Sampled Fictitious Play on Networks

2019 ◽  
pp. 33-44
Author(s):  
Alexander Nikolaev ◽  
Alexander Semenov ◽  
Eduardo L. Pasiliao
Keyword(s):  
Fictitious Play

Fictitious Play Property for Games with Identical Interests

1996 ◽  
Vol 68 (1) ◽  
pp. 258-265 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dov Monderer ◽  
Lloyd S. Shapley
Keyword(s):  
Fictitious Play

scholarly journals Sampled fictitious play is Hannan consistent

2018 ◽  
Vol 109 ◽  
pp. 401-412
Author(s):  
Zifan Li ◽  
Ambuj Tewari
Keyword(s):  
Fictitious Play

scholarly journals A fictitious play-based response strategy for multistage intrusion defense systems

2013 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 473-491 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yi Luo ◽  
Ferenc Szidarovszky ◽  
Youssif Al-Nashif ◽  
Salim Hariri
Keyword(s):  
Response Strategy ◽  
Fictitious Play ◽  
Defense Systems

The dynamic demand game: a Markov state fictitious play approach to a two-echelon supply chain problem under demand uncertainty

2012 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 319 ◽  
Author(s):  
Diana G. Ramí ◽  
N.A. rez ◽  
Julio Mario Daza Escorcia ◽  
Javier Visbal Martinez ◽  
Carlos D. Paternina Arboleda ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Demand Uncertainty ◽  
Fictitious Play ◽  
Dynamic Demand ◽  
Markov State ◽  
Chain Problem

scholarly journals On Randomized Fictitious Play for Approximating Saddle Points over Convex Sets

2013 ◽  
pp. 65-76 ◽  
Author(s):  
Khaled Elbassioni ◽  
Kazuhisa Makino ◽  
Kurt Mehlhorn ◽  
Fahimeh Ramezani
Keyword(s):  
Convex Sets ◽  
Saddle Points ◽  
Fictitious Play

Classes of Potential Games

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
João P. Hespanha
Keyword(s):  
Resource Allocation ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Potential Games ◽  
Congestion Games ◽  
Fictitious Play ◽  
Resource Allocation Problem ◽  
Distributed Resource Allocation ◽  
Symmetric Games ◽  
The Cost

This chapter discusses several classes of potential games that are common in the literature and how to derive the Nash equilibrium for such games. It first considers identical interests games and dummy games before turning to decoupled games and bilateral symmetric games. It then describes congestion games, in which all players are equal, in the sense that the cost associated with each resource only depends on the total number of players using that resource and not on which players use it. It also presents other potential games, including the Sudoku puzzle, and goes on to analyze the distributed resource allocation problem, the computation of Nash equilibria for potential games, and fictitious play. It concludes with practice exercises and their corresponding solutions, along with additional exercises.

scholarly journals Valuable Cheap Talk and Equilibrium Selection

Games ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 34 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julian Jamison
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Formal Model ◽  
Equilibrium Selection ◽  
Cheap Talk ◽  
Fictitious Play ◽  
Meaningful Communication

Intuitively, we expect that players who are allowed to engage in costless communication before playing a game would be foolish to agree on an inefficient outcome amongst the set of equilibria. At the same time, however, such preplay communication has been suggested as a rationale for expecting Nash equilibria in general. This paper presents a plausible formal model of cheap talk that distinguishes and resolves these possibilities. Players are assumed to have an unlimited opportunity to send messages before playing an arbitrary game. Using an extension of fictitious play beliefs, minimal assumptions are made concerning which messages about future actions are credible and hence contribute to final beliefs. In this environment, it is shown that meaningful communication among players leads to a Nash equilibrium (NE) of the action game. Within the set of NE, efficiency then turns out to be a consequence of imposing optimality on the cheap talk portion of the extended game. This finding contrasts with previous “babbling” results.

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