Argument Strength in Probabilistic Argumentation Using Confirmation Theory

2021 ◽  
pp. 74-88
Author(s):  
Anthony Hunter
2018 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex O. Holcombe ◽  
Samuel J. Gershman

AbstractZwaan et al. and others discuss the importance of the inevitable differences between a replication experiment and the corresponding original experiment. But these discussions are not informed by a principled, quantitative framework for taking differences into account. Bayesian confirmation theory provides such a framework. It will not entirely solve the problem, but it will lead to new insights.


2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Revaz Kakubava

AbstractBy using a purely probabilistic argumentation, two theorems are proved. They simplify the existing methods of analysis for the {M/G/1} queuing system by means of the supplementary variables method.


2007 ◽  
Vol 101 (3) ◽  
pp. 739-753 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert C. Sinclair ◽  
Tanya K. Lovsin ◽  
Sean E. Moore

This study investigated the effects of mood state, issue involvement, and argument strength on responses to persuasive appeals. Through an unrelated second study paradigm, 144 introductory psychology students were randomly assigned to High or Low Issue Involvement, Happy or Sad Mood Inductions, and Strong or Weak Argument conditions. Attitudes, measured on 9-point Likert-type scales, and cognitive responses, measured through a thought listing, were assessed. On attitudes, people in the Happy Induction condition were equally persuaded by Strong and Weak Arguments, whereas people in the Sad Induction condition were persuaded by Strong, but not Weak, Arguments. Involvement had no effect. On the thought-listing measures, people in the Happy Induction condition showed modest elaboration. A stronger pattern of effects, consistent with high elaboration, was noted on the thought listings of people in the Sad Induction condition and who were in the High Involvement group. Interestingly, people in the Sad Induction condition who were in the Low Involvement group showed mood-congruency on thoughts. The data suggest that the effects of mood state are not moderated by the effects of issue Involvement on this measure of attitudes but that there may be some moderation on measures of elaboration. Implications and directions for research are discussed.


2015 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 345-382 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. M. Gabbay ◽  
O. Rodrigues

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keith Ransom ◽  
Amy Perfors ◽  
Danielle Navarro

Everyday reasoning requires more evidence than raw data alone can provide. We explore the idea that people can go beyond this data by reasoning about how the data was sampled. This idea is investigated through an examination of premise non‐monotonicity, in which adding premises to a category‐based argument weakens rather than strengthens it. Relevance theories explain this phenomenon in terms of people's sensitivity to the relationships among premise items. We show that a Bayesian model of category‐based induction taking premise sampling assumptions and category similarity into account complements such theories and yields two important predictions: First, that sensitivity to premise relationships can be violated by inducing a weak sampling assumption; and second, that premise monotonicity should be restored as a result. We test these predictions with an experiment that manipulates people's assumptions in this regard, showing that people draw qualitatively different conclusions in each case.


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