scholarly journals Intertemporal Disagreement and Empirical Slippery Slope Arguments

Utilitas ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 184-197 ◽  
Author(s):  
THOMAS DOUGLAS

One prevalent type of slippery slope argument has the following form: (1) by doing some initial act now, we will bring it about that we subsequently do some more extreme version of this act, and (2) we should not bring it about that we do this further act, therefore (3) we should not do the initial act. Such arguments are frequently regarded as mistaken, often on the grounds that they rely on speculative or insufficiently strong empirical premises. In this article I point out another location at which these arguments may go wrong: I argue that, in their standard form, the truth of their empirical premises constitutes evidence for the falsity of their normative premises. If we will, as predicted, do the further act in the future, this gives us at least a prima facie reason to believe that the performance of this further act would be good, and thus something we should try to bring about. I end by briefly assessing the dialectic implications of my argument. I delineate a subset of slippery slope arguments against which my objection may be decisive, consider how the proponents of such arguments may evade my objection by adding further premises, and examine the likely plausibility of these additional premises.

2002 ◽  
Vol 61 (3) ◽  
pp. 545-550 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hallvard Lillehammer

In his recent book “Euthanasia, Ethics, and Public Policy”, John Keown puts forward two slippery slope arguments against the legalisation of voluntary euthanasia. One of these arguments claims that a defender of voluntary euthanasia is logically committed to the permissibility of non-voluntary euthanasia. This paper seeks to show that Keown’s argument either rests on a logical confusion or on a misunderstanding of the value of autonomy.


2015 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 273 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas Walton

Although studies have yielded a detailed taxonomy of types of slippery slope arguments, they have failed to identify a basic argumentation scheme that applies to all. Therefore, there is no way of telling whether a given argument is a slippery slope argument or not. This paper solves the problem by providing a basic argumentation scheme. The scheme is shown to fit a clear and easily comprehensible example of a slippery slope argument that strongly appears to be reasonable, something that has also been lacking.


1982 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 303-316 ◽  
Author(s):  
Trudy Govier

Slippery slope arguments are commonly thought to be fallacious. But is there a single fallacy which they all commit? A study of applied logic texts reveals competing diagnoses of the supposed error, and several recent authors take slippery slope arguments seriously. Clearly, there is room for comment. I shall give evidence of divergence on the question of what sort of argument constitutes a slippery slope, distinguish four different types of argument which have all been deemed to be slippery slopes, and contend that two of these types need involve no logical error.We find in textbook accounts three quite differently oriented treatments of slippery slope: conceptual — relating to vagueness and the ancient sorites paradox; precedential — relating to the need to treat similar cases consistently; and causal — relating to the avoidance of actions which will, or would be likely to, set off a series of undersirable events.


2013 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 33
Author(s):  
James Franklin

Both the traditional Aristotelian and modern symbolic approaches to logic have seen logic in terms of discrete symbol processing. Yet there are several kinds of argument whose validity depends on some topological notion of continuous variation, which is not well captured by discrete symbols. Examples include extrapolation and slippery slope arguments, sorites, fuzzy logic, and those involving closeness of possible worlds. It is argued that the natural first attempts to analyze these notions and explain their relation to reasoning fail, so that ignorance of their nature is profound.


2018 ◽  
Vol 44 (10) ◽  
pp. 657-660 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric Blackstone ◽  
Stuart J Youngner

In 1989, Susan Wolf convincingly warned of a troublesome consequence that should discourage any movement in American society towards physician-assisted death—a legal backlash against the gains made for limiting life-sustaining treatment. The authors demonstrate that this dire consequence did not come to pass. As physician-assisted suicide gains a foothold in USA and elsewhere, many other slippery slope arguments are being put forward. Although many of these speculations should be taken seriously, they do not justify halting the new practice. Instead, our courts, regulatory agencies, journalists, professional organisations and researchers should carefully monitor and study it as it unfolds, allowing continuous improvement just as our society has done in implementing the practice of limiting life-sustaining treatment.


Author(s):  
Claire Colebrook

What is the relationship between extinction and disability? As “we” face a future of resource-depletion, eco-system collapse, and runaway global warming, it might seem more urgent than ever to develop new forms of rationality and technology to allow us to survive. The conception of survival, or living-on, is at the heart of Derrida’s deconstruction, as is an inherently promissory account of time and experience. In the spirit of deconstruction, this chapter looks at the ways in which ability, capacity, and radically future promising are intertwined with an inflated and unsustainable mode of existence. Just as extinction threats pose necessary questions to the present regarding what life or lives will survive into the future, so the legacy of philosophy’s past and conditions pose questions as to the forms of life that have been granted a prima facie right to survival.


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