Classes of Potential Games

Author(s):  
João P. Hespanha

This chapter discusses several classes of potential games that are common in the literature and how to derive the Nash equilibrium for such games. It first considers identical interests games and dummy games before turning to decoupled games and bilateral symmetric games. It then describes congestion games, in which all players are equal, in the sense that the cost associated with each resource only depends on the total number of players using that resource and not on which players use it. It also presents other potential games, including the Sudoku puzzle, and goes on to analyze the distributed resource allocation problem, the computation of Nash equilibria for potential games, and fictitious play. It concludes with practice exercises and their corresponding solutions, along with additional exercises.

Games ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 34 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julian Jamison

Intuitively, we expect that players who are allowed to engage in costless communication before playing a game would be foolish to agree on an inefficient outcome amongst the set of equilibria. At the same time, however, such preplay communication has been suggested as a rationale for expecting Nash equilibria in general. This paper presents a plausible formal model of cheap talk that distinguishes and resolves these possibilities. Players are assumed to have an unlimited opportunity to send messages before playing an arbitrary game. Using an extension of fictitious play beliefs, minimal assumptions are made concerning which messages about future actions are credible and hence contribute to final beliefs. In this environment, it is shown that meaningful communication among players leads to a Nash equilibrium (NE) of the action game. Within the set of NE, efficiency then turns out to be a consequence of imposing optimality on the cheap talk portion of the extended game. This finding contrasts with previous “babbling” results.


Author(s):  
U. Tejasvi ◽  
R. D. Eithiraj ◽  
S. Balakrishnan

Problems can be handled properly in game theory as long as a countable number of players are considered, whereas, in real life, we have a large number of players. Hence, games at the thermodynamic limit are analyzed in general. There is a one-to-one correspondence between classical games and the modeled Hamiltonian at a particular equilibrium condition, usually the Nash equilibrium. Such a correspondence is arrived for symmetric games, namely the Prisoner’s Dilemma using the Ising Hamiltonian. In this work, we have shown that another class of games known as potential games can be analyzed with the Ising Hamiltonian. Analysis of this work brings out very close observation with real-world scenarios. In other words, the model of a potential game studied using Ising Hamiltonian predicts behavioral aspects of a large population precisely.


Author(s):  
Martijn H. H. Schoot Uiterkamp ◽  
Marco E. T. Gerards ◽  
Johann L. Hurink

In the resource allocation problem (RAP), the goal is to divide a given amount of a resource over a set of activities while minimizing the cost of this allocation and possibly satisfying constraints on allocations to subsets of the activities. Most solution approaches for the RAP and its extensions allow each activity to have its own cost function. However, in many applications, often the structure of the objective function is the same for each activity, and the difference between the cost functions lies in different parameter choices, such as, for example, the multiplicative factors. In this article, we introduce a new class of objective functions that captures a significant number of the objectives occurring in studied applications. These objectives are characterized by a shared structure of the cost function depending on two input parameters. We show that, given the two input parameters, there exists a solution to the RAP that is optimal for any choice of the shared structure. As a consequence, this problem reduces to the quadratic RAP, making available the vast amount of solution approaches and algorithms for the latter problem. We show the impact of our reduction result on several applications, and in particular, we improve the best-known worst-case complexity bound of two problems in vessel routing and processor scheduling from [Formula: see text] to [Formula: see text]. Summary of Contribution: The resource allocation problem (RAP) with submodular constraints and its special cases are classic problems in operations research. Because these problems are studied in many different scientific disciplines, many conceptual insights, structural properties, and solution approaches have been reinvented and rediscovered many times. The goal of this article is to reduce the amount of future reinventions and rediscoveries by bringing together these different perspectives on RAPs in a way that is accessible to researchers with different backgrounds. The article serves as an exposition on RAPs and on their wide applicability in many areas, including telecommunications, energy, and logistics. In particular, we provide tools and examples that can be used to formulate and solve problems in these areas as RAPs. To accomplish this, we make three concrete contributions. First, we provide a survey on algorithms and complexity results for RAPs and discuss several recent advances in these areas. Second, we show that many objectives for RAPs can be reduced to a (simpler) quadratic objective function, which makes available the extensive collection of fast and efficient algorithms for quadratic RAPs to solve these problems. Third, we discuss the impact that RAPs and the aforementioned reduction result can make in several application areas.


Author(s):  
Jihun Park ◽  
Dongwon Seo ◽  
Gwangui Hong ◽  
Donghwan Shin ◽  
Jimin Hwa ◽  
...  

Software planning is very important for the success of a software project. Even if the same developers work on the same project, the time span of the project and the quality of software may change based on the project plan. When software managers plan a software project, they strive to allocate human resources in a more efficient way to produce a better software with less cost. The planning process is, however, time-consuming and complicated, especially when the size of the software project is large. Many approaches have been proposed to help software project managers by providing optimal human resource allocations in terms of minimizing the cost. Previous approaches, however, only concentrated on minimizing the cost, and no existing works have considered the practical issues affecting project schedules in practice. We elicited the practical considerations relating to the human resource allocation problem through discussions with a group of software project experts. The practical considerations can affect the project schedule in practice, but their importance has not been taken into consideration in previous approaches. Reflecting the practical considerations, we propose an approach for solving the human resource allocation problem using a genetic algorithm (GA). We compare our approach to an approach that only considers minimization of the time span. Our evaluation shows that the proposed algorithm considers the practical considerations well, in terms of continuous allocation on relevant tasks, minimization of developer multitasking time, and balance of allocation. We also conducted a survey targeting software developers and managers, and the responses showed that practical considerations are as important as minimizing the cost, and our approach would be helpful to software managers. We also investigate the effect of weight factors and coefficient between sub-scores, and find that it is difficult to consider some practical considerations at the same time.


2019 ◽  
Vol 07 (02) ◽  
pp. 119-136
Author(s):  
Hongbing Zhou ◽  
Weiyong Yu ◽  
Peng Yi ◽  
Yiguang Hong

In this paper, we consider a distributed resource allocation problem with communication limitation. We propose a gradient-descent algorithm to solve the distributed resource allocation problem with quantization mechanism due to the communication limitations or in order to reduce the communication cost in the network. With carefully selected parameters, the convergence and correctness of the quantized algorithm can be obtained for fixed communication topologies and moreover, extended to switching jointly connected topologies. The exact optimal value can be obtained, which is different from some existing works, whose convergence accuracies were limited by the quantization bandwidth. In addition, the data rate of the proposed algorithm is also analyzed for both fixed and switching communication networks. Particularly, in the fixed topology case, we obtain that 1 bit is sufficient to solve the distributed problem with the proposed algorithm.


2012 ◽  
Vol 22 (04) ◽  
pp. 1250014
Author(s):  
DOMINIC DUMRAUF ◽  
BURKHARD MONIEN

We determine the complexity of computing pure Nash equilibria in restricted network congestion games. Restricted network congestion games are network congestion games, where for each player there exits a set of edges which he is not allowed to use. Rosenthal's potential function guarantees the existence of a Nash Equilibrium. We show that computing a Nash equilibrium in a restricted network congestion game with two players is [Formula: see text]-complete, using a tight reduction from MAXCUT. The result holds for directed networks and for undirected networks.


1999 ◽  
Vol 01 (03n04) ◽  
pp. 283-299 ◽  
Author(s):  
MARK VOORNEVELD ◽  
PETER BORM ◽  
FREEK VAN MEGEN ◽  
STEF TIJS ◽  
GIOVANNI FACCHINI

In congestion games, players use facilities from a common pool. The benefit that a player derives from using a facility depends, possibly among other things, on the number of users of this facility. The paper gives an easy alternative proof of the isomorphism between exact potential games and the set of congestion games introduced by Rosenthal (1973). It clarifies the relations between existing models on congestion games, and studies a class of congestion games where the sets of Nash equilibria, strong Nash equilibria and potential-maximising strategies coincide. Particular emphasis is on the computation of potential-maximising strategies.


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