s):  
Alexander A. Guerrero

Philosophers spend a lot of time discussing what consent is. In this chapter, Alexander Guerrero suggests that there are also hard and important epistemological questions about consent and that debates about consent often mistake epistemological issues for metaphysical ones. People who defend so-called “affirmative consent” views sometimes are accused of, or even take themselves to be, offering a new, controversial view about the nature of consent. Guerrero argues that this is a mistake. The right way of understanding “affirmative consent” is as a view about what is required, epistemically, before one can justifiably believe that another person has consented. This view will be justified, if it is, because of background views about epistemic justification and the way epistemic justification interacts with moral norms governing action. Guerrero concludes by discussing the implications of this view for the morality and law regarding consent.


Author(s):  
Lucinda Vandervort

This article proposes a rigorous method to map the law on to the facts in the legal analysis of sexual consent using a series of mandatory questions of law designed to eliminate the legal errors often made by decision makers who routinely rely on personal beliefs about and attitudes toward “normal sexual behavior” in screening and deciding cases. In Canada, sexual consent is affirmative consent, the communication by words or conduct of “voluntary agreement” to a specific sexual activity, with a specific person. As in many jurisdictions, however, the sexual assault laws are often not enforced. Reporting is lowest and non-enforcement highest in cases involving the most common type of assailants, those who are not strangers but instead persons the complainant knows, often quite well—acquaintances, supervisors or coworkers, and family members. Reliance on popular narratives about “seduction” and “stranger-danger” leads complainants, police, prosecutors, lawyers, and trial judges to truncate legal analysis of the facts and leap to erroneous conclusions about consent. Wrongful convictions and perverse acquittals, questionable plea bargains and ill-considered decisions not to charge, result. This proposal is designed to curtail the impact of prejudgments, assumptions, and biases in legal reasoning about voluntariness and affirmative agreement and to produce decisions that are legally sound, based on the application of the rule of law to the material facts. Law has long had better tools than the age-old and popular tales of “ravishment” and “seduction.” Those tools can and should be used.


2011 ◽  
Vol 49 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 303-304
Author(s):  
Tiffany M. Mueller ◽  
Zoë D. Peterson
Keyword(s):  

AUC IURIDICA ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 2018 (4) ◽  
pp. 131-141
Author(s):  
Sabina Krajíčková
Keyword(s):  

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 163-175 ◽  
Author(s):  
Monica K. Miller

Purpose Affirmative consent (AC) policies require potential sexual partners to clearly and positively confirm that they want to engage in sexual behavior – in contrast to standard “no means no” policies, which typically define consent through resistance. AC policies might not be effective because they do not align well with typical scripts of how consent is given in practice. This study aims to compare participants’ judgments as to what constitutes sexual assault, using either an AC policy or a standard “no means no” policy. Design/methodology/approach Participants read 16 scenarios depicting various male-female sexual encounters and applied either an AC or a standard “no means no” policy to determine whether the encounter was consensual. Findings When an AC policy was used, participants were more likely to judge the scenario as sexual assault. Aspects of the scenario (which reflect AC policy criteria), such as the type of communication (verbal or nonverbal), clarity of communication (clear or unclear) and resistance (high or low) also affected judgments of the scenario. Relationship type (stranger vs acquaintance) did not affect judgments. Students were more likely to perceive the scenarios as sexual assault than community members; they also perceived differences between scenarios based on verbal communication and clarity more than community members. Finally, there was no main effect of participant gender, however, men perceived differences between scenarios based on verbal communication type, whereas women did not. Research limitations/implications Findings indicate that participants are generally able to apply AC policies correctly, even though AC criteria do not generally align with common sexual scripts. Originality/value This is the first study known to test whether decision-makers can properly apply criteria outlined in AC policies and whether the application of these policies affect decisions-makers judgments as to whether a sexual encounter is consensual or assault.


2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 107-127 ◽  
Author(s):  
Japa Pallikkathayil

The way in which consent to sexual interactions is understood in the US is undergoing a transformation. Many universities, sometimes at the behest of lawmakers, are moving to adopt ‘affirmative consent’ policies, which define consent in terms of affirmative behavior that goes beyond mere silence or lack of resistance. Although these policies are a move in the right direction, I argue that their content has not been properly understood. In particular, the circumstances in which nonverbal behavior may communicate consent are more limited than might be apparent. And even though these circumstances can be abstractly identified, it is difficult to give people adequate guidance about when some of them obtain. Moreover, I argue that no matter how the allowance for nonverbal behavior is construed, affirmative consent policies unnecessarily prohibit interactions that people may have reason to engage in. I propose an alternative policy that remedies these problems with the affirmative consent policies that are currently being implemented. And I note that the justification for this alternative policy does not turn on any special features of the university setting. Instead, the account I give suggests grounds for reforming the law as well.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document