A Formalization of the Slippery Slope Argument

We are often warned against stepping onto ‘slippery slopes’ — dangerously slick slides leading down to where the really bad stuff lies. But, as Arthur Miller here explains, these warnings often exaggerate the risk of a slip.

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The psychological mechanism of the slippery slope argument

Journal of Memory and Language ◽

10.1016/j.jml.2010.10.002 ◽

2011 ◽

Vol 64 (2) ◽

pp. 133-152 ◽

Cited By ~ 44

Author(s):

Adam Corner ◽

Ulrike Hahn ◽

Mike Oaksford

Keyword(s):

Slippery Slope ◽

Slippery Slope Argument ◽

Psychological Mechanism

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The Slippery Slope Argument in the Ethical Debate on Genetic Engineering of Humans

Science and Engineering Ethics ◽

10.1007/s11948-016-9861-3 ◽

2016 ◽

Vol 23 (6) ◽

pp. 1507-1528 ◽

Cited By ~ 9

Author(s):

Douglas Walton

Keyword(s):

Genetic Engineering ◽

Slippery Slope ◽

Ethical Debate ◽

Slippery Slope Argument

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The Standing is Slippery

Philosophy ◽

10.1017/s0031819104000440 ◽

2004 ◽

Vol 79 (4) ◽

pp. 553-572 ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

Michael J. Wreen

Keyword(s):

Primitive Streak ◽

Slippery Slope ◽

Cutoff Point ◽

Critical Examination ◽

Slippery Slope Argument ◽

Correct Form ◽

The One ◽

General Objection

This paper is a critical examination of the so-called slippery slope argument for the conservative position on abortion. The argument was discussed in the philosophic literature some time back, but has since fallen into disfavor.The argument is first exposed and a general objection to it is advanced, then rebutted. Rosalind Hursthouse's more detailed and stronger objection is next aired, but also found less than convincing. In the course of discussing her objection, the correct form of the argument is identified, and it's noted that rejection of the argument requires finding fault with its inductive premise. That, in turn, requires either (a) identifying and defending a cutoff point other than conception, or (b) not identifying a cutoff point but directly attacking the argument's conclusion. As far as (a) is concerned, all except one alternative cutoff point have severe problems that have been well discussed in the literature. The one that doesn't, the appearance of the ‘primitive streak’, is examined in detailed, but ultimately rejected. As for (b), five different grounds for rejecting the conclusion are identified and discussed, but none is found plausible.Variations on the slippery slope argument, concerning different conclusions that it may have, are then distinguished, related to each other, and critically discussed, and the paper ends with some cautionary remarks about the defense of the argument tendered.

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Intertemporal Disagreement and Empirical Slippery Slope Arguments

Utilitas ◽

10.1017/s0953820810000087 ◽

2010 ◽

Vol 22 (2) ◽

pp. 184-197 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

THOMAS DOUGLAS

Keyword(s):

Standard Form ◽

Prima Facie ◽

Slippery Slope ◽

Slippery Slope Arguments ◽

Slippery Slope Argument ◽

Prima Facie Reason ◽

The Future

One prevalent type of slippery slope argument has the following form: (1) by doing some initial act now, we will bring it about that we subsequently do some more extreme version of this act, and (2) we should not bring it about that we do this further act, therefore (3) we should not do the initial act. Such arguments are frequently regarded as mistaken, often on the grounds that they rely on speculative or insufficiently strong empirical premises. In this article I point out another location at which these arguments may go wrong: I argue that, in their standard form, the truth of their empirical premises constitutes evidence for the falsity of their normative premises. If we will, as predicted, do the further act in the future, this gives us at least a prima facie reason to believe that the performance of this further act would be good, and thus something we should try to bring about. I end by briefly assessing the dialectic implications of my argument. I delineate a subset of slippery slope arguments against which my objection may be decisive, consider how the proponents of such arguments may evade my objection by adding further premises, and examine the likely plausibility of these additional premises.

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