Factors influencing the update of beliefs regarding controversial political issues

When updating beliefs in light of new information, people preferentially integrate information that is consistent with their prior beliefs and helps them construe a coherent view of the world. Such a selective integration of new information likely contributes to belief polarisation and compromises public discourse. Therefore, it is crucial to understand the factors that underlie biased belief updating. To this end, I conducted three pre-registered experiments covering different controversial political issues (i.e., Experiment 1: climate change, Experiment 2: speed limit on highways, Experiment 3: immigration in relation to violent crime). The main hypothesis was that negative reappraisal of new information (referred to as “cognitive immunisation”) hinders belief updating. Support for this hypothesis was found only in Experiment 2. In all experiments, the magnitude of the prediction error (i.e., the discrepancy between prior beliefs and new information) was strongly related to belief updating. Across experiments, participants’ general attitudes regarding the respective issue influenced the strength of beliefs, but not their update. The present findings provide some indication that the engagement in cognitive immunisation can lead to the maintenance of beliefs despite disconfirming information. However, by far the largest association with belief updating was with the magnitude of the prediction error.

Belief Updating and Paranoia in Individuals with Schizophrenia

Background and Hypothesis: Persecutory delusions are among the most common delusions in schizophrenia and represent the extreme end of the paranoia continuum. Paranoia is accompanied by significant worry and distress. Identifying cognitive mechanisms underlying paranoia is critical for advancing treatment. We hypothesized that aberrant belief updating, which is related to paranoia in human and animal models, would also contribute to persecutory beliefs in individuals with schizophrenia. Study Design: Belief updating was assessed in 42 schizophrenia and 44 healthy participants, using a 3-option probabilistic reversal learning (3-PRL) task. Hierarchical Gaussian filter (HGF) was used to estimate computational parameters of belief updating. Paranoia was measured using the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS) and the revised Green et al. Paranoid Thoughts Scale (R-GPTS). Unusual thought content was measured with the Psychosis Symptom Rating Scale (PSYRATS) and the Peters et al. Delusions Inventory (PDI-21). Worry was measured using the Dunn Worry Questionnaire. Results: Consistent with prior work, paranoia was significantly associated with elevated win-switch rate, prior on volatility and sensitivity to volatility in both schizophrenia and across the whole sample. These relationships were specific to paranoia and did not extend to unusual thought content or measures of anxiety. We did, however, find a significant indirect effect of paranoia on the relationship between prior beliefs about volatility and worry. Conclusions: This work provides evidence that relationships between belief updating parameters and paranoia extend to schizophrenia, may be specific to persecutory beliefs, and contribute to theoretical models implicating worry in the maintenance of persecutory delusions.

Reduced precision underwrites ego dissolution and therapeutic outcomes under psychedelics

Evidence suggests classic psychedelics reduce the precision of belief updating and enable access to a range of alternate hypotheses that underwrite how we make sense of the world. This process, in the higher cortices, has been postulated to explain the therapeutic efficacy of psychedelics for the treatment of internalising disorders. We argue reduced precision also underpins change to consciousness, known as ‘ego dissolution’, and that alterations to consciousness and attention under psychedelics have a common mechanism of reduced precision of Bayesian belief updating. Evidence connecting the role of serotonergic receptors to large-scale connectivity changes in the cortex suggests the precision of Bayesian belief updating may be a mechanism to modify and investigate consciousness and attention.

Contested science: Individuals with higher metacognitive insight into interpretation of evidence are less likely to polarize

Societal polarization over contested science has increased in recent years. To explain this development, political, sociological, and psychological research has identified societal macro-phenomena as well as cognitive micro-level factors that explain how citizens reason about the science. Here we take a radically different perspective, and highlight the effects of metacognition: How citizens reason about their own reasoning. Leveraging methods from Signal Detection Theory, we investigated the importance of metacognitive insight for polarization for the heavily contested topic of climate change, and the less heavily contested topic of nanotechnology. We found that, for climate change (but not for nanotechnology), higher insight into the accuracy of own interpretations of the available scientific evidence related to a lower likelihood of polarization over the science. This finding held irrespective of the direction of the scientific evidence (endorsing or rejecting anthropogenicity of climate change). Furthermore, the polarizing effect of scientific evidence could be traced back to higher metacognitive insight fostering belief-updating in the direction of the evidence at the expense of own, prior beliefs. By demonstrating how metacognition links to polarization, the present research adds to our understanding of the drivers of societal polarization over science.