Attempts at Reaching a Multilateral Agreement on Migration: A Synoptic History

AbstractThe Chemical Weapons Convention remains a landmark international treaty. It was the first multilateral agreement to ban an entire class of weapons of mass destruction and include a strict verification regime to monitor compliance. Scientists were not only deeply engaged in the negotiation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, but have been central to the life of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) ever since it came into existence almost 20 years ago. Over that time, during which the OPCW focused primarily on its mission to oversee the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles, the organization has relied on a very committed core of scientific expertise – from within and outside – to help guide it. As that core task comes to a close, the Organization faces a new challenge: ensuring that chemical weapons do not return. Meeting that challenge will require new approaches to the OPCW’s mission.

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Post JCPOA

Jurnal ICMES ◽

10.35748/jurnalicmes.v3i1.42 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 3 (1) ◽

pp. 27-52

Author(s):

Muhammad Halil Rahim

Keyword(s):

Time Pressure ◽

Analytical Framework ◽

Coercive Diplomacy ◽

Multilateral Agreement ◽

Pull Out ◽

The U.S

This paper analyzes the effectiveness of U.S.’ coercive diplomacy policy towards Iran carried out through the (re)implementation of sanctions regime after its withdrawal from the so called multilateral agreement ‘JCPOA’ on 8 May 2018. Unsatisfied with the terms of the Agreement, the U.S. administration decided to pull out from the Agreement and immediately implemented sanctions regime against Tehran. Despite the significance of previous studies regarding U.S.’ implementation of sanctions against Iran, I did not found any study that used a specific theory to indicate factors or conditions favoring the success of U.S. sanctions against Iran. In particular, I did not found any literature that analyzes the effectiveness U.S.’ sanctions against Iran after its withdrawal from JCPOA using a specific theory. This paper will fill that gap in the literature by examining the case study using a theory-driven research. The Analytical framework that I apply in this paper is coercive diplomacy theory developed by Tom Sauer which I elaborate into five main variables: objective, demand, threat, time-pressure, and motivation. By examining those factors, this paper argues that U.S.’ coercive diplomacy policy against Iran has been ineffective because of the lack of U.S.’ calculation and considerations to the five variables.This paper analyzes the effectiveness of U.S.’ coercive diplomacy policy towards Iran carried out through the (re)implementation of sanctions regime after its withdrawal from the so called multilateral agreement ‘JCPOA’ on 8 May 2018. Unsatisfied with the terms of the Agreement, the U.S. administration decided to pull out from the Agreement and immediately implemented sanctions regime against Tehran. Despite the significance of previous studies regarding U.S.’ implementation of sanctions against Iran, I did not found any study that used a specific theory to indicate factors or conditions favoring the success of U.S. sanctions against Iran. In particular, I did not found any literature that analyzes the effectiveness U.S.’ sanctions against Iran after its withdrawal from JCPOA using a specific theory. This paper will fill that gap in the literature by examining the case study using a theory-driven research. The Analytical framework that I apply in this paper is coercive diplomacy theory developed by Tom Sauer which I elaborate into five main variables: objective, demand, threat, time-pressure, and motivation. By examining those factors, this paper argues that U.S.’ coercive diplomacy policy against Iran has been ineffective because of the lack of U.S.’ calculation and considerations to the five variables.

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